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This dissertation examines the instrumental benefits of civil society discourse 
for Muslim civil society organizations and their pursuit of conservative agendas.  
Since early 1990, informal religious communities in the Muslim world have been 
reestablishing themselves as formal NGOs at unprecedented rates. Additionally, they 
are joining forces and forming transnational coalitions.  The constituents’ goals of 
religious support and solidarity remain unchanged in terms of their commitment to 
conservative and religious norms.  By contrast, existing transnational civil society 
literature is dominated with assumptions of liberal and secular agendas.  Yet, despite 
the seemingly inherent contradiction, the members of these faith-based organizations 
and coalitions persistently position themselves within the sphere of civil society.  This 
dissertation problematizes this conflict and asks: Why are the previously informal 
Islamist networks adopting the discourse of civil society, transforming into formal 
NGOs, and establishing transnational coalitions? 
In this study, I examine one of the largest Muslim NGO coalitions to date - the 
Union of the NGOs of the Islamic World (UNIW).  With its 193 member NGOs from 
46 countries, the UNIW aims to consolidate faith-based Muslim NGOs and to 
coordinate member actions for the welfare of Muslim communities around the world.  
Based on fieldwork conducted in Turkey, Germany, the U.S., Malaysia and 
Cambodia, I employ qualitative and ethnographic methods and draw on diverse 
sources of data including in-depth interviews, participant observation and document 
analysis. 
My findings suggest that framing this transnational religious solidarity project 
as a transnational civil society network provides Islamist groups additional channels 
of power. Specifically, previously informal communities find opportunities to 
increase their social capital through membership in a transnational coalition, engage 
in mutually profitable relationships with states, and claim legitimacy as global 
political actors. The empirical findings of the dissertation challenge several 
assumptions of the constructivist and sociological institutionalist literature. These 
perspectives’ contributions to the study of transnational advocacy networks, 
international NGOs, and transnational NGO coalitions have prioritized ideational and 
normative concerns over instrumental and interest-based motivations in transnational 
non-state actor politics. In this dissertation I argue that ideational motivations of 
transnational non-state actors regularly intersect with instrumental concerns. By 
demonstrating the instrumental motivations of norm-oriented networks, this 
dissertation moves beyond the instrumental/ideational divide that permeates the 
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Note on spellings and transliteration  
 
 
I transliterated the Arabic terms in this dissertation using a slightly modified version 
of the system used by the International Journal of Middle East Studies. I wrote the 
non-English words in the most familiar form, to the extent possible, for example: 
Qur’an, hadith, waqf, sadaqa. In the interests of simplicity and accessibility, I used 
the transliterations of Arabic words without diacritics above and below the letters. 
However, I retained the ‘ayn character ( ‘ ). 
  
I italicized only the first occurrence of a foreign word. I provided short translations in 























Civil society is the rising currency today. If we are to be taken seriously, if 
the voice of the Muslim world is going to be heard in international platforms, 
we have to be civil society organizations and networks. Who listens 
community leaders, let alone religious figures at the UN anymore?1 
 
The quote above is typical of what I heard repeatedly throughout the fieldwork 
between 2008 and 2011, studying one of the largest Islamic NGO coalitions: the 
Union of the NGOs of the Islamic World.  UNIW is a transnational network of 
Muslim NGOs from all corners of the globe. Its foremost concern is the “dispersed, 
disintegrated, and poverty stricken” state of the Umma – the global Muslim 
community. According to its leaders, the only way to help serve Islam’s “revival, 
welfare and future” is to unite Muslim populations around the world by consolidating 
Muslim NGOs under one roof. 
Launched in 2005 in Turkey, UNIW today has 193 member NGOs from 46 
countries. All members of the UNIW are faith-based organizations: they were 
founded by Muslims, their mission statements explicitly identify Islamic doctrine or 
tradition as their ideological framework, their agendas focus on the mobilization of 
Muslim populations, and their activities are exclusively aimed at Muslim persons or 
groups. The members of UNIW mostly work in humanitarian relief, social aid, 
development, education, and religious socialization. UNIW, as an umbrella 
organization, facilitates communication, interaction, and information flow among its 
members; monitors crisis regions in the ‘Islamic World’, raises awareness about the 
                                                
1 Interviewee 7, (UNIW Deputy Secretary General), personal interview by author, September 4, 2009. 
 2 
issues of Muslim populations around the globe; and mobilizes its members towards 
collective solutions.   
During the initial stages of the project, I endlessly surveyed the academic 
literature and policy reports about Islamic organizations and networks; read UNIW’s 
annual reports and bulletins; analyzed the UNIW’s member NGOs’ mission 
statements and project descriptions. The prevalence of references to Islam, and the 
overwhelming emphasis on religious solidarity in all of these documents led me to the 
assumption that this dissertation’s center of analysis would be the role of religion in 
transnational Muslim NGO networks. This assumption was not unwarranted: The 
integration of faith into development and humanitarian sectors is indeed a growing 
field in the academic literature and development practice since mid-1990s.  
I went on the first phase of my fieldwork in June-August 2008 with a clear focus 
on the role of religious faith. For three months, I asked my interviewees questions 
probing how they put religious faith into practice in their projects. My interview 
subjects did talk about Islam and used a religious framework to explain their 
missions, projects, and goals. Yet, religious faith did not appear as UNIW’s 
organizing principle. I returned from that first trip confused and frustrated. As I kept 
transcribing the interviews, I was struck by UNIW members’ insistence on framing 
this global religious solidarity project as a civil society initiative. The interviewees 
talked frequently about the importance of civil society in contemporary politics: How 
“civil society is the rising currency in world politics today.” It was during the later 
stages of the fieldwork when I realized that this is a story about civil society rather 
than religion. 
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UNIW is a faith-based Muslim NGO coalition that is motivated by religious 
normative goals. UNIW’s and its member NGOs’ leaders, members and volunteers 
are driven by the goal of global religious solidarity. UNIW is not different than 
previous Islamic networks and alliances in its emphasis on Islamic consolidation 
through religious revival. However, they are strikingly different than their 
predecessors as they forcefully emphasize their civil society character. UNIW’s 
leaders assert that the coalition is ‘the first global Islamic civil society coalition’ 
rather than a global religious solidarity network. The leaders of UNIW’s member 
NGOs argue that they are civil society organizations and not religious communitarian 
movements. This prompts the central question of this dissertation: Why are the 
previously informal Islamist groups transforming into formal NGOs and establishing 
formal coalitions? More specifically, why does UNIW, effectively a religious 
solidarity alliance, adopt the discourse and organizational structures of the civil 
society framework?  
I demonstrate in this dissertation that this is a strategic decision. I argue that the 
civil society identity and discourse provide these groups additional channels of power 
by increasing their social and organizational capital, by opening inroads to mutually 
beneficial relationships with states and governments, and by allowing them to claim 
legitimacy as political actors in the transnational political sphere. The empirical 
findings of the dissertation challenge several assumptions of the constructivist and 
sociological institutionalist literature. Both perspectives have been prolific in 
demonstrating the ways in which ideational factors such as norms, values, and beliefs 
supersede interest-based concerns in the formation and sustenance of transnational 
 4 
non-state actors. While I do not subscribe to the purely interest-based perspective of 
realism, I argue that ideational motivations of transnational non-state actors regularly 
intersect with instrumental concerns. By demonstrating the instrumental motivations 
of norm-oriented networks, this dissertation moves beyond the 
instrumental/ideational divide that permeates the literature on transnational non-state 
actors.  
 
Background of the debate: Is it… or isn’t it? 
 
“But all they do is service work; are they even civil society?” is the question I 
heard most frequently over the last two years anytime I discussed my work in 
academic circles. Herein lies the assumption of the dominant perspectives on civil 
society that the primary task of civil society is political advocacy. Emerging in the 
late 1970s and 1980s as an agent of resistance to the totalitarian regimes in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe, this perspective conceptualizes civil society as an 
autonomous platform that is independent from the state, and in search of democratic 
and long-term solutions to social problems. A la Vaclav Havel, the proponents of this 
perspective assume that civil society is a sphere of action that restrains state power, 
safeguards individual rights and freedoms, and struggles to materialize active 
citizenship.  
“Are Islam and civil society even compatible?” is the question UNIW executives 
hear most frequently anytime they claim their identity as civil society actors. Herein 
lies the second assumption of civil society perspectives pertinent to this study: that 
the idea of an Islamic civil society is an oxymoron because Islam has a totalistic set of 
beliefs and values which does not allow pluralism, liberalism, and self-autonomy. 
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According to this perspective, civil society is a ‘Western dream’ (Mardin 2006) that 
emerged from the particular historical and political conditions of Western Europe, 
and thus, has little or no analytical utility in in the Muslim world (Monshipouri 1997: 
57). Rooted in the essentialist assumptions of Orientalist scholarship, this perspective 
considers Islam as a total way of life that infuses every aspect of daily life, 
institutions, and organization systems. Therefore, the proponents of this perspective 
argue that the existence of civil society and its institutional arrangements in an 
Islamic society is impossible.  How legitimate are these questions? 
First, the statement that the majority of UNIW’s member organizations are 
humanitarian/social aid/development NGOs that mainly work in service provision has 
a basis. Most organizations run orphan care programs in war zones and poverty 
stricken areas, distribute food and clothing in crisis regions, establish mobile and 
temporary soup kitchens, organize fast-breaking dinner deliveries and animal 
sacrifices, drill wells and canals in water shortage areas, provide religious education 
to children and teenagers, give educational scholarships, run vocational training 
programs, and provide health services. Taken together, the largest portion of UNIW’s 
member base is indeed service provision organizations.  
However, the assumption that service work is not political, therefore these 
organizations cannot be considered civil society actors, does not stand on as firm a 
ground. Humanitarian action has always been a form of politics for which the 
pretense of being impartial and neutral, therefore non-political was essential (Leader 
2000: 3). In the social aid/charity system, the very decision about which population to 
help, with what kind of projects, funded by whom, involve ideological reasoning and 
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political strategy for all non-governmental organizations, be it faith-based or non-
faith based. UNIW’s member organizations are Muslim faith-based NGOs, which are 
funded by Muslims, helping exclusively Muslim populations with projects whose 
ideological framework is derived from Islamic doctrine or tradition. Therefore, 
ideology and politics are involved in every aspect of their practice.  
Additionally, the “harmless façade” of humanitarian action allows organizations 
to maneuver within a wider range of politics. The best example of how humanitarian 
frame lends itself to effective political action is the May 2010 “Freedom Flotilla” 
mission where one of UNIW’s largest members, a humanitarian relief organization, 
orchestrated an overt political action against Gaza’s blockade by attempting to deliver 
10,000 tons of supplies to Palestinians. The very reason why this operation could be 
launched in the first place was that it was organized by a humanitarian organization 
delivering humanitarian aid. Yet, it was direct political action in purpose and effect, 
since the primary goal was to bring the blockade under the spotlight in the 
international arena.  
It should also be noted that while most member organizations of UNIW work in 
service provision, UNIW itself mobilizes the collective power of its members towards 
global political advocacy. It works against Islamophobia; monitors the human rights 
violations in crisis areas such as Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, East Turkistan, and 
Kashmir among others; raises awareness about the humanitarian conditions of 
Muslim populations; and mobilizes its members towards solutions. In doing, UNIW 
acts as a global advocacy group on behalf of Muslim populations around the world. 
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The ideological commitments of UNIW are evident in its discourse, activities and 
objectives. Its mission statement has all the components of a successful mobilizing 
frame: injustice, identity, and agency. Its executives and members argue that due to 
the subjugating, disintegrating, and exploiting politics of Western hegemony and 
colonialism, the Muslim World is in ruins today. They claim that the only solution is 
to mobilize Islamic agency by consolidating the civil initiatives of the Muslim World 
to speak in one voice. They repeatedly state that they are disillusioned by state-
initiated Islamic solidarity projects and that it is only the collective civil stance that 
can overcome the social, economic, and political infirmities the Muslim world faces. 
In that sense, the very existence of UNIW is the product of a political stance.  
 
1.1 Research Questions 
 
“Whether Islam and civil society are compatible?”, “Does Islam allow 
pluralism?”, “Can service organizations be considered civil society actors”, and 
“Where do we draw the line between overt and covert civil society politics?” are 
questions that have been discussed at length in the academic literature on Islam, civil 
society and non-governmental organizations. Yet, I argue that it is an unproductive 
exercise because these discussions sidestep the key issue that this dissertation tackles: 
Why do the organizations themselves and the UNIW claim to be civil society actors? 
Therefore, the central question of this project is: 
 
Why are the previously informal Islamist networks transforming into formal 








1. How do we explain the insistence of UNIW, which is in effect a transnational 
religious solidarity project, on framing itself as a global civil society initiative?  
 
2. What kind of benefits does the civil society frame provide to UNIW and its 
member NGOs?  
 
3. How do UNIW and its member NGOs negotiate the religious framework of an 
Islamic solidarity network and the liberal framework of the civil society discourse?  
 
 
I argue that the fact that these actors assert their civil society character is more 
telling than whether or not they fit into the already contested definitions of civil 
society actors. I demonstrate in this dissertation that framing this transnational 
religious solidarity project as a transnational civil society initiative provides Islamist 
groups unprecedented channels of power. The previously informal communities find 
opportunities to increase their social capital through membership in a transnational 
coalition, they find access to cooperative relationships with states and governments, 
and claim legitimacy as global political actors.  
 
1.2 Theoretical Considerations 
Here, constructivist scholarship of the international relations literature and 
sociological institutionalism lend some insights. Both sociological institutionalism 
and constructivism have been very influential in putting transnational politics and the 
power of non-state actors under the spotlight. In reaction to the interest-based 
perspectives in sociology and international relations, sociological institutionalism and 
constructivism have called attention to the power of culture, norms, global scripts, 
and identities in transnational politics.  
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Sociological institutionalism’s argument that world cultural principles yield 
similar forms and structures across the globe is particularly significant in explaining 
the spread of isomorphic NGO structures in diverse parts of the world irrespective of 
domestic characteristics. The international development aid system is particularly 
influential in shifting the emphasis from states to ‘civil society’. International policy 
makers, development agencies and international institutions, such as the European 
Union, USAID, World Bank, and the British Department for International 
Development, regularly emphasize strengthening civil society organizations in 
developing countries to promote political empowerment and democratic 
consolidation. Yet, they endorse a particular form of civil society composed of non-
governmental and non-profit organizations that take over functions hitherto reserved 
for the state including providing health and education services, instituting income-
generating schemes, and creating safety nets to alleviate poverty. Accordingly, these 
institutions exclusively work with organizations that fit into the Western associational 
forms (Nelson 2000: 417) or  who are “willing to transform themselves to the 
required format” (Seckinelgin 2000: 373).  
This shift in emphasis from states to ‘civil society’ has resulted in the 
mushrooming of non-governmental organizations in all corners of the world. These 
organizations incorporate formal structural elements that are externally legitimated 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977), take upon similar activities in similar kind of project 
forms, and become increasingly homogenous in their “structure, culture and output” 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1991: 64). The majority of UNIW’s member organizations are 
fairly young organizations that caught the NGO wind in 1990s. They model 
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themselves after the organizations they consider successful; adopt similar projects, 
strategies, and governance structures; and use identical elements of the civil society 
discourse such as ‘democracy’, ‘good governance’, and ‘participation’. 
The civil society blueprint does not only deliver development aid, but also 
political legitimacy to both states and non-state actors. The civil society concept has 
its roots in classical antiquity, yet its meaning and significance have altered 
depending on historical conditions and the type of political authority (Kaldor 2003: 
16). The concept evolved from a rule of law and a state of ‘civility’, to the hegemony 
of bourgeois rule, to an agent of resistance against totalitarian states, and gained its 
key role as a guarantor of participatory democracy and active citizenship. Today, it is 
distinctively characterized as an indispensable ‘third force’ which is able to organize 
itself, functions outside the state and ensures democratic stability and regime 
accountability by keeping the state’s operations in check.  
Thus, the civil society idea has completed its life-cycle and now is taken for 
granted as an essential element of any legitimate political regime. Therefore, it is 
imperative for collective actors to claim that they are civil society organizations in 
order to claim legitimacy in the political arena. Similarly, it is imperative for country 
regimes to establish that they have strong and vibrant civil societies. The existence of 
a perceivable civil society allows regimes to claim legitimate governance rather than 
unlawful authority. It is not important that most of those regimes in question do not 
allow any dissidence in politics. Nor does it matter that half of these organizations do 
not fit into the conventional definitions of civil society. Best expressed by a UNIW 
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executive: “civil society is the rising currency of politics today”. In other words, if 
civil society is what is required, civil society is what we have.  
Constructivist scholarship in international relations also sheds a light to the global 
spread of NGOs and UNIW’s self-claimed civil society identity. Constructivist 
literature’s contributions to the study of transnational advocacy networks, 
international institutions and global civil society have shifted the focus in 
transnational politics from states to non-state actors. According to this perspective, 
the trends in contemporary transnational politics should be analyzed by ideational and 
normative variables rather than the traditional realist, power-oriented, interest based 
analysis. An abundance of empirical studies in this vein demonstrated that ideational 
factors such as norms, ideas, and culture evolve into global structures. These global 
structures in constructivist terminology, or global scripts in sociological 
institutionalist terminology, redefine state and actors interests and change policy. In 
parallel with sociological institutionalism, constructivism considers principled actors 
such as transnational advocacy networks, international non-governmental 
organizations, and social movements as the main agents of norm diffusion. Motivated 
by norms, values and ideas, these transnational non-state actors are effective in 
promote causes and deploy norms such as human rights, environmental protection, 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, and poverty alleviation as a development 
strategy among others.  
 
1.3 Towards an Analytical Framework to Guide Analysis 
 
What is evident from the above discussion is that the studies of transnational 
politics position transnational non-state actors in the category of the 
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principled/instrumental classification. Rooted in the “ideas versus interests” 
distinction of the international relations scholarship, this perspective associates 
transnational civil society, namely advocacy networks and NGO coalitions, with 
principled beliefs, ideational concerns and values as opposed to instrumentalist 
concerns and interest-based motivations. Transnational non-state actors are 
conceptualized as altruistic groups that promote liberal norms and secular values. 
Moreover, the power of non-state actors over state actions and interests is given 
disproportionate attention. Numerous empirical works on the power of human rights, 
environment and social justice activists present an unbalanced view of the actions of 
transnational non-state actors and their power over state interests.  
First of all, in line with the “demise of the nation-state” stance within 
transnationalism/globalization scholarship, the question is overwhelmingly posed as: 
How powerful are transnational non-state actors against states? Most empirical work 
in this field has focused on the impact of transnational non-state actors on states and 
international institutions. However, a closer look reveals that state/non-state actor 
relationship has a more complex and interdependent character. First and foremost, we 
need to turn the question around and ask how states impact the organization and 
actions of non-state actors. Not only do states enable/constrain the actions of 
transnational non-state actors, in some cases states and non-state actors engage in 
mutually beneficial relationships. In the case study of this dissertation, we see that the 
transnational non-state actor and the state have dovetailing interests. On the one hand, 
the state facilitates the organization and activities of UNIW. On the other hand, 
UNIW complements the state identity and its interests. Therefore, by showing how 
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principled non-state actors and the state regularly interact and mutually benefit from 
their interdependent relationship, this study moves beyond the ideational/materialist 
divide.  
Second, the rigid separation between value-based and interest-based perspectives 
clouds the material dimension of the non-state actor sphere in transnational politics.   
While non-state actors and collective movements are mobilized by norms and values, 
there are instrumentalist elements that ensure the sustainability of networks.  UNIW 
is a transnational NGO coalition established primarily to promote shared values, 
worldviews and ideological commitments. The normative drive behind UNIW’s 
formation is global Islamic solidarity. On the other hand, the long-term sustainability 
and effectiveness of the network necessitate an instrumental component.  In order to 
ensure deeper commitment from the members, it acts as an interest group advancing 
their interests. UNIW’s members are stakeholders since they have in common a set of 
normative values and norms that inform their religious solidarity ideal. But they are 
also shareholders as their commitment depends on the network’s provision of 
sufficient benefits to outweigh the membership costs. In other words, the network not 
only engages in an interest-based relationship with the host state, but also with its 
members. By examining the instrumental as well as normative dimensions of the 
network, the analytical framework of this study takes on a middle-ground approach in 
the way of new transnationalism.    
Third, the emphasis on secular transnational non-state actor networks that 
promote liberal norms disregards a considerably large section of transnational civil 
society: religious networks that promote conservative norms. The constructivist 
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scholarship has been silent about the non-liberal networks, particularly those that 
espouse political Islam. At the root of this oversight is the assumption that liberal and 
Islamist discourses are competing normative claims in world politics. However, non-
liberal networks aptly connect the liberal framework of civil society and the 
conservative framework of religion. While Islamist groups employ religion as a 
mobilizing frame, they position themselves within the sphere of civil society. They 
adopt the organizational models of the liberal networks and employ the discursive 
tools of civil society.  They make their conservative claims using the liberal 
discursive opportunities of civil society and religious freedom. Therefore, a well-
rounded analysis of religious solidarity networks necessitates not only an examination 
of the role of religion as an organizing principle, but also the role of civil society 
discourse and its organizational models. 
The epistemic strategy I choose in building my analytical framework suggests a 
triangular reasoning.  I position my argument as a ‘middle ground’ between the 
interest-based and value-based positions of the state/non-state actor relationship 
debate. The logic of triangular reasoning, as Arendt (1972: 12) explains, requires the 
“enumeration of three options – A, B, C – whereby A and C represent the opposite 
extremes and B the ‘logical’ middle-of-the-road ‘solution’ of the problem”. Arendt 
warns against the logical fallacy of this strategy by noting that presenting both A and 
C as undesirable options, therefore settling on B, restricts the exploration of the 
multitude of real possibilities.  
I employ a triangular reasoning in which A and B positions are constructed in 
binary oppositions. These binary oppositions appear in various constellations. They 
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are aligned along a line separating the value-based approach from the interest-based 
position. I use various combinations of terms to highlight a particular aspect of each 
position as well as to avoid repetition. I apply instrumental concerns and material 
motivations in reference to the interest-based position. Conversely, I use ideational 
concerns and normative motivations in reference to the value-based position 
throughout the document. However, I do not suggest a rigidly defined B position to 
settle the debate. Instead, following Arendt’s caution, I point to the ‘multitude of real 
possibilities’ in which state/non-state actor interaction may take various forms. The 
versatile ‘give-and-take’ between these two parties suggests that the ‘middle-ground’ 
is not located at an equidistant point. Rather, the frequent overlaps between as well as 
the malleability of their normative concerns and material motivations, as I 
demonstrate in the empirical analysis, suggest that the B position shifts depending on 
the particular conditions of interaction.  
 
1.4 Dissertation Overview 
Including the introduction, the dissertation is composed of nine chapters. In the 
next chapter, I review the transnationalist research agenda within sociological 
institutionalist and constructivist literatures. Both of these are vast and diverse 
literatures. Guided by the analytical framework of the study, I primarily discuss these 
literatures in relation to their perspectives on (1) instrumental (interests) versus 
ideational (norms) divide, and (2) dynamics of state and transnational non-state actor 
relationship. I build on insights from works on the non-state actors of transnational 
politics, namely transnational advocacy networks, international non-governmental 
organizations, and transnational NGO networks. I argue that while non-state actors 
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are motivated by value-oriented concerns, instrumental factors play a key role in their 
emergence, organizational structures, strategies and objectives. In the final section of 
the chapter, I briefly discuss the opportunity structures and framing concepts of social 
movements literature. As I point out in the following chapters, UNIW cannot be 
categorized as a transnational social movement, as it has a formal structure and well-
defined organizational boundaries. However, these two concepts of social movements 
literature are useful tools to identify UNIW’s discursive means, ideological motives, 
and geopolitical and organizational opportunities. Chapter 3 presents the research 
methodology of the study. It overviews the study design, data gathering and analysis. 
Chapter 4 briefly traces the history of humanitarian NGOs in Muslim-majority 
countries. As described in this chapter, NGO structures, in the Western sense of the 
term, are fairly recent. The transformation of informal religious communities into 
formal NGO structures was triggered by two critical events: the Soviet War in 
Afghanistan in 1980s and the war in Bosnia in the first part of 1990s. Both conflicts 
were interpreted as acts of aggression against Islamic communities and therefore 
became catalysts for Islamic mobilization. Islamist groups’ works in the refugee 
camps and in the war-inflicted areas were the training grounds for contemporary 
Islamic non-governmental organizations. By the mid-1990s, not only faith-based 
humanitarian and social aid organizations started to mushroom in all corners of the 
Islamic world, they also started to form transnational networks and alliances.  
The Union of the NGOs of the Islamic World (UNIW), as introduced in Chapter 
5, is one of the largest and most significant of these transnational NGO networks. In 
this chapter, I overview UNIW’s history, mission, and organizational structure. I 
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situate the organization within the faith-based organization context, and assess the 
extent to which UNIW and its member organizations translate religion into practice. 
Both UNIW and its member organizations are faith-based organizations whose 
identity and mission are derived from Islamic religion and traditions. In the chapter, I 
investigate the influence of religious faith in the member organizations’ activities, 
agendas and ideological frameworks. I discuss the role of religion in each issue area 
in detail; namely humanitarianism, social aid, development, education and 
socialization.  
While UNIW is a transnational faith-based network whose primary goal is to 
consolidate Islamic solidarity around the world by bringing together Islamic 
organizations, it does not characterize itself as an Islamic solidarity alliance. As 
presented above, UNIW defines itself as a “global civil society coalition’, ‘the voice 
of Islamic civil societies’, or ‘the representative of Muslim civil society in the 
international arena’. In other words, the language of its self-description is infused by 
notions of the civil society discourse. In Chapter 6, I tackle the explicit references to 
its civil society character and investigate the reasons why UNIW chooses to adopt a 
civil society language. In this chapter, I first overview the trajectory of the civil 
society idea, and I present the Islam and civil society debate. Next, I identify the ways 
in which civil society framework provides UNIW an invaluable discursive 
opportunity structure. In light of the arguments of sociological institutionalism, I state 
that UNIW’s discourses, practices and structure are embedded in the prevailing 
political culture that deems the civil society framework as the most legitimate form of 
collective action. Thus, UNIW frames itself as a civil society initiative because they 
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are aware of the norms of contemporary transnational politics. Civil society character 
allows UNIW to claim legitimacy as a credible political actor. In other words, UNIW 
employ the organizational models and discursive elements of the civil society 
framework as instrumental tools.  
The next two chapters discuss the geopolitical and organizational opportunity 
structures that come with the civil society discourse and the NGO format. In Chapter 
7, I explore the intersections between Turkish foreign policy strategy and UNIW’s 
mission and ideology. Shaped by the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party 
since 2002, Turkey’s foreign policy vision seeks to cast Turkey a regional, if not 
global role by cultivating stronger relationships with its interconnected regions. The 
proponents of this policy maintain that this venture requires more than geopolitical 
and economic vigor: Establishing social and cultural ties with these regions is 
essential. In that respect, UNIW, as a global Muslim NGO network, led by Turkish 
pro-Islamic NGOs, complements the government’s vision to be a leading actor in the 
region and in the broader Islamic World. Throughout the chapter I present the ways in 
which UNIW’s operations dovetail with the goals of Turkish foreign policy goals. I 
conclude the chapter with two cases studies that demonstrate how UNIW acts as an 
ideal soft power instrument for the Turkish government: 1) enhancing economic and 
political engagements between Turkey and African countries, and 2) playing strategic 
roles in Turkey’s foreign policy position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
In Chapter 8, I continue to conduct an instrumental reading of UNIW - this time 
by analyzing power within the network. While UNIW is a value-oriented network, 
which is inspired by ideational factors, interest-oriented motivations are essential to 
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its performance and long-term sustenance. Again, UNIW’s members are faith-based 
organizations, which are motivated by religious beliefs and values. Yet, these 
ideational factors are not sufficient to ensure their commitment to the network. In 
other words, UNIW’s members are simultaneously stake-holders and share-holders. 
They subscribe to a common set of values, beliefs and ideological commitments, but 
at the same time, they expect instrumental benefits from their involvement in the 
network. In the chapter, I identify the expectations of the members in entering the 
network and the benefits they reap from their involvement. I specifically focus on 
leverage, legitimacy, boomerang effect, information sharing, and increasing visibility. 
In the last section of the chapter, I present a case study of the East Turkistan conflict. 
By analyzing the ways in which the Uyghur groups frame their grievances to match 
UNIW’s ideological interests, I demonstrate that internal workings of transnational 
non-state groups depend on instrumental factors as much as ideational ones.  
In the conclusion chapter I pull together the arguments and analyses of the study 
and suggest a rethinking of the civil society concept as a global norm. Considering 
the elasticity of the ways in which the civil society concept is used and reused, I 
discuss the usefulness of the term. Should we discard it altogether? I conclude that the 
empirical findings of this study alone are proof that the concept still holds currency. It 
is a legitimizing and leveraging tool for groups that are in the peripheries of global 










TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS AND ITS ACTORS: 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
 
Since the mid-1990s, a renewed interest in transnationalism has emerged in 
international relations, political science and sociology disciplines. The transnationalist 
research agenda put transnational networks, global/transnational civil society, 
transnational social movements and world polity on the academic map. Despite their 
differences, these diverse literatures all made the common point that transnational 
non-state actors play a prominent role in world politics.  
The transnationalist research program is intrinsically linked to broader discussions 
of the constructivist and sociological institutionalist scholarship in its emphasis on the 
power of ideas, norms, and identities. As opposed to interest-based perspectives, 
these two parallel scholarships prioritize the ideational and normative concerns over 
material and interest-based ones. Sociological institutionalism proposes that world-
cultural principles and norms produce actor identities and interests; constructivism 
follows suit by arguing that non-state actors are primarily motivated by these 
ideational factors rather than instrumental ones.  
The ideational/material divide that defines these paradigms is the theoretical basis 
of this dissertation. In this project, I reassess the principled transnational non-state 
actors with regards to normative and instrumental concerns. Not subscribing to a 
rational-choice perspective, I argue that norm-motivated non-state actors’ 
instrumentalist motivations are critical to their survival and performance.  
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In order to evaluate this argument, I dissect its theoretical components that are 
spread across multiple disciplines and scholarly literatures. Each of these theoretical 
schools is vast and multilayered. My objective here is not to write a genealogy of 
each field but to pull together the links as pertinent to the case.  In the first section, I 
review the norms and interests discussion within sociological institutionalism and the 
constructivist turn in international relations theory. Next, I move on to examine 
transnational non-state actors and collective action; namely transnational advocacy 
networks, international NGOs and NGO networks. In the second section, I briefly 
introduce social movements literature’s opportunity structures and framing concepts 
in order to apply them as analytical tools. In the final section, I connect the links and 
flesh out this project’s analytical framework to guide analysis.  
The organization of theoretical debates throughout the dissertation’s chapters 
reflects the analytical framework of the study.  The project puts forward a three-tiered 
analysis: (1) the instrumental/ideational divide, (2) the use of civil society 
framework’s ideational tools in instrumental ways, and (3) the demonstration of this 
argument in the case of UNIW. 
The theoretical foundations of the study rest on the tension between instrumental 
and ideational motivations of non-state actors. This tension is debated most 
specifically in the constructivist and institutionalist literatures of international 
relations and sociology. I elaborate on the ‘norms versus interests’ debate by 
discussing these two main fields in this chapter. 
Within that framework, the project focuses on the ways in which non-state actors 
utilize the ideational tools of the civil society discourse towards their instrumental 
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goals. In that sense, civil society theory serves as a second-level empirical case for the 
overarching theoretical discussion of ideational/instrumental motivations of non-state 
actors. Therefore, rather than grouping all theoretical debates in this chapter, I cover 
the civil society theory separately in Chapter 6.  
Only on the third-tier, I analyze the specific case of UNIW and demonstrate the 
instrumental benefits of framing a transnational solidarity project as a transnational 
civil society initiative. In the remainder of the chapters, I delineate the material 
outcomes of this strategy; namely increasing social capital, instituting cooperative 
relationships with states and governments, and claiming legitimacy in global politics.  
 
2.1 TRANSNATIONALISM AND NON-STATE ACTORS 
 
Transnational politics has garnered attention within sociology, political science 
and international relations disciplines recently but the idea of transnationalism and 
non-state actors is not new. The paradigm shift in the study of transnational actors 
emerged in early 1970s as a reaction to the rigidity and state-centrism of the 
(neo)realist paradigm2 in international relations. Nye and Keohane’s (1971) seminal 
work on transnational relations presented an alternative perspective by introducing 
non-state actors and transnational relations as powerful actors. In their view, states are 
not the only actors in world politics: non-state actors, that is “any somewhat 
autonomous individual or organization that controls substantial resources and 
participated in political relationships with other actors across state lines” (Nye and 
Keohane 1971: xxi), play critical roles in transnational politics.  
                                                
2 The realist approach assumed that states are the only significant actors in world politics; world 
politics are dictated by competitive self-interests; and state ideologies are dictated by national security 
and material interests. World politics, according to the realist ideal type, is composed of pure interstate 
relations dominated by zero-sum security conflict. 
 23 
Nye and Keohane’s world politics paradigm has redefined the transnational 
politics research agenda by shifting the focus from unitary states and their relations 
towards nonstate actors’ resources and interactions. While Nye and Keohane’s work 
triggered an interest in political sociology and international relations fields, the 
subsequent research wave restricted its empirical focus to the political economy of 
transnationalism (Tarrow 2001: 4). Studies about non-state actors focused on 
multinational corporations (Gilpin 1971, 1975), expansion of powerful complexes of 
governmental and business organizations leading world capitalism, and resistance to 
transnational economic penetration (Arrighi and Silver 1984, Walton 1989). 
In 1980s and 1990s, the study of transnational politics took a turn away from 
political economy towards the ideational and normative analysis of cross-border non-
state actors. Particularly the end of Cold War steered the attention of international 
relations and political science scholars from structuralist theories such as realism and 
state-centered institutionalism towards domestic politics and transnational relations 
(Risse 2002: 258). Constructivism in political science and institutionalism in 
sociology have put the social and ideational aspects of transnational life under 
spotlight.  
 
2.1.1 Sociological Institutionalism and Constructivism: The Power of Norms 
 
Sociological institutionalism and constructivism opened a new path towards the 
study of transnational politics and the power of non-state actors. In contradiction to 
the interest-based perspectives in sociology and international relations,3 sociological 
                                                
3 In international relations, the (neo)realist approach takes the interest-oriented actors to its center, and 
explains international politics in terms of power and national interest. Realism considers the world as 
an anarchic terrain that is manipulated by states that seek to maximize their power and interests. For 
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institutionalism and constructivism push toward a culture and norm centered 
perspective. Interest-based approaches conceptualize international politics as a 
domain populated by actors who act solely on their instrumentally rational pursuit of 
fixed interests. Sociological institutionalism and constructivism, on the other hand, 
bring culture and norms into the discussion. Sociological institutionalism challenges 
previous approaches’ notion of purposive actors with its “constituted” actors. For the 
world society theorists, actors’ identities and interests are not exogenous but 
constructed by world-cultural conceptions. In other words, actors’ collective 
identities, interests, roles and subjective selves are defined and shaped by global 
scripts. Constructivism shares sociological institutionalism’s emphasis on the role of 
ideas, knowledge and culture. Constructivists conceptualize these ideational elements 
as ‘norms’ and argue that norms shape state identity and interests. 
Sociological institutionalism and constructivism are not only relevant because of 
their contributions to the interests versus ideas debate, which lies at the heart of this 
project, but also because both perspectives propelled an interest in transnational non-
state actors. According to both perspectives, these non-state actors - professions, 
epistemic communities, international nongovernmental organizations, and 
transnational advocacy networks – are conduits of world cultural principles/norms.  
                                                                                                                                      
states, power involves military capability and economic resources, and national interests are contained 
in wealth and security. (Neo)liberalism’s assumptions are not entirely different. It still takes states as 
the key actors that seek to maximize their wealth and explains transnational cooperation among states 
as one of strategic, interest-driven moves. Interest-based theoretical perspectives of the international 
system analysis have their counterparts in sociology as well. For instance, state-competition theory 
(Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Goldstone 1991; Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1975, 1992) explains 
transnational structures by military power of states. Similarly, world-system theory (Wallerstein 1974, 
1979; Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995) reduces the mechanisms of transnational contention to economic 




Both sociological institutionalism and constructivism are multifaceted 
perspectives with diverse empirical interests. In the remainder of this section I will 
discuss their contributions in relation to their respective takes on: (1) state versus 
transnational non-state actor dynamics, and (2) materialist (interests) / ideational 
(values) divide. 
 
2.1.1.1 Sociological Institutionalism 
 Sociological institutionalism, particularly, posed a direct challenge to the 
materialist assumptions of prevailing approaches by introducing the roles of norms 
and culture at a global level. The emphasis on ideational factors influenced 
international relations and political sciences disciplines, which resulted in the 
constructivist turn in the study of international politics.  
Sociological institutionalist research has produced an extensive body of literature 
about nation-states, individuals, and organizational structures across the globe. The 
starting point of the sociological institutionalist research is the empirical observation 
that modern state structures and their policy domains are strikingly similar to each 
other despite the differences in socioeconomic conditions, country resources, cultures 
and local task demands. Sociological institutionalists explain this commonality by the 
pervasiveness of a world society/polity4 that is based on Western cultural standards of 
rationality. They maintain that social structures and social actors are embedded in 
                                                
4 The differences between world society and world polity have not been clearly defined in sociological 
institutionalist theory. In fact, the two terms have been used interchangeably to a large extent. Thomas 
(2009: 117) addresses this conceptual ambiguity by stating that world society, world polity and world 
culture “are not three systems, levels, or spheres; rather, they are concepts each of which points to or 
foregrounds certain aspects of the world.” According to this framework, world polity refers to the 
patterns and sources of authority and political action, world culture denotes ontological and moral 
schema, and world society covers the properties of a stateless society (Thomas 2009: 119).  
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these widespread norms and meaning sets. Thus, nation-states are not simply actors 
within the world culture; they are embedded in and produced by that world polity and 
culture. One step further, organizations are embedded in national institutional 
environments that are the products of world polity (Jepperson 2001: 3). Following 
this reasoning to its micro implications, individual agency is directed by the norms of 
institutional cultural environments rather than self-interest.  
Sociological institutionalists, then, could argue that the sprawling world culture 
produces similar forms and structures across the globe, which they labeled 
isomorphism. The sociological institutionalist research program was very prolific in 
mapping isomorphism in state structures, policy domains, and organizations. 
Extensive research has documented isomorphism in areas as diverse as education5 
(Meyer and Hannan 1979; Meyer, Ramirez, and Boli-Bennett 1977; Ramirez and 
Rubinson 1979; Meyer and Ramirez 1981), welfare policies (Strang and Chang 
1993), population control programs (Barrett and Frank 1999), environmental policies 
(Frank 1997, Meyer et al. 1997), science policies (Finnemore 1996), constitutional 
articulations of citizen rights (Boli 1987). The main thread that ties such diverse 
empirical domains is the thesis that isomorphic forms and structures proliferate as the 
world polity/society structuration deepens (Gulmez 2010: 256). 
Compared to the actor-centric and power-based theories, sociological 
institutionalism does not put much emphasis on autonomous and purposive actors and 
                                                
5 The field of education proved to be a very fruitful research area in fleshing out the main tenets of 
sociological institutionalism in a cross-national capacity. Research established that national systems of 
education not only expanded cross-nationally, but also, and more importantly, demonstrated surprising 
similarities irrespective of domestic characteristics (Meyer and Hannan 1979). Educational systems 
and curricula, in particular, displayed remarkable isomorphism, which supported the pervading world 
culture thesis (Meyer, Ramirez, and Boli-Bennett 1977; Ramirez and Rubinson 1979; Meyer and 
Ramirez 1981). 
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their interests. Instead, it highlights the wider global-institutional environment that 
produces the actor identities and interests. Sociological institutionalists fall short of 
specifying the mechanisms by which these scripts of global-institutional 
environments create the actors (Finnemore 1996: 339). Yet, they specify the conduits 
of world society models and discourses. According to the world society/polity 
theorists, “epistemic communities”6 (professions), advocacy networks, international 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations propel the diffusion of world-
cultural principles and “shape the frames that orient other actors, including states” 
(Boli and Thomas 1999: 15). International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), 
among the conduits of world-cultural models, have received the most attention from 
world society/polity scholars. INGOs, according to Boli and Thomas (1999: 19), 
enact, code, modify and propagate world-cultural structures and principles: 
 
“INGOs are loci of transnational contextual knowledge…The INGO context 
supplies purposes and meanings of action, models for global organizing, forms of 
discourse and communication, and avenues for influencing states and other actors. 
The larger cultural reality is translated by individuals into specific forms and 
actions that reveal broad homologies” (Boli and Thomas 1999: 34). 
 
INGOs, then, are the primary organizational field in which world cultural 
principles – universalism, individualism, rational voluntaristic authority, progress, 
and world citizenship – take structural form. In doing, sociological institutionalism 
                                                
6 Epistemic communities are groups of technical specialists who share common causal understandings 
and policy prescriptions. Haas (1992: 3) defines an epistemic community as “a network of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular political domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy- knowledge and an agreement on a “common set of cause and effect 
relationships” (Haas 1989: 384 n20). Epistemic communities encourage states to act in consistence 
with norms, beget policy coordination between states, and in some cases change state identities and 
preferences by advocating the internationalization of new norms. For example Haas (1989) illustrates 
how the spread of scientific knowledge by epistemic communities has altered states’ interests and 
persuaded the southern European and North African states to regulate international marine pollution in 
the Mediterranean Sea.  
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maintains, INGOs lobby and force states to act on these principles. In that respect, 
world polity scholars bestow significant power to the world culture and INGOs as its 
conduits rather than nation-states.7 
 
2.1.1.2 Constructivism 
Constructivism in international relations complement sociological 
institutionalism’s view on the significance of ideational factors as well as the role of 
non-state actors in transnational politics. Constructivists replace sociology’s culture 
concept with norms, and argue that world politics are embedded within a framework 
of norms and values, which alter the identities and preferences of international actors. 
Contrary to the previous theories that viewed sovereign states as the single most 
important actors with material interests, constructivists maintain that state identities 
and interests are neither exogenous nor determined by domestic politics 8  but 
constructed by intersubjective structures 9  (Wendt 1994: 385). Therefore, 
                                                
7 This is not to say that world polity theorists dismiss the nation-state as a powerful actor. Boli and 
Thomas (1997: 188) clarify this point: “We think of the operation of the world polity only as a world 
proto-state. A singular authority structure is lacking, states monopolize the legitimated use of violence, 
and states jealously guard their sovereignty. Nevertheless, the world as a proto-state has shared cultural 
categories, principles of authority, and universally constructed individuals who, as world proto-
citizens, assume the authority to pursue goals that transcend national and local particularisms.” 
8 From the early 1990s, constructivists have problematized the conceptualization of the nation-state on 
a wide range of issues including state interests, security, territory, and sovereignty. Katzenstein’s 
(1996) edited book on culture and national security is seminal both in terms of illustrating the 
arguments of constructivism and questioning the assumptions of security studies. Katzenstein and his 
collaborators (1996: 4) rejected the realist assumption that states and their interests are given, and 
argued that cultural-institutional context and the constructed identity of states, governments, and other 
political actors are the key, yet often overlooked, determinants of national security policies. Following 
Katzenstein’s critique of the core assumptions regarding the study of state, some constructivists 
problematized international political system’s unquestioned basics such as sovereignty and territory. 
They argued that state sovereignty is not a fact, but a social construct (Walker 1993; Bartelson 1995; 
Biersteker and Weber 1996). For constructivists, state sovereignty was never a constant of the 
Westphalian system (Fowler and Bunk 1995; Krasner 1999); it was continuously revised and violated 
for diverse causes and purposes.  
9 Constructivist arguments were largely influenced by the structure-agency debates in other social 
sciences, especially philosophy and sociology. Giddens' structuration theory was a starting point for 
suggesting the mutually constitutive nature of the state and the international system. Giddens (1984) 
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constructivists argue, the international system is a constitutive domain, rather than 
simply a strategic one.10 
Constructivism is not a single unified movement. In fact, constructivists present 
differences in their arguments and theoretical assumptions.11 Yet they agree on (1) the 
socially constructed nature of behavior, interests and relationships, and (2) the role of 
values and ideas in international relations (Wendt 1987, 1992; Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 
1989; Katzenstein 1996; Lapid and Kratochwil 1996; Friedman and Starr 1997; 
Ruggie 1998). 
If state identity and interests are not constants, what is it that constructs them? 
The answer to this question, that it is international norms that shape and define the 
identities and preferences of states and international actors, is the foremost 
constructivist argument that opened the intellectual space to discuss the state - 
transnational non-state actor relationship in international politics.  
Constructivism, influenced greatly by sociological institutionalism, employed a 
sociological approach to bring in the discussion of socially constructed norms and 
identities to a debate that was largely dominated by interest-based perspectives. While 
sociological institutionalists call these social and cognitive structures institutions, 
constructivists refer to them as norms and rules (Finnemore 1996: 326). Norms are 
                                                                                                                                      
argued that structures (i.e., the rules and conditions that guide social action) do not determine actors' 
behavior. There is an intersubjective relationship between actors and structures based on shared 
understanding and meaning. While structures constrain actors, actors in turn transform structures by 
reflecting and acting on them in new ways. This notion of structuration led Wendt (1992) to argue that 
the structure of anarchy does not constrain state actors. Anarchy, Wendt states, 'is what states make of 
it' because “it can only have meanings attached to it by states in the process of interaction” (Rengger 
2000: 85). 
10 Wendt illustrates the constructivist view with the following statement: "500 British nuclear weapons 
are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons because  the British are 
friends and the North Koreans are not" (Wendt 1995: 73). That is to say, it is less the material fact of 
numbers of nuclear warheads that matter; what matters is how the actors think about each other, i.e. 
their ideas and beliefs. Material facts enter the picture but they are secondary to ideas.  
11 For a review of the constructivist research program see Adler 1997 etc. 
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broadly defined as “shared (thus social) understandings of standards for behavior” 
(Klotz 1995: 14). Katzenstein (1996: 5) draws attention to the identity component of 
norms by defining them as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors 
with a given identity”. Norms are critical to the production and reproduction of 
identities. They can be “constitutive” in that they create the actor’s identity, thus, 
interests and actions. They can be “regulative” in that they prescribe and shape the 
actor’s behavior (Klotz 1995: 14). 
Akin to sociological institutionalist research agenda, which emphasizes the 
significance of global norms and culture in the formation of institutions, 
constructivists initially focused on demonstrating the significance of norms in 
comparison to “brute material conditions like biology, geography and technology” 
(Fearon and Wendt 2002: 57). Also similar to the world polity/culture paradigm, 
constructivists who worked on the sweeping effectiveness of norms demonstrated that 
certain norms diffuse and evolve into global structures which in turn shape state and 
actor interests despite local conditions and task demands.12  
Constructivists have been prolific in demonstrating the ways in which the global 
diffusion of norms affect international politics and state behavior13 as well as nonstate 
                                                
12 International norms were argued to be so potent as to govern the conduct of war and control patterns 
of violence. For instance. Price (1997) used a Foucauldian genealogy to demonstrate that the 
prohibition against the use of chemical weapons is a political construct that has evolved throughout the 
20th century. Constructivists documented the construction of new international norms and institutions 
against torture, disappearances, and political killings (Clark 2001), governing the use of landmines 
(Finemore and Sikkink 1998; Price 1998; Cameron 1998). 
13 For example, Finnemore (1996) suggests that the pervasiveness of international norms result in 
isomorphism in the science policies of very diverse countries. She argues that international 
organizations like the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orgaization (UNESCO) 
“teach” states to value certain goals and define their interests accordingly. Klotz (1995) poses a similar 
question: why a number of international organizations and states adopted sanctions against the 
Apartheid regime in South Africa despite their security and material interests? Klotz answers this 
question by the strength of a global norm of racial equality. She argues that the rising antiapartheid 
sentiment, which was embedded in the racial equality norm, compelled nonstate actors such as the 
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actors (Katzenstein 1996, Cortell and Davis 2001, True and Mintrom 2001). While 
not all constructivists agree on the importance of non-state actors in the international 
system, the largest and growing segment of constructivist research agenda prioritizes 
the role of non-state actors in the creation and international diffusion of norms.14  
Constructivism’s focus on the agents of norm diffusion, i.e. norm entrepreneurs, 
furthered the interest about transnational non-state actors in various disciplines in 
1990s.  Once the first wave of constructivists established that “norms matter” and that 
norms have structural effects on state behavior, the next logical step was to identify 
its agents. Transnational relations, social movements and contentious politics scholars 
began to examine the emergence and politics of nonstate actors who organized 
transnationally. In that sense, work on the agency of non-state actors complement the 
constructivist research program on norms (Pierce 2003: 583).  
Scholars in this vein examined networks and coalitions of nonstate actors (Smith 
et al. 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Gills 2000; O’Brien et al. 2000; Smith and 
Johnston 2002; Armstrong et al. 2003), transnational human rights and democracy 
                                                                                                                                      
Organization of African Unity and the United Nations General Assembly to mobilize international 
public towards sanctioning the apartheid regime. More importantly, the growing tide of antiapartheid 
sentiment pushed states like the United States and the United Kingdom to act against their security and 
material interests and join the sanctioning coalition.  
14 Nadelman’s work is illustrative of the constructivist research agenda’s focus on the relationship 
between international norms and nonstate actors. Nadelman (1990) puts the global diffusion of norms 
under the spotlight and traces the historical evolution of particular norms into what he calls “global 
prohibition regimes”. He traces the historical evolution of international norms prohibiting piracy, 
slavery, international drug trafficking, and trafficking in women and children for purposes of 
prostitution. These norms have been institutionalized in international law and in the domestic criminal 
laws of states, thus created global prohibition regimes. Nadelman argues that the conduits of global 
prohibition regimes are nonstate actors like transnational nongovernmental organizations. 
Transnational nongovernment organizations act as “transnational moral entrepreneurs” in diffusing 
norms14 to a global audience. They “mobilize popular opinion and political support both within their 
host country and abroad; they stimulate and assist in the creation of like-minded organization in other 
countries; and they play a significant role in elevating their objective beyond its identification with the 
national interests of their government”. Transnational nongovernmental organizations reach beyond 
their host countries to appeal to foreign governments and elites.  
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movements (Risse et al. 1999), global and regional environmental movements 
(Young 1997; Khagram et al. 2002), and immigrant rights coalitions (Soysal 1995). 
In the next section, I discuss the work on transnational non-state politics in relation to 
the purposes of the study. Again, the literature on transnational politics and its non-
state actors is a complex and multifaceted one. In the rest of the chapter, I discuss the 
theoretical and empirical work in this area pertaining to the normative/instrumental 
divide, as well as the organizational patterns of global/transnational networks, and 
their relationships with states.  
 
2.1.2 Global/Transnational Non-State Politics  
The contributions of sociological institutionalism and constructivism on the cross-
border actions and influence of non-state actors have helped set the stage for a 
thorough study of transnational politics and non-state actors in 1990s. The end of 
Cold War and the intensification of the globalization process led scholars researching 
political activism to argue that the framework of politics has shifted away from the 
sovereign state.15 
Globalization is a multidimensional process, not to mention an overused and 
underspecified concept. In broad terms, it is a set of contingent economic, political, 
technological, and social processes and practices that transcends territorial boundaries 
(Castells 1996; Giddens 1990; Held et al. 1999; Rosenau 2003; Sassen 1998; Scholte 
2000). Globalization has rearticulated the structural power and mobility of capital, 
                                                
15 Even though arguments about the demise of the territorial/nation-state have been subject to critical 
debate, it is generally maintained that as a result of the globalization process “territorial location, 
territorial distance and territorial borders no longer have a determining influence” on social 
connections (Scholte 1999: 9). In other words, globalization concurrently intensifies and extends “the 
worldwide social relations which link distant localities” (Giddens 1990). 
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which in turn increased economic integration and deregulated the trade in goods, 
services and financial flows. The flow of global capital also facilitated transborder 
production processes and the globalization of markets. Globalization is also 
conceptualized as a cultural process, which is marked by an increased flow of ideas, 
knowledge, experiences and information across international borders. The 
“interconnecting” nature of global processes decreases the importance of territorial 
location, distance and borders on social connections (Scholte 1999: 9). Therefore, 
globalization concurrently intensifies and extends “the worldwide social relations 
which link distant localities” (Giddens 1990: 64).  
Non-profit associations and social movements have been forming network and 
alliances across borders for almost two centuries (Risse 2002). However, this process 
has been immensely accelerated thanks to the expansion of technological 
infrastructure. Increases in the usage of the internet, mobile phones, and landlines 
have enabled the development of more intense networks and have allowed greater 
access for groups outside the main centers of international power (Anheier, Glasius, 
and Kaldor 2001: 6). 16  The informational revolution has strengthened NGOs’ 
capacity to collect, collate, select, and publicize information on various issues ranging 
from development disasters, the environment, the effect of World Trade Organization 
(WTO) policies such as patenting, to human rights violations (Chandoke 2002: 40).  
                                                
16 Conversely, it can be argued that while 2 billion people in the world earn less than 2 dollars a day, 
access to information technologies remain a distant prospect. Whereas estimated internet user 
population is 78.3% in Canada and the USA , 58.3% in Europe, and 36.2% in Latin America, it is 
31.7% in the Middle East, 23.8% in Asia, and 11.4% in Africa. In total, only 30.2% of the world 
population are Internet users (Internet Usage Statistics,  http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm, 
March 2011). 
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The growing economic, technological and cultural integration of a globalizing 
world allow domestic civil societies and socio-political movements to organize 
transnationally. Politics are no longer conceptualized as a nationally bounded activity 
run by state actors. To the contrary, it is agreed upon that there are new arenas for 
political action,17 and that “there are no longer clear distinctions between domestic 
and global levels of politics” (Khagram et al. 2002: 4). 
The amalgamation of politics and the emerging power of the non-state actors led 
some authors to herald the emergence of a transnational civil society (Florini 2000), 
global civil society (Anheier et al. 2001; Kaldor 2003; Keane 2003), cosmopolitan 
society (Delanty 2006), world politics (Lipschutz 1992), international civil society 
(Colas 2002), and their corresponding notions of global citizenship (Dorsey 1993; 
Wapner 1995; Falk 1998), as well as global governance (Rosenau 1995; Reinicke 
1998; Hewson and Sinclair 1999) and global justice (Falk 2000; Mollendorf 2002). 
The scope and definition of each term varies. The scholarly literature on 
transnational/global political action has problematized its ‘globalness’ (Florini 2000; 
Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith et al. 1997), actors (Kaldor 2003; Tarrow 2001), 
values and ideology (Colas 2002; Seckinelgin 2002), plurality (Kenny 2003; Pichardo 
1997; Scholte 2002), and material resources (Edwards and Hulme 1995; Malhotra 
2000; Riddell 1999; Salm 1999). But the common thread is the networks of 
associational activity and social agency that reach beyond territorial boundaries. This 
sphere of political activity is “located between the family, the state, and the market 
and operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities and economies” 
                                                
17 See, for example, Risse-Kappen 1995; Smith, Charfield and Pagnucco 1997; Lipschutz 1992; Keck 
and Sikkink 1998; Boli and Thomas 1999; Stiles 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Peterson 1992; 
Florini 2000. 
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(Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001: 17). Non-state institutions, organizations and 
networks cooperate transnationally to advance shared agendas and engage in political 
activities. The issues that occupy the agenda of global non-state actors include, but 
are not limited to, “ecological problems, globalizing economy, transborder protection, 
trade, investment, money and finance, human rights, and civic activism that are 
directed at global governance agencies like the United Nations, Bretton Woods 
institutions, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO)” (Scholte 1997: 10). 
This transnational/global sphere of non-state politics is attributed an ipso facto 
positivity. It is argued to bear the possibility to secure material welfare across the 
globe, promote civic education, give voice to the marginalized groups, provide a 
platform for alternative perspectives, increase transparency and accountability, 
promote legitimation with regard to suprastate governance, and consequently enhance 
social cohesion (Scholte 1997: 25-28). As the transnational non-state political action 
is posited as the panacea to every problem under the sun, its actors receive an equally 
over-glorified treatment. The literature assumes that value-oriented, altruistic 
concerns rather than materialistic ones drive non-states actors. Their normative ideals 
are overstated at the expense of instrumental motivations.  In the next section, I 
briefly introduce the actors of the transnational non-state politics and elaborate on the 
normative and instrumental concerns that drive/motivate their actions.  
 
2.1.3 Transnational Non-State Actors 
As the boundaries and interdependencies of politics transcend local/national 
territories toward regional/global spheres, the actors multiply as well. Global and 
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regional economic and political actors increasingly dominate international politics.18 
The complexity of transnational non-state politics results in disagreements on who 
exactly are the actors of this burgeoning platform. Yet NGO coalitions, transnational 
advocacy networks, and transnational social movements appear as the major actors of 
non-state politics.  
NGOs have emerged in the post-World War II context and have proliferated 
significantly in the last two decades. The term NGO is often used referring to groups 
providing social welfare services; development support organizations; social action 
groups struggling for social justice and structural changes; support groups providing 
legal, research, or communications assistance; and local groups providing social 
services. The universe of NGOs includes, but is not limited to, charitable, religious, 
research, human rights, and environmental organizations (Scholte 1997).  
                                                
18  The interconnected nature of the globalization process has significant implications on the 
sovereignty of the nation-state. The nation-state has to share its sovereignty and regulatory functions 
with several local and global players, including intergovernmental organizations, international and 
supranational agencies and institutions such as the United Nations, European Union, World Bank, IMF 
as well as non-state actors and transnational bodies such as multinational corporations, pressure groups 
and nongovernmental organizations such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International, among many 
others. Likewise, the sole authority of the nation-state over the citizenship body has been challenged 
due to the increasing circulation of capital, substantial international migration, rise of transnational 
organizations, and regional integration. In this sense, as the boundaries of an exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive citizenship have blurred, taking descent or inhabitance in a well defined territory and 
defining political community in spatial terms have become more difficult  (Hammer 1990, Joppke 
1999, Soysal 1994). The appearance of concepts such as transnational society, post-national society, 
regional society, and global society is a significant indicator of the transformation in the range and 
content of the contemporary political community. While nation-states are still of key significance, they 
are no longer the sole actors of the international system. To be sure, these developments have by no 
means heralded the demise of the nation-state. Nation-states are still of central significance as they 
continue to legitimize themselves through the implementation of diverse policies over issues such as 
security, social welfare and environment. As such, nation states become increasingly dependent on 
global political communities and transnational agencies, and continue to be relatively decisive on 
domestic regulations at once.  Correspondingly, territoriality continues to dominate certain issues such 
as migration, sense of identity and community, and markets for certain goods (Scholte 1997: 9). 
Therefore, rather than proclaiming the demise or rise of the nation-state, the argument developed here 
maintains that states are reconstituting themselves in a political system increasingly populated by 
global and regional economic, political and cultural players. In other words, the nation-state is 
becoming a multi-layered and multi-centered component of this transnational mechanism and a major 
agent of global capitalism (Robinson and Jerry 2000: 184). 
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There is not an agreement in the literature on how to classify the complex world 
of non-governmental organizations (Lewis and Wallace 2000; Vakil 1997). For the 
purposes of this study, I classify the multitude of NGOs in three categories based on 
their orientation: welfare, development, and advocacy. Welfare oriented NGOs are 
based on the charity model. They provide medical care, housing, potable water, 
clothing, food, educational services, and vocational training and humanitarian relief 
to disaster stricken areas. Development oriented NGOs aim to reduce long-term 
poverty through capacity building, sustainability and self-sufficiency projects. They 
provide technical assistance in agriculture, small business development, microcredit 
programs and income-generating schemes. Welfare and development NGOs take over 
functions hitherto reserved for the state as they typically act in areas which 
government action is non-existent or inoperative (Ghils 1992: 421). Advocacy NGOs 
pursue specific policy goals and make their claims against governments, businesses or 
other advocacy organizations. They work in areas such as environmental protection, 
labor, healthcare, religion, democracy and social justice (Prakash and Gugerty 2010: 
1-2). 
In the last two decades NGOs have taken on a global character as the 
organizations increasingly began to act internationally.  International non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) are “organizations that operate independently of 
governments, are composed of members from two or more countries, and are 
organized to advance their members’ international goals and provide services to 
citizens of other states through routine transactions with states, private actors, and 
international institutions” (Tarrow 2001: 12). INGOs focus more on pressuring 
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governments when the legitimacy of their actions is in doubt. They pursue objectives 
at the transnational level, either for the benefit of their members or for that of 
individual social groups through economic and social development; assistance to 
refugees; scientific and technological research; and the dissemination of ideological, 
cultural and religious ideas. 
NGOs have also started to create or join networks and coalitions to pool 
ideational, strategic and material resources with their like-minded counterparts. NGO 
coalitions are not new; they formed networks, coalitions and umbrella organizations 
before the advent of communication technologies. International women’s 
organizations, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, and the World 
Conservation Unit are only a few of the NGO coalitions that predate the introduction 
of relatively cheaper communication technologies. As global communications 
became more affordable in 1990s, the number of such networks and coalitions 
skyrocketed. Coalitions, such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the 
Coalition for an International Criminal Court, and Jubilee 2000, could facilitate 
information exchange among member NGOs, devise common strategies, pool 
economic and social capital, and mobilize support (Willetts: 2001).  
NGOs are also the driving force of transnational advocacy networks. Advocacy 
networks connect diverse non-state actors – domestic and international NGOs, social 
movement activists, research and advocacy organizations, international institutions – 
from different countries by “shared values, a common discourse, and a dense 
exchange of information and services” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). Values act as the 
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common denominator for the activists of different countries. In fact, Keck and 
Sikkink argue, activists are motivated by values rather than material concerns.  
Advocacy is the core activity of transnational networks. Organized to promote 
causes, transnational advocacy networks run campaigns on a wide range of issues. 
These activists use information politics to spread politically useful information to 
where it will have the most impact, symbolic politics to frame issues in a way that 
create awareness and expand the constituency, leverage politics to persuade and 
mobilize powerful actors and institutions, and accountability politics to pressure 
governments to live up to previously endorsed policies and principles. By promoting 
interests, running agenda-setting activities, and deploying new norms, transnational 
advocacy networks force states to accept new norms. They by-pass state authority and 
establish direct links between domestic and international levels of politics.  
Empirical studies in this area have successfully documented transnational non-
state actors’ role in generating international norms, redefining state interests, shaping 
the policies of international institutions.  
Environmental policy making is one of the biggest issue areas in which 
transnational non-state actors have been effective. The number of environmental non-
state actors has increased dramatically over the last 30 years. They create 
international awareness about environmental problems, affect legislative process 
inside the states, lobby for environmental laws, influence international treaties, and 
pressure states to adopt domestic environmental policies which in turn address 
international environmental problems (DeSombre 2006: 73-76). Environmental 
NGOs have indeed become the auxiliaries of international environmental diplomacy 
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when states cannot operate due to their operational constraints (Princen and Finger 
1994). In addition to environmental NGOs, networks of scientists and policy research 
institutes have politicized environmental issues and have directly influenced world 
politics with regards to ozone-depleting substances (Litfin 1994). Lipschutz takes the 
power of non-state actors argument to the next level and heralds the emergence of a 
global civil society around ecological interdependence. Lipschutz and Conca (1993) 
state that the traditional authority structure of world politics has deteriorated and 
governments are ill-equipped to grapple with emergent issues. Instead, they argue, 
social movements and non-state actor networks “play an increasingly important role – 
perhaps in concert with the state, perhaps in competition, and perhaps even as an 
alternative organizing principle for world politics, based on new constitutive rules and 
institutional forms” (Lipschutz and Conca 1993: 9). Similarly, Wapner (1996) argues 
that transnational environmental NGOs practice world civic politics outside the 
standard state centric channels. By creating international ecological sensibility, 
framing environmental problems in political terms, and creating links between local, 
national and international levels of action, environmental NGOs construct a global 
civil society, or a ‘slice of associational life that exists above the individual and below 
the state, and across national boundaries’ (Wapner 1996: 4). 
Domestic and institutional effects of international human rights norms have 
proved to be another productive issue area to analyze transnational non-state actor 
and state relationship (Brysk 2000; Klotz 1995; Cook 1996; Korey 1998; Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999). Keck and Sikkink (1998) developed a complex 
model of norm diffusion – the boomerang pattern – by which domestic human rights 
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groups, who are denied access to political processes at home, appeal to transnational 
actors and publicize information about human rights violations. In cooperation with 
transnational actors, human rights groups are able to generate bilateral pressure from 
key states or multilateral pressure through international human rights mechanisms. 
The complex relationship between the domestic actors, the repressive state and 
external mobilization was later developed into the ‘spiral model’ which identified the 
multiple phases and tactical concessions of the process (Risse and Sikkink 1999).   
 
2.1.4 Power of Norms and Interests 
Located in the constructivist tradition, Keck and Sikkink’s interpretation of 
transnational advocacy networks prioritize normative goals over materialist ones. In 
fact, an overwhelming majority of the literature on transnational non-state actors, 
including the global/transnational civil society literature, transnational advocacy 
networks literature and the NGO literature among others, stress the actors’ principled 
beliefs and values and discount their instrumental concerns. Non-governmental 
organizations do not pursue material gains per se, as they are by definition non-profit 
seeking entities. However, many organizations and networks still have instrumental 
concerns.  
First, their organizational forms require a certain set of instrumental 
considerations. Most non-governmental organizations stem from loosely organized 
social movements. In their evolution to non-governmental organizations and 
coalitions, the formerly volatile and informal groups adopt bureaucratized 
organizational structures (Kriesberg 1997: 12). They have permanent members, 
offices and administrative staff. NGOs, which establish international chapters or 
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coalitions, also have headquarters, development offices and committees, and 
governing bodies. Some organizations such as Oxfam and Amnesty International 
have multimillion-dollar budgets and employ hundreds of field officers and staff 
members (Fisher 1997: 447). In that sense, although non-governmental organizations 
are readily assumed to be operating on principled beliefs rather than material 
interests, in operation they act like firms or businesses (Sell and Prakash 2004).  
Second, attaining the ideational goals require instrumental use of strategies, 
leverage politics, and tactical cooperation with government agencies, international 
organizations, and in some cases, states. In order to influence policy or state behavior 
and to advance their causes, organizations seek access to power through cooperation, 
and compromise with likeminded counterparts, and adjust their organizational 
structures accordingly. For instance, small NGOs with limited power and resources 
adjust their goals and agendas in order to fit with those of international NGOs or 
larger NGO coalitions. NGOs’ strategies and structures also depend on the type and 
capacity of their resources (Gamson 1975; McCarth and Zald 1977). In crude 
economic terms, NGOs have to strategize their economic, political and social capital 
in order to gain increasing returns to scale.  They choose the issues they want to 
advance and the tactics they employ strategically. Organizations also consider their 
members’ and donors’ political reservations and expectations when deciding which 
tactics to pursue and which issues to agitate for. This is particularly critical for 
development NGOs. In general, donors want a large part or preferably all of their 
donations to be used in projects and “not on overhead or on something as amorphous 
as ‘advocacy’ even if this produces tangible results in the long-run” (Khan et al 2009, 
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6). The result-oriented expectations of donors force development NGOs to pursue 
short-term projects that deliver immediate results rather than long-term ones, which 
would ensure long-term self-sustainability.  
To sum up, while non-state actors are motivated by value-oriented concerns, 
instrumental factors play a key role in their emergence, organizational structures, 
strategies and objectives. In social movement terms, non-state actors make strategic 
use of opportunity structures to gain power, attain their goals, and sustain 
mobilization.  Union of the NGOs of the Islamic World (UNIW) is a transnational 
NGO coalition established primarily to promote shared values, worldviews and 
ideological commitments. The normative drive behind UNIW’s formation is global 
Islamic solidarity. However, while it is a religious solidarity organization directly 
guided by normative/ideational concerns, it would be a mistake to frame it as a solely 
value-oriented network. UNIW is no different than any other network or coalition in 
terms of its instrumental concerns. A richer analysis is only possible if we consider 
the ideational and material resources available to UNIW. To that end, in the next 










2.2 ANALYTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS THEORY 
UNIW is by no means a transnational social movement. Transnational social 
movements are the most rare of the transnational action forms. Social movements 
require higher levels of density, cohesion and coordination. Social movements are 
dynamic and hard to control (Tarrow 1998); they engage in contentious politics, 
frequently use protests and disruptive action, and threaten social order (Khagram, 
Riker and Sikkink 2002: 8). Most distinctively, transnational social movements are 
informal networks that link various actors across borders. As opposed to UNIW’s 
formal membership system and well-defined organizational boundaries, transnational 
social movements are loose networks of actors who assume a shared collective 
identity and solidarity across borders despite infrequent and limited personal 
interaction. In that sense, UNIW does not fit into the description of a transnational 
social movement in the collective action taxonomy. While this study is not an 
analysis of UNIW as a transnational social movement, the contributions of the social 
movement literature in providing the analytical tools to theorize means, motives and 
opportunities are indispensable to the study of any collective action form. In this 
study, I borrow two key concepts from social movement theory: (1) opportunity 
structures, and (2) framing. 
 
2.2.1 Opportunity Structures 
That “social movements do not operate in a vacuum” is almost a platitude within 
the social movement literature. Mobilization of any collective action depends on 
multiple external factors: level of grievances, access to resources, and the availability 
of mobilizing structures. Perhaps the most important of these exogenous factors are 
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those that restrict or enhance the likelihood of mobilization, and determine the choice 
of claims, strategies and actions. This set of external constraining or permitting 
factors make up the ‘opportunity structures’ within which a collective movement 
maneuvers.  
While movement scholars have produced a large body of work on opportunity and 
constraint structures, until recently they have restricted their analytical scope to 
domestic institutions and processes. Most research on opportunity structures sought to 
explain the cause/effect relationship between institutional and political change in a 
national system and opportunities for mobilization (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989). 
Furthermore, the majority of North American social movement theory in the 1990s 
has disproportionately focused on domestic political factors. Among the most widely 
employed dimensions of domestic political opportunity structures were the openness 
of the institutionalized political system, shifts in political alignments, stability of elite 
coalition, availability of elite allies, and the nature of state repression (Tarrow 1998). 
Opportunity structures, then, are the possibilities and obstacles presented by 
specific political and social structures of a particular political system. The 
globalization process, on the other hand, has linked international and domestic 
politics in complex ways. As the links between states, non-state actors, and 
international institutions integrated,19 domestic movements found opportunities to 
build transnational alliances. These new transnational opportunity structures 
                                                
19 Tarrow (2005: 7) argues the integration increases “horizontal density of relations across states, 
governmental officials, and nonstate actors”. It also increases “vertical links among the subnational, 
national, and international levels”. Finally, it enhances “formal and informal structures that invite 
transnational activism and facilitate the formation of networks of nonstate, state, and international 
actors.” These three trends create complex vertical and horizontal relationships within institutions such 
as the United Nations, the World Bank; regional alliances like the European Union, and NAFTA; and 
informal networks among capitalists, NGOs and advocacy networks; and in transnational systems of 
migration, crime, and religious activism. 
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transformed the way in which activist groups wage political struggles. For instance, 
international institutions create additional political spaces for non-state actors to 
organize and mobilize (Tarrow 2005: 26-7). Also, transnational social movement 
organizations offer activists opportunities to establish and formalize their ties (Smith 
2005). The participation of transnational organizations, networks, and coalitions in 
international institutions creates further transnational opportunity structures (Sikkink 
2005: 156).   
Domestic or transnational in scope, most research in this field focuses on the 
structural and political aspects of opportunity structures. Yet, the new political spaces 
opened by transnationalism also brought about an interest in the nonstructural 
dimensions of opportunity structures in social movement research. Before the 
“cultural turn” in social movement analysis, theorists had explored nonstructural 
elements such as ideologies (Noonan1995); changes in the prevailing cultural climate 
(Brand 1990); the availability of innovative master frames (McAdam 1996: 25); and 
moral visions, cognitive understandings, and emotions (Goodwin and Jasper 1996). In 
line with the analytical focus of collective action frame perspective, theorists 
separated “objective structural opportunities from the subjective cultural framing of 
those opportunities” (Polletta 2004: 165).  
A broader perspective on the role of cultural processes in collective action 
developed parallel to the cultural turn in social movement theory. Ferree et al. (2002) 
proposed the concept of “discursive opportunity structures” to refer to the ideational 
resources that constrain and enable particular discourses at a given time. These 
nonstructural resources include elements such as cultural context, mass media norms, 
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interpretive packages, metaphors and symbols. Discursive opportunity structures 
enable social movement groups to frame and strategize their efforts within the 
contours of discursive politics. As part of the broader political opportunity structure, 
the discursive opportunity structure encompasses “the framework of ideas and 
meaning-making institutions” (Ferree 2002: 62).  
 
“Worldviews and values, and the more specific norms, ways of thinking, 
practices, resources, and rules that support them, provide a pool of potential 
legitimating devices for particular ways of framing an issue and justifying one’s 
position on it. They offer discursive opportunities as rivals compete in linking 
their framing of an issue with broader cultural symbols, themes, and narratives.” 
(Ferree et. al. 2002: 70)  
 
This meaning-making process has institutional implications. Organizational actors 
that have relatively “regularized access to the political-legal system” (Ferree et al. 
2002: 70), seize advantages by promoting particular frames in public discourse. 
Transnational networks cast a wider net and employ discursive politics on a global 
level. Uninhibited by the relatively consistent and restricted discursive opportunities 
of a national system, transnational non-state actors enjoy the latitude to choose the 
most fitting symbolic, cultural, and ideational resources to frame their claims and 
strategize action.  
 
2.2.2 Framing 
Meaning making and interpretive efforts by social movement activists is a critical 
dimension of discursive opportunity structures. Social movement activists develop 
and employ collective action frames to define the issues with which they are 
concerned (Snow and Benford 1992; Jasper 1997; Oliver and Johnston 2000; Westby 
2002). Collective action frames are “action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that 
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inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns” (Snow and Benford 
2000: 611). Social movement activists construct frames by using the available 
elements of the “cultural toolkit” (Swidler 1986). Metaphors, symbols, and themes of 
the larger cultural system help activists shape ideas and meanings, and interpret 
events and occurrences. By framing issues and events in particular ways, movements 
legitimate their actions, generate support, mobilize potential adherents, and 
demobilize antagonists (Benford and Snow 2000: 613). In sum, then, collective action 
frames help movement activists to define issues in particular ways to articulate 
grievances, identify sources of injustice, propose solutions and alternative modes of 
action, and motivate collective mobilization.  
Collective action frames can be broken down into three principle components: 
injustice, identity and agency (Gamson 1992). The injustice component refers to the 
conditions and actions that create harm and suffering for those represented by the 
social movement. The identity component identifies those who are responsible for 
these conditions (they) and those who are affected (us). It provides the latter group a 
collective vision of itself. The agency component conveys the consciousness that 
movement participants can alter the conditions to which they are subject by “defining 
them as potential agents of their own history” (Gamson 1992: 7).  
Collective action frames are not the sum of “individual attitudes and perceptions 
but also the outcome of negotiating shared meaning” (Gamson 1992: 111). In other 
words, frames are generated through “active, ongoing, and continuously evolving” 
(Snow and Oliver 1995: 587) processes. Throughout this dynamic process, social 
movements select certain elements from the cultural toolkit, highlight some issues 
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and ignore others in order to generate frames to mobilize participants. One of the 
frame development processes is the discursive one. By articulating and amplifying 
particular issues, events and experiences, social movement entrepreneurs offer a new 
perspective, vision, or interpretative schemata. The selective adoption of particular 
issues, events, or beliefs is a strategic process in that it is “deliberative, utilitarian, 
and goal-directed” (Benford and Snow 2000:624). Social movement activists develop 
frames to recruit new members, mobilize adherents, and acquire new resources. 
Social movements package and repackage events and issues in order to present 
alternative ways of interpreting reality, so framing is also a contested process. Since 
social movements are not centralized and homogenous entities, different parties 
within a movement may experience disputes about how to frame issues in the most 
advantageous way. Framing disputes also occur externally. Opponents challenge the 
movement’s frame and counterframe the issues to weaken the latter’s position.  
Most of the framing literature has focused on national contexts (McCarthy 1997; 
Smith 2002). Creating a widely embraced frame on a national scale is a challenging 
effort for social movements. Undertaking such an effort on a transnational scale is 
“far more lengthy, extensive, and multifaceted” (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco 
1997: 245). Transnational framing provides dispersed actors a common ground to act 
collectively. It “links grievances at various local and national levels with each other in 
such a way as to promote shared actions and interpretations of social and political 
problems” (Olesen 2006: 181).  Tarrow (2005: 60) defines global/transnational 
framing as “the use of external symbols to orient local or national claims”. 
Transnational movements aim to create frames that resonate in diverse cultures and 
 50 
contexts. By extrapolating Snow and his collaborators’ (1986: 497 - 475) proposed 
frame alignment typology, one can identify four mechanisms by which transnational 
social movements construct broader frames. First mechanism, frame bridging, links 
two ideologically compatible but structurally separate frames that refer to a particular 
issue. Second mechanism, frame amplification, refers to the clarification and 
invigoration of an existing values or beliefs to connect the issue to people’s lives. 
Third mechanism, frame extension, is broadening the frame to make the message 
salient to potential participants. The forth and most ambitious mechanism, frame 
transformation, refers to a general reframing effort by which old ideas, values and 
meanings are replaced by new ones.  
Framing is directly linked to broader opportunity structures such as political 
environment and institutional resources. The success of any social movement depends 
on the available organizational resources in order to successfully frame their issues 
and to form strategic alliances between groups. As mentioned above, while UNIW is 
not a social movement, its use of civil society discourse and religious solidarity ideal 
can be understood through the lens of opportunity structures and framing. The next 
section pulls together the theories and concepts discussed above to explain the 









As emphasized above, UNIW is not a social movement as it has a more formal, 
united and structured organizational model. Thus, treating it as a social movement 
restricts the scope of analysis. For example, its intra-organizational dynamics and its 
interrelationship with states and governments open up particularly productive 
analytical paths.  These paths would not be as accessible from a strictly social 
movement perspective. Nonetheless, social movement scholarship’s analytical 
contributions such as framing and opportunity structures lend themselves as useful 
devices throughout the analysis. In the remainder of the document, I borrow 
Adamson’s (2005) three types of systemic-level opportunity structures to organize the 
argument: 1) discursive opportunity structures, 2) geopolitical opportunity structures, 
and 3) institutional opportunity structures.  
Discursive opportunity structure framework helps me analyze the ways in which 
UNIW employs a civil society discourse as an instrumental tool to achieve its 
normative goal of global Islamic solidarity. Discursive opportunity structures help 
norm-motivated groups to frame their causes and strategize their actions in line with 
the resonant political discourses. They allow activists to “reinterpret, reformulate, 
rethink, and rewrite the norms and practices” (Katzenstein 1998: 17).  UNIW’s stated 
objective is to ensure global Islamic solidarity and as a coalition of Muslim faith-
based NGOs, it could define itself as a religious solidarity alliance. Yet, as UNIW’s 
representatives frequently repeat, it identifies with civil society actors and defines 
itself as a global Muslim civil society network. It does so because UNIW’s leaders are 
aware that in order to be taken seriously as legitimate political actors, and 
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consequently attain their stated goals, they have to frame their mission and identity 
within the contours of the civil society discourse. This is especially imperative in the 
post-9/11 politics where any Islamic alliance is met with skepticism among the 
international public. Intergovernmental organizations choose to cooperate exclusively 
with organizations that fit into the Western associational forms. International media is 
more receptive to statements from civil society organizations rather than informal 
religious networks. Channels to state access is more open to particular forms of civil 
society; namely non-governmental and non-profit organizations. Country regimes, 
which claim to have legitimate governance in the international politics, are eager to 
announce that they have strong and vibrant civil societies. In other words, civil 
society provides opportunity structures to non-state actors as well as states on 
multiple levels.  
UNIW, then, uses the discursive opportunity structures of the contemporary 
transnational politics and employs the civil society framework strategically. In the 
process, however, it draws selectively from the “normative toolbox and ideational 
resource pool” (Adamson 2005: 554). In contradiction to the copious empirical cases 
of constructivist scholarship on transnational non-state actors such as transnational 
advocacy networks and social movements, UNIW is not a secular network that 
promotes liberal norms. To the contrary, UNIW is a religious network that espouses 
conservative norms. Yet, UNIW’s leaders and member NGOs aptly choose the most 
fitting ideational resources of the liberal toolbox and combine them with conservative 
norms. They simultaneously employ liberal norms such as human rights, anti-
discrimination, and freedom of speech and conservative norms such as 
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communitarian duty, family loyalty, gender and sexuality. In that sense, UNIW is 
able to make its conservative claims using the liberal discursive opportunities of civil 
society.  
Next, geopolitical opportunity structures provide an analytical basis to examine 
UNIW’s mutually beneficial relationship with states and governments. As presented 
in the discussion above, constructivist scholarship downplays the role of state 
interests and geopolitics (Adamson 2005). To the contrary, it magnifies the power of 
norm-motivated non-state actors. Accordingly, the empirical work in this field puts an 
unbalanced emphasis on the impact of transnational non-state actors on states and 
international institutions. This tendency presents an off-balanced picture of the power 
of NGOs, INGOs and transnational advocacy networks over states. However, 
geopolitics and countries’ interests provide structural incentives and constraints 
(Risse 1994). In that sense, the state/non-state actor relationship is a more complex 
and interdependent one. 
The specific case of UNIW is the best example to this argument. As mentioned in 
the introduction chapter, UNIW is based in Turkey and has received significant 
support from Turkish government agencies. Both material support and international 
connections were made available to UNIW by the Turkish government agencies 
because UNIW dovetails with Turkish government’s foreign policy interests. 
Explained in detail in chapter 7, Turkish government’s foreign policy strategy aims to 
cast Turkey as a regional leader, and possibly a global actor since 2002. Therefore, 
Turkey’s foreign policy vision prioritizes establishing cultural and trade relations with 
its interconnected regions. Drawing on the religious and cultural bonds through a neo-
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Ottomanist policy, Turkey’s foreign policy necessitates the services of a soft-power 
actor; preferably a civil society initiative. UNIW’s mission of consolidating global 
Islamic solidarity and its identity a global civil society actor fit the bill perfectly. The 
geopolitical interests of the state supply the norm-motivated non-state actor structural 
incentives and material benefits.  In other words, contrary to the constructivist 
scholarship’s assumptions, the transnational non-state actor and the state are engaged 
in an interdependent and mutually benefiting relationship.  
Finally, the concept of institutional opportunity structures is particularly 
productive is examining the workings of power within the UNIW and the material 
dimensions of the intra-organizational dynamics. Institutional opportunity structure 
idea is closely linked to constructivist scholarship on transnational advocacy networks 
and international nongovernmental organizations as organizational platforms that 
promote interests, provide leverage to domestic groups to amplify the visibility of 
their issues, attain ideational and material resources, and influence state practices 
directly (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Individual local organizations and groups 
turn to the institutional opportunity structures that are available to them at the level of 
transnational non-state politics when domestic regimes are unresponsive and channels 
of institutional access to states are blocked.  
UNIW’s member NGOs enter the network because they have similar ideational 
motivations; they subscribe to UNIW’s values, worldviews, and ideological 
commitments. In other words, they make their commitments based on normative 
goals. However, this commitment comes with two caveats. One, the sustainability of 
members’ commitments depends on UNIW’s ability to offer sufficient benefits to 
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outweigh the members’ investment of time, staff and resources. Members stay 
committed insofar as they obtain added values from the network, such as leverage, 
legitimacy, resources, and visibility. Two, UNIW will support the individual NGOs’ 
causes and extend its resources insofar as the NGOs fit with its institutional culture. 
Therefore, member NGOs which expect UNIW’s support, have to frame their causes, 
organizational identities, and structures to match UNIW’s goals, tactics, ethics, 
culture and organizational structure. In other words, while UNIW is a network that is 
mobilized by norms and values, there are instrumentalist concerns and power 































RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Global/transnational processes have become subjects of great interest in social 
sciences and political philosophy. There is an abundance of theories about global civil 
society, transnational society, world society, transnational networks and movements. 
However, much of the literature on global/transnational networks remains theoretical. 
In Riles’ (2000:4) words, scholarly literature on this field “is characterized by the 
armchair approach to global institutional knowledge”.  
One undisputable explanation to this tendency in scholarly literature is the 
obvious logistic and material limitations. Cost and time constraints remain formidable 
obstacles in front of the study of transnational phenomena. This is especially the case 
for qualitative research. Second is the problem of ‘the analytical case study’: 
Networks are fuzzy, hard to define and circumscribe. The challenge in drawing the 
boundaries of transnational networks renders actual field research and data collection 
difficult. Moreover, as discussed above, the blurry lines between domestic and global 
levels of politics, as well as local and transnational actors, (Khagram et al. 2002) 
complicates in-depth empirical research. 
As a result, majority of research in this area is based on quantitative data. Most 
sociological institutionalist research, Finnemore and Sikkink (2001: 35) point out: 
use quantitative methods to describe overall characteristics of normative or 
cultural structures and plot change in these over time...These analyses can provide 
correlative evidence about the timing and patterns of normative change but are 
less suited to understanding how and why change happens. To accomplish this, 
constructivists have used a variety of tools to capture intersubjective meanings, 
including discourse analysis, process tracing, genealogy, structured focused 
comparisons, interviews, participant observation, and content analysis. 
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Although I challenge constructivist scholarship’s assumptions and arguments 
on specific theoretical points, I find its methodological recommendations pertinent to 
the study of UNIW.  In order to explain the reasons why informal faith-based group 
are establishing formal NGOs and transnational coalitions, I employed a ‘multi-year, 
multi-method, and multi-site approach (Riles 2002). I used qualitative and 
ethnographic methods and drew on diverse sources of data including in-depth 
interviews, participant observation and document analysis. UNIW’s sheer size and 
geographical coverage necessitated a multi-year and multi-site data collection. 
Throughout the research process I conducted interviews in Turkey, Germany, and the 
United States. I conducted additional on-site interviews in UNIW’s 9th Council 
Meeting in Malaysia and observed UNIW’s fieldwork in Cambodia. Over the years, I 
attended several international meetings and conferences organized by UNIW or its 
member NGOs. I also collected and analyzed numerous written materials published 
by UNIW and its members. In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss these research 
procedures and the data collection methods in detail. Next, I describe data 
management, and analysis. In the final sections of the chapter, I discuss the issues that 
arose during data collection and define the terms and concepts that are frequently 
used throughout this document.  
 
3.2 Research Procedures and Data Collection 
 
3.2.1 Interviews: Turkey, Germany, and the United States 
 
Between June 2008 and May 2010, I conducted a total of 52 interviews with 
people including UNIW’s secretary general, executive council members, and 
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representatives of member NGOs from 22 different countries. Most interviews were 
conducted on-site. I met the interviewees at their workplaces, NGO offices, the 
UNIW headquarters in Istanbul, or at international conferences. 
The majority of interviewees had university degrees and came from middle to 
upper-middle class backgrounds in their countries. The age of the interviewees ranged 
from 19 to 62, with a median of 42. The younger interviewees were in the lower 
positions in the organizational hierarchy. Tenure of interviewees in their 
organizations ranged from 1 to 18. Of the 52 interviewees, 18 were women who were 
the representatives of either women’s organizations or the women’s branches of 
larger organizations.  
I used semi-structured in-depth interviews, which lasted from 45 minutes to 3 
hours. For each interview, I used a guide which covered 1) the history, mission, and 
projects of the individual member NGO, 2) the member NGO’s engagements with 
UNIW, 3) opinions about the necessity of a transnational Muslim NGO coalition. I 
sent potential interview subjects the abstract of the project and interview guide by e-
mail beforehand. In all the interviews, these points served as opening questions 
during which interviewees started to feel comfortable in the interview setting and 
with me. In most cases, interviewees continued to talk about issues pertinent to the 
study, gave concrete examples, shared personal experiences, and explored nuances.  
I taped each interview with the interview subject’s consent. The introduction of 
the tape-recorder resulted in unease at the beginning of each interview without 
exception. In most cases, after developing some rapport during the opening questions 
of the interview, the interview subjects started to feel comfortable, ‘forgot’ about the 
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tape recorder, and the interaction became normal. None of the interview subjects 
refused to be tape recorded, but several interviewees asked me to stop recording at 
times when they wanted to explain a ‘sensitive’ issue.  
 
Table 3.1: Distribution of Interviews (by Country) 
 
Country # of Interviews  Country # of Interviews 
Albania 1  Macedonia 1 
Bahrein 1  Malaysia 3 
Bangladesh 1  Mauritania 1 
Cambodia 2  Morocco 1 
Cameroon 1  Pakistan 1 
East Turkistan 2  Palestine 1 
Germany 2  Sri Lanka 1 
Indonesia 1  Sudan 1 
Iran 1  Syria 1 
Kuwait 1  Turkey 25 
Lebanon 1  USA 2 
 
 
Although interviewing is always a conversational process (Guna 1981; Lincoln 
and Guba 1994), the traditional (sometimes called asymmetrical) methods of 
interviewing positions the interview subjects as “vessels of answers”.  The 
interviewer’s job in this case is to ask the right questions to reveal information, 
without allowing her biases to intrude in the process. However, it is impossible for the 
researcher to strip the interview from the interpersonal dynamics of the process.  In 
fact, treating the interviewee simply as a repository of knowledge can hinder the 
development of rapport. 
In order to “incite the respondent’s answers” (Holstein and Gubrium 1995: 123) 
and build rapport in the process, I used the format and principle of active 
interviewing. This format enabled me to pay attention to the social context and the 
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interactional dynamics of the interview. This approach was essential for me to build a 
sense of trust with my research subjects. As I discuss in detail below, due to the 
sensitive political nature of the research topic, the research subjects were hesitant in 
disclosing information during interviews, and even agreeing to meet with me. 
Therefore, explaining myself, my position, and creating a sense of trust through a 
conversational process was critical to the progress of the research. Active 
interviewing format also allows the researcher to challenge the interviewees by 
pointing out the inconsistencies in their responses. The interviewer and the subject, 
then, engage in an interactional process, during which they co-construct and negotiate 
interview responses (Holstein and Gubrium 1995). This technique was especially 
useful in discussing contested topics like the nature of civil society under 
authoritarian Islamic regimes. The interviewees’ first response to this question was to 
take defensive positions and list examples of charitable organizations in Islamic 
tradition. Except for a few tense cases, I asked probing questions about the conditions 
of authoritarian regimes, the respondent’s opinion about the normative functions of 
civil society, and the dissonance between the conditions of authoritarian regimes and 
civil society. It was during these conversational, and sometimes uncomfortable, 
processes that interview subjects reflected on their assumptions, and elaborated on 
their positions, occasionally diverging from their initial response.  
 
3.2.2 Participant Observation and Focus Groups: Malaysia and Cambodia 
In addition to interviewing subjects, I attended meetings and conferences 
organized by UNIW, and spent extensive time in the offices and headquarters of 
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member NGOs in order to familiarize myself with UNIW’s ideological commitments 
and its organizational culture. Throughout the research process, I attended several 
meetings held in Istanbul by UNIW or its Turkish member NGOs. The type, length 
and scope of the meetings varied considerably. Some were large, three-days long 
international conferences that were attended by high-profile politicians, diplomats and 
social movement activists. Others were half-day internal committee meetings where 
the progress of projects was discussed. I also attended several informal events such as 
Sunday brunches of women branches of NGOs or alumni functions.  
Some of the most informative research opportunities appeared spontaneously. For 
example, in June 2009 I was at the UNIW headquarters for a prescheduled interview 
with one executive member. After the interview, the UNIW staff suggested that I stay 
longer to meet a Syrian NGO member who was visiting the UNIW headquarters later 
that day. Not only I had a chance to meet the Syrian visitor that day, I also had the 
opportunity to hang out and have off-the-record conversations with the UNIW staff 
between meetings. Similarly, I spent the entire day with UNIW’s German NGO 
members when I was visiting them for prescheduled interviews in Cologne, Germany. 
The spokesperson of one member NGO took me out to lunch with his family and 
volunteers, and gave me a tour of the Muslim neighborhood in between my 
appointments. These informal settings were very helpful in erasing the pressure of the 
formal interview environment and allowing me to probe more freely on issues that 
were discussed during interviews.  
The most fruitful of such informal interactive settings was the two weeks I spent 
with UNIW’s staff, executive committee members and the spokespeople of UNIW’s 
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member NGOs in Malaysia and Cambodia in May 2010. As I discuss in detail in 
Chapter 5, UNIW holds periodical council meetings every three months in a different 
country. These meetings are summits intended for member NGOs to convene, review 
projects and activities of the previous year, discuss new business, and form working 
relationships. UNIW held its 9th Council Meeting in Malaysia in May 2010. Although 
I voiced my interest in attending council meetings since my first meeting with the 
UNIW secretary general in 2008, it was not until 2010 that the UNIW executive 
committee members were comfortable enough to allow me observe these internal 
meetings. In November 2009, I contacted the UNIW secretary general about the 
upcoming council meeting in Malaysia but I did not get the green light until the 
executive committee discussed my request privately and reached a decision in March 
2010.  
Attending UNIW’s council meeting was a critical turning point in the research 
because it was at this international summit that I had access to a wide range of 
UNIW’s members. NGO spokespeople from 26 countries attended the council 
meeting in Kuala Lumpur. The four-day long meeting involved presentations by 
spokespeople, open discussions about issues and projects, decision-making sessions 
for further action. On the last day of the meetings, an open to public symposium –the 
International Symposium on Good Governance in Islamic World- was held with the 
participation of Malaysian political figures, scholars, and journalists in addition to the 
council meeting attendees.  
UNIW’s council meetings are held in a different country each time. Subsequent to 
the meetings, a select delegation travels to a neighboring country to visit and support 
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NGOs, to introduce UNIW to state officials and government agencies, and to get 
information about the conditions of Muslim populations in the country. In the days 
following the council meetings in Malaysia, I traveled to Cambodia with the UNIW 
delegation. In Cambodia, the delegation visited the Cambodian Muslim Intellectual 
Alliance, met with the Cambodian Secretary of State, and visited a Muslim village 50 
km outside o Phnom Penh to observe the living conditions of Muslim minority 
population in Cambodia. UNIW executives allowed me to participate in all meetings 
in Cambodia so I had the rare opportunity to shadow the UNIW delegation for the 
duration of their stay.  Thanks to my all-access status, I had a chance to observe the 
decision-making, agenda setting, strategy building and networking processes of the 
organization in action.  
Attending UNIW’s formal meetings in Malaysia and Cambodia was very 
productive to better inform my knowledge of the organizational culture and how 
various actors interacted within these settings. However, the most important aspect of 
this field trip was having the opportunity to interact with UNIW members and 
executive informally. We stayed in the same hotels, ate all meals together, and 
traveled as a group. In fact, I learned most about the organization and its ideology 
while ‘hanging out’ with some of the UNIW executive members in the evenings in 
the hotel lobby. During these casual conversations, UNIW discussed everything 
ranging from the humidity in Malaysia to international politics. For example, a key 
dimension of this dissertation, namely UNIW’s close engagements with the Turkish 
government, emerged during one of these casual conversations with six people from 
the Turkish delegation late at night at the hotel lobby in Malaysia. An offhand 
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question I asked to UNIW’s secretary general sparked a heated debate in the group 
about the role of the pro-Islamic AKP government in Turkey on UNIW’s success. 
After twenty minutes of circumventing the issue, one member put it bluntly: “Let’s be 
honest. Could we do all this if it was not for the AKP?” Although I did not record and 
quote the conversations in these informal settings due to ethical concerns, information 
revealed during these encounters was essential in framing the focus of the project. 
 
3.2.3 Document Review and Analysis 
Throughout the research process, I collected written material published either by 
UNIW or by its member NGOs. These published material included periodicals, press 
releases, bulletins, brochures, mission statements, and reports that address the 
activities, projects, and opinions of the organizations. Periodicals were particularly 
essential in gaining insight to the ideological positions of the organizations. Periodical 
journals and newsletters are mostly circulated within the organization that publishes 
them. The opinion pieces and essays in these publications take up issues that are 
debated within the community around the publishing organizations. Therefore, such 
material revealed insider information and perspectives that were otherwise brushed 












Table 3.2: Data Collection Procedures (by timeline and location) 
 
 Research Activity Procedure Location Timeline 
Stream 1 Research 
Preparation 
• Preliminary Approval 
Arranging Logistics for 
Research 
Maryland, USA March /May  
2008 
Stream 2 Data Collection I • Interviews 
• Document collection 
• Building initial contacts 





Stream 3 Data Collection II • Interviews 





Stream 4 Data Collection 
III 
• Additional Interviews 




2009 – January 
2010 
Stream 5 Data Collection 
IV 
• Interviews 




Stream 6 Data Collection V • Interviews 
• Document collection 








3.3 Problems and Virtues of the Data 
 
The transnational qualitative methodology of the project presented particular 
challenges throughout the data collection process. One of the main challenges results 
from elite interviewing methods. Elites are “a group of individuals, who hold, or have 
a privileged position in society” (Richards 1996:199) and therefore they can speak on 
behalf of groups they represent. On the other hand, the very nature of their privileged 
positions creates a number of operational challenges in data collection. The most 
significant of these is the issue of access. As Richards (1996: 200) explains, 
“Sometimes, it is simply not possible to obtain a representative sample, because 
certain individuals or categories of individuals refuse a request for an interview.” This 
was definitely the case at the initial stages of the research. The sensitive political 
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nature of the research topic and my lack of former connections with any religious 
network made it difficult to secure interviews with UNIW executives at the 
beginning. My outsider status to the network, and my affiliation with an American 
university raised concerns in the initial stages of the research. Three NGO 
spokespeople I contacted for interviews rejected my appointment requests on the spot. 
UNIW’s secretary general was the key gatekeeper in the organization. I could get 
access to him only towards the end of the first phase of data collection. After our 
initial interview 2008, he was willing to provide me additional connections and 
facilitate my interaction with other NGO spokespeople and executive committee 
members through his staff. Once I conducted interviews with the secretary general 
and other higher-level individuals in the organization, it became easier to get 
interview appointments with UNIW members on the phone during the second phase 
of the data collection.  
The challenges of data collection did not only stem from the specific issues of elite 
access. Transnational qualitative research also involves challenges of logistics and 
language. In the remainder of this section, I describe both in detail and identify the 
strategies I used to ensure the reliability of data. 
 
3.3.1 Sampling Considerations  
As described above, UNIW is one of the largest Islamic NGO coalitions in terms 
of its geographical scope. While this was one of the critical reasons why I chose 
UNIW as this dissertation’s case study, the very geographical reach of the 
organization presented unique challenges during data collection. Most importantly, 
logistical and material limitations prevented me from collecting first-hand data on 
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UNIW’s all 193 members NGOs. In order to improve the coverage of the data, I 
attended UNIW’s international council meetings. These international member 
summits provided access to a total of 46 NGOs, which constitutes 23.8 % of UNIW’s 
member NGOs. The data fares better in covering the geographical scope of UNIW’s 
membership base. Having the opportunity to conduct face-to-face interviews with 
NGOs from 22 different countries, I could cover 47.7 % of UNIW’s country 
membership. I remedied the data’s partial coverage of UNIW’s membership base in 
two ways: (1) focusing on UNIW’s missions, projects, and goals as an umbrella 
organization, and (2) reflecting on the data collected from 46 NGOs rather than 
generalizing it to UNIW’s entire member base.  
This dissertation project analyzes UNIW’s objectives and practices as an umbrella 
organization. Accordingly, the research questions aim to identify the reasons why 
UNIW’s founders and current directors strive to vitalize civil society initiatives in 
Muslim countries, bring Muslim NGOs under UNIW’s umbrella, and most notably, 
frame this religious solidarity alliance within the discourse and organizational 
structures of the civil society framework. As such, the dissertation project aims to 
analyze UNIW as a global Muslim NGO coalition project, rather than the specifics of 
its individual member organizations. Therefore, I could firmly draw conclusions on 
UNIW’s discourses and practices as an NGO coalition since I had the opportunity to 
collect data from UNIW’s founders and executive members throughout the course of 
the research. 
Conversely, the data does not allow me comment as firmly on UNIW’s 
membership base. As described above, the data covers 23.8% of UNIW member 
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NGOs and 47.7% of country membership. Broken down to regional membership, 
some world regions are represented more strongly than others.20 In the few cases in 
which I discuss member NGOs’ discourses and practices, I solely rely on the 
collected data on the particular NGO rather than generalizing the data to UNIW’s 
entire membership base. In those cases, I specify the particular NGO, the interview 
subjects’ roles in the organization, provide a brief overview of the organization’s 
history, mission, and projects. As a result, certain aspects of the network’s ideological 
concerns and commitments become more salient. For instance, the data on South East 
Asian, Central Asian, and European NGOs allows me to delve deeper into the 
grievances of religious minorities in these regions. Similarly, the data on West 
African and Middle African member NGOs provides detailed information on the pros 
and cons of humanitarian efforts. The overrepresentation of Turkish member NGOs 
both in UNIW’s membership and in the collected data results in a thorough analysis 
of the ways in which Turkish member NGOs benefit from the Turkish government’s 
foreign policy vision. On the other hand, insufficient data from the East African, 
South African and the Arabian Peninsula (except for the data on Kuwaiti and 
Bahraini member NGOs) hinders analysis on the particular issues, concerns and 




                                                
20 Data covers 14.3% of Middle Eastern and North African member NGOs, 22.2% of European 
member NGOs, 16.7% of West African member NGOs, 50% of Middle African member NGOs, 
36.7% of South East Asian member NGOs, 66.7% of Central Asian member NGOs, and 100% of 
North American NGOs. Due to the strong affiliation to Turkish NGOs and executive committee 
members, ratio of Turkish NGO data is calculated separately. The collected data covers 30.9% of 
UNIW’s Turkish member NGOs.  
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3.3.2 Language Considerations 
The second issue that emerged during the data collection process involves the 
language in which the interviews are conducted. I interviewed the Turkish members 
of UNIW in their first-language. The rest of the interviews were conducted in 
English, which is the interview subjects’ second-language. All interview subjects 
were middle-class professionals who were rather fluent in English and none of them 
expressed discomfort about the interview language. At the same time, I recognize the 
potentially limiting nature of having to express multifaceted political opinions in a 
second language. In order to avoid mistranslations, I only quote comments, which the 
interview subjects restated and elaborated on.  
I also did not include data that might have been potentially mistranslated by a third 
party. For instance, in the exceptional case of the Syrian NGO interview, I had to use 
a non-professional translation. The NGO spokesperson spoke French and Arabic, and 
not English or Turkish. The interview opportunity presented itself spontaneously at 
the UNIW headquarters therefore I had not had a chance to recruit a professional 
translator beforehand. A Cameroonian member who spoke Turkish volunteered his 
services on the spot. Each question and answer underwent translations in multiple 
languages. Since I cannot trust the quality of translations, I did not include this 
interview to the data analysis. I use a single quote from this interview in the 
document, only because it was a typical comment that came up multiple times during 




3.4 Data Management and Analysis 
As mentioned above, one of the main challenges of qualitative research on 
transnational networks is the problem of the analytical case study. A transnational 
NGO coalition such as UNIW presents the researcher a vast number of angles and 
foci to systematize the data collection. In light of my research question, I decided to 
adopt a two-tiered perspective: 1) data about UNIW across organizations, and 2) in-
depth data on the member organizations within the network.  
In order to manage, code, and analyze the collected data, I used the qualitative 
analysis software, QSR NVIVO7. NVIVO was allowed efficiency in data management 
by keeping all transcribed interviews and field notes in one file. Coding is the 
analytical process of identifying and recording different passages of the text for 
significant events, experiences, and ideas (Strauss and Corbin 1998). As the 
advocates of grounded theory suggest (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss 1987), the 
most appropriate coding approach for qualitative analysis is to employ in vivo coding, 
using the expressions and phrases from the text as codes. In vivo codes are 
particularly useful in identifying new variables than adopting constrained literature-
based codes (Diamantopoulos and Souchon 1996).  While the exploratory nature of 
all qualitative research in the emergent field of transnational faith-based NGO 
networks necessitate this coding approach as opposed to a predetermined coding 
scheme, I did not go into the field without any ideas or preconceptions. Recognizing 
the impossibility of the tabula rasa approach (Gibbs et al. 2002: 62), I paid extra 
effort to avoid interpretations based on pre-existing theory.  
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I analyzed the data along the following lines: 
• Analysis of the data for certain themes: UNIW’s history and mission, 
UNIW’s composition, shared values and ideological commitments across 
UNIW’s members, discrepancies between discourse and practice, opinions 
about the West/Islam dichotomy, opinions about the normative functions 
of civil society, state/business/civil society relationship. I recoded the data 
as new themes and patterns emerged. 
• Data were coded for how particular discourses and organizational 
structures were used to access additional channels of power by attaining 
legitimacy, public visibility, and resonance.   
 
I started the analysis with open coding. Open coding is the labeling of concepts 
and categories during the early stages of coding. I continued this process until some 
codes began to stand out as significant and links between codes began to cohere 
(Benaquisto 2008). NVIVO’s code organizing system in a tree node structure was 
particularly useful at this stage to build a hierarchy of concepts and sub-concepts21. I 
then moved on to axial coding in order to refine specific concept categories and to 
present the links between concepts and sub-concepts (Strauss and Corbin 1998). In 
the last stage of the coding process, selective coding, I refined the core categories, 
identified the conditions and consequences of the core category, and integrated the 





                                                
21 For a full list of codes, see Appendix E: Code Chart. 
 72 
 
3.5 Definition of Terms 
I have discussed the terms below in detail throughout the dissertation. However, 
given the degree of ambiguity with which many of these terms are often used, I 
clarify each of them here and provide brief definitions that might help the reader. 
Advocacy: All activities designed to influence the decision-making process of an 
institutional elite or change legislation, policy or practice on behalf of a collective 
interest. Non-profit advocacy may take the form of conducting research, publicizing 
issues or policies, lobbying members of decision-making bodies, campaigning to 
generate public support, and coalition building to mobilize resources towards a 
common goal.  
Community-based organizations: Organizations that are organized at a local 
level and are representative of a community or a significant segment of a community. 
Community-based organizations focusing on identifying and addressing community 
needs such as social, educational, environmental, or public safety services. Their 
activities depend heavily on voluntary labor and financial support.   
Geopolitics/ Geostrategy: Geopolitics refers to the location of the particular 
country, and the geographic distribution of economic and national resources. 
Geostrategy is the direction of a state’s foreign policy with regards to geopolitical 
factors. States selectively focus their diplomatic and material resources to specific 
geographical locations based on territory, location, and potential alliance partners. 
However, the geostrategy of a state is wider than crude geographical realities of a 
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region. A state may devise its geostrategy “because of ideological reasons, interest 
groups, or simply the whim of its leader.” (Grygiel 2006: 22). 
International/Multinational/Transnational: The interchangeable use of 
international, multinational, and transnational often clouds the differences between 
distinct political spheres. I find Portes’ (2001) classification very useful in 
distinguishing the terms. In this classification, international activities are conducted 
by states or nationally based institutions. Multinational activities are carried out by 
formal institutions whose purpose and interests transcend a single nation-state. 
Transnational activities on the other hand are initiated and sustained by non-
institutional actors across borders. 
Islam/Islamism/Muslim/Islamist: Similarly, there is a great deal of confusion 
about the difference in meaning between these terms. In this dissertation I use these 
terms in different ways. Islam is a religion with its scriptures, rituals and obligations. 
Muslims are the adherents of the religion of Islam.  Whereas Islam refers to the faith 
and cultures, Islamist refers to the political ideology based in Islam. In Gole’s 
(2000:93) terms, Islamism “carries the ideal of changing society as a whole – of 
Islamization of all spheres of life, ranging from gender relations, private/public 
boundaries, scientific knowledge, and governance principles”. Islamism, therefore, is 
a religio-political ideology based in Islamic principles. Muslims who believe that 
Islam can and should form the bases of political ideology are termed as Islamists.  
Muslim World/ Islamic World/ Muslim-majority countries: Muslim World, 
Islamic World, Islamic geography, Muslim geography are terms that are used 
frequently both by UNIW’s leaders and its members in reference to the geographical 
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areas where Muslims live as a majority or minority. I retain terms when paraphrasing 
the interview subjects’ comments. In the rest of the document, I use Muslim majority 
countries to refer to parts of the world in which a substantial Muslim population live 
even if the degree of attachment to Islam in all these regions is different. 
Non-Profit Organizations / Non-Governmental Organizations: Non-profit, or 
not-for-profit, organizations are self-governing and formalized associational entities 
that do not pursue self-serving aims. Non-profit organizations do not particularly seek 
profit-producing goals. Any material gain, such as income or financial surplus, is not 
shared by members but plowed back into the organization. Similarly, members cannot 
divide the assets among themselves for personal benefit if the organization ceases to 
exist. Non-governmental organization is a non-profit group or association that pursue 
social, cultural, legal, and environmental goals by lobbying, persuasion, or direct 
action. Salamon and Anheier (1992) identify five common characteristics of NGOs: 
(1) formal, institutionalized with regular meetings; (2) non-profit distributing, the 
financial surplus does not accrue to owners or directors; (3) self-governing, able to 
control and manage its own affairs, (4) voluntary, members join by choice, and (5) 
private, independent of institutionalized political structures.  
Philanthropy / Charity: While both philanthropy and charity are associated with 
voluntary giving, they are often defined in contrasts. The two terms are differentiated 
based on the objectives and reach of voluntary action. The idea of charity has closer 
ties to the religious tradition of altruism, compassion and empathy. Charitable giving 
is aimed to relieve immediate suffering. Philanthropy is defined in a more impersonal, 
institutionalized, and professional approach. Philanthropy refers to “voluntary action 
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for the public good” (Payton 1988) rather than a spontaneous act of mercy or 
compassion. In the international non-profit domain, humanitarian relief aid that is 
transferred to disaster stricken areas is associated with charity, whereas the 
development aid that aims to implement long-term solutions to systemic problems is 
associated with philanthropy.  
Political entrepreneurs: Individuals possessing power positions or access to 
institutions who attempt to change the political status quo by persuading others. As 
such, the term is not limited to individuals who are embedded within the formal 
political system, such as politicians and bureaucrats. Actors who operate from outside 
the political system, such as NGO leaders, social movement members, or lobbyists, 
are also considered political entrepreneurs. Political entrepreneurs promote change 
not only for ideological reasons, but also for political profit including monetary gain, 
job security, political support, or public prestige. 
Social Mobilization / Community Mobilization: Social mobilization refers to 
the process, through which social actors organize to identify and pursue collective 
interests. They raise awareness among social constituencies, articulate interest to 
governing bodies, and strengthen public support by pooling resources and building 
solidarity. In the development sector, social mobilization is used to cover larger and 
rapid scale efforts while community mobilization is used to refer to spontaneous, 
grassroots efforts that undertake smaller-scale projects.  
Stakeholders: Stakeholders are individuals, communities or organizations that 
benefit from the activities of a non-governmental organization. Stakeholders often 
include donors, regulators, board members, staff, and volunteers as well as the NGOs’ 
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beneficiaries. An NGO’s accountability and legitimacy depend on the performance 
monitoring by stakeholders. 
Transnational non-state actors: This term covers all non-state actors, including 
transnational advocacy networks, international non-governmental organizations, and 
transnational social movements that operate across the globe and form part of politics. 
Critically, these actors are neither states nor intergovernmental organizations. They 
operate independently of states, governments and intergovernmental organizations, 
but they act alongside them, and sometimes collaborate with them. 
Transnational politics: The term transnational is used to refer to human 
activities and social institutions that transcend national borders. Transnational politics 
is the interchange of ideas, issues and conflicts between actors in two or more 
countries. The term political does not only refer to matters that concern the state, its 
governments, and its policies but also formal and informal non-state actors.  
Voluntarism: Voluntarism refers to the activity of individuals who offer their 
time for the benefit of others. Two key components of voluntarism are free will and 
the absence of monetary gain. In the context of NGOs, members volunteer their time 












FROM LOCAL CHARITIES TO TRANSNATIONAL COALITIONS: 
 




Associational life has a long history in Muslim societies. Social and personal ties 
of religious communities have functioned as vivid, informal civic networks for 
centuries. Guilds, sufi orders,22 religious trusts and foundations enjoyed a significant 
degree of autonomy and leadership role in communities (Zubaida 2001: 233). 
Particularly awqaf (sing.: waqf), charitable trusts funded by philanthropic 
endowments, have served as social organizations. “Donated in perpetuity for 
philanthropic purposes” (Clark 2004: 8), awqaf funded the maintenance of mosques 
or charities such as hospitals, schools, universities, pensions and other works of 
public utility. Yet, the transformation of Islamic charities into NGOs, in the modern 
definition of the concept, is a recent one. In the early 1980s, Islamic charities started 
to transform into formal faith-based NGOs to extend modest social aid and 
humanitarian relief to cities such as Cairo, Tehran, Algiers, Beirut and Gaza 
(Ghandour 2003).  
It was during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the war in Bosnia that civic 
action went through a major transformation. As Muslim countries and communities 
around the world mobilized to provide humanitarian relief to Afghans under invasion, 
                                                
22 Sufism dates back almost to the time of the Prophet Muhammad, and it has been present in Muslim 
societies for more than 12 centuries. It is the inward-looking, mystical or psycho-spiritual dimension of 
Islam, emphasizing personal and emotional religious experiences. Historically, Sufis were organized 
into brotherhoods, guilds, or mystical orders, each with its own religious rites, saintly lineage and 
leadership structure (Green 2012). 
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the number of humanitarian Muslim NGOs rapidly increased. By mid-1990s, some of 
the more successful NGOs started to implement international relief programs. As 
faith-based organizations, which are rooted in Islamic traditions of charity and 
voluntarism, they refer to Qur’anic texts and hadith23 to explain their inspiration. 
Furthermore, they work almost exclusively with Muslim populations, and claim to act 
on Umma’s24 behalf.  
In this chapter I trace the evolution of non-governmental organizations from 
charities to transnational NGO networks in the Muslim world. In the first section, I 
discuss the transformative effects of the wars in Afghanistan and Bosnia on Islamic 
charities. In the second section, I overview the contemporary NGO field, specifically 
focusing on transnational humanitarian/social aid organizations in Muslim countries. 
In the final section, I take a look at the transnational networks and alliances among 
Islamic NGOs. 
 
4.1 Two Triggers: Wars in Afghanistan and Bosnia 
The Afghan War was the first great cause that mobilized support for Muslims in 
need by blending ‘Islamic relief’ and ‘Islamic solidarity’ (Benthall and Bellion-
Jourdan 2003). The Islamic organizations that mobilized during the Afghan War 
operated on an ideal of Islamic solidarity which consisted of three elements: da’wa 
(Islamic call), jihad  (in the sense of armed support of the Islamic Cause), and ighatha 
(humanitarian relief). The da’wa organizations were committed to preaching the 
message of Allah internationally. Their ideological mission was to spread the call to 
                                                
23 The collection of traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad that includes his sayings and acts. 
24 Global community of believers. 
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Islam among the Afghan refugees in camps in the outskirts of Peshawar. The jihad 
organizations were paramilitary groups that directly supported Afghan combatants. 
The ighatha organizations offered mainly medical services by establishing hospitals 
and medical clinics, and providing medicines and medical equipment (Benthall and 
Bellion-Jourdan 2003: 71-74). The Afghan War period of Islamic mobilization is 
marked by the convergence in the missions and actions of these three organization 
types. ‘Islamic relief’ in this period, “was not merely an action of relief for victims, 
but a part of a total commitment to the support of a political cause with a strong 
religious component” (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003: 74). Although all three 
elements of Islamic solidarity (da’wa, jihad, ighatha) were present in Islamic NGOs’ 
activities during the Afghan War, the organizations evolved towards 
professionalization over the years. While some organizations became more politically 
active, others dropped the da’wa and jihad components and specialized in 
humanitarian aid (Ghandour 2002, Salih 2004). 
The Bosnian conflict (April 1992 – December 1995) became a catalyst for another 
chapter of Islamic mobilization after the Afghan War. The Bosnian case was critical 
in mobilizing the Muslims of the Umma as they interpreted the conflict as “an 
aggression against Islam and the Islamic community” (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 
2003: 128). The support from the Umma came in two major strands: military 
involvement of foreign combatants and humanitarian aid by Islamic relief 
organizations.  
 On the one hand, the jihadist interpretation of the Bosnian conflict mobilized 
foreign groups and volunteers to participate in military combat, similar to the Afghan 
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War experience. Arab combatants who had taken part in the Afghan War, militants 
from armed Islamist groups, pro-Iranian combatants and new volunteers flocked to 
Bosnia to participate in fight to defend Islam and Muslim populations. On the other 
hand, the Bosnian case was transformative as it gave a considerable boost to the 
development of Islamic charities. Especially between 1992 and 1993, NGOs from all 
over the Muslim geography mushroomed in an effort to provide aid to the Bosnian 
population and raise awareness about the humanitarian crisis caused by the conflict. 
In addition to many Muslim charities such as Helping Hands and Children’s Relief 
Fund, several transnational organizations thrived during this period. Organizations 
such as Muslim Aid and Islamic Relief refused to participate in military combat and 
were emphatic in limiting their activities to humanitarian aid.  
The Bosnian case was also momentous in launching projects that later became 
permanent fixtures to the repertoire of Muslim NGOs of all sizes. Displacement of the 
Muslim population in Bosnia in order to protect the civilians appeared to be a critical 
decision for both the Western and Islamic NGOs in this period. The decision was 
critical because it could possibly contribute to the policy of ethnic cleansing and it 
could also expose the civilians to the risk of extermination in the process. For the 
Islamic NGOs, the exodus of Muslim populations would bear the risk of elimination 
of Islam in Bosnia. Furthermore, relocation would expose Muslim populations to the 
risk of assimilation in their host countries. Therefore, the Islamic NGOs prioritized 
two objectives: “taking care of refugees, and keeping Muslim populations inside 
Bosnia” (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003: 140). 
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The threat of losing or compromising Islamic identity in Bosnia shaped Islamic 
NGOs’ activities and projects. Such projects, which were developed in order to 
reinstate the role of Islam among the Bosnian population during this period, were 
adopted and replicated by Islamic NGOs worldwide thereafter. Specifically the food 
aid programs during religious festivals became the staples of Muslim NGOs. 
Throughout the Bosnian crisis, Islamic NGOs organized fast-breaking dinners in 
refugee camps or in Bosnian towns and villages during Ramadan. The organizations 
gave away new clothes and presents for the festival following the month of Ramadan. 
During Eid al-Adha (the Festival of Sacrifice), these organizations arranged animal 
sacrifices and meat deliveries to Bosnian Muslims (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 
2003: 143). In addition to providing humanitarian aid and food deliveries, many of 
these organizations also supported the local Islamic institutions by developing Islamic 
educational programs. Islamic NGOs sought paths to re-Islamization of Bosnia by 
building mosques and Quranic schools, distributing Islamic literature such as “copies 
of the Quran, small leaflets reproducing suras of the Quran and summarizing the 
principles of Islam” (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003: 143 - 144).  
 
4.2 Contemporary NGOs in the Muslim World 
Most contemporary Muslim humanitarian NGOs trace their origins to mostly 
amateur field work in Bosnia in the early 1990s. The Bosnian case came to be the 
training ground for organizations to acquire the skills and proficiency that were 
extended to other areas in the years to come. Since 1990s, these NGOs have evolved 
and professionalized. While some organizations kept their militant outlook, most 
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organizations professionalized their operations with an eye towards efficiency, 
effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003; Ghandour 
2003). Muslim NGOs retained their Islamic identity and references to religious values 
and obligations while adopting the organizational models of the ‘Western’ aid 
agencies. They use the same technical-logistical, fundraising, and communication 
techniques that are used by the larger international aid sector (de Cordier 2009:613).  
Larger organizations such as Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid started making their 
recruitment decisions based on competence, expertise in fields of management and 
administration, information technology, teaching, social work and professional 
training. Militant commitment or charitable intentions are no longer enough to be 
recruited in these organizations (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003: 79). The 
professional staff, as well as voluntary workers, are educated, middle-class, urban 
professionals majority of whom are doctors, engineers, and school-teachers (Clark 
2004: 11). 
Today, there are a wide variety of community-based and transnational Islamic 
NGOs that are involved in social aid and welfare. They have been especially 
conspicuous in providing food, clothing and shelter to the poor, sick and disabled; 
bringing emergency relief to disaster stricken areas; sinking wells in water shortage 
areas; supporting orphanages, schools, hospitals, and youth centers. Transnational 
Muslim NGOs serve the victims of natural disasters and wars, sponsor viable 
economic projects and small businesses that can help the victims find employment 
and earn a living. While these organizations aim to alleviate poverty and suffering, 
they do not define poverty only in terms of material needs. Markedly different from 
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secular humanitarian and development organizations, transnational Muslim NGOs are 
equally concerned about spiritual needs. According to these organizations, religious 
ignorance and backwardness, the dissolution of Islamic values, and the dispersion of 
the global Muslim community are as alarming as material poverty and deprivation. In 
order to solve the problem of religious deprivation, transnational Muslim 
organizations work to establish solidarity in the Muslim Umma, address individual 
Muslims’ religious needs by providing religious education, constructing mosques and 
madrasas, and distributing copies of the Qur’an.  
Two of the oldest and largest transnational Muslim NGOs are the International 
Islamic Relief Organization (IIROSA) and the International Islamic Charitable 
Organizations (IICO). Both are Gulf-based organizations and their headquarters are in 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait respectively. Both organizations provide aid in their home 
countries but they mostly work transnationally through country offices. For example, 
the primary recipients of IIROSA’s aid are Muslims in Jordan, Sudan, Pakistan, 
Somalia, Azerbaijan, Yemen, Nigeria, Afghanistan and Ethiopia.25 They run orphan 
sponsorship, urgent relief, health care, education programs; build mosques, Islamic 
centers and schools; and provide Qurbani sacrifice and fast breaking aid. 
The Islamic traditions of charity form the basis of NGOs’ funding. Helping the 
disadvantaged, such as giving money to the poor or helping someone in distress, is an 
obligation rather than an individual choice (Krafess 2005: 327). Charitable acts, both 
as zakat (Obligatory alms giving) and as sadaqa26 (voluntary almsgiving), are close 
companions to prayer. Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam and as such it is 
                                                
25 IIROSA Annual Report 2003/2004.  
26 Sadaqa is not an obligation, yet Qur’an recommends voluntary almsgiving to win the favor of God. 
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incumbent on all Muslims.27 Commanded in the Qur’an, zakat is a system that 
“organizes the transfer of money from the well-off to the poor and needy” (Krafess 
2005: 335). Every Muslim is obligated to donate 2.5% of his/her annual possessions 
as an act of piety to the poor, the needy, recent converts to Islam, slaves, bankrupts, 
those who have committed themselves to some act of service or devotion, and to 
wayfarers (Dean and Khan 1995:198). In Islamic countries, governments are 
obligated to establish agencies to collect zakat. In Muslim-minority countries, where 
there is no government or state organization to collect and distribute zakat, Muslim 
NGOs invite Muslims to make their annual zakat donations to them. Zakat donations 
constitute Muslim NGOs’ primary source of funding in non-Muslim countries (Weiss 
2002). Especially in the West, the Muslim diaspora has helped the mushrooming of 
zakat collecting NGOs. Unlike the first generation Muslim immigrants who 
overwhelmingly transferred their zakat donations through mosques or philanthropic 
foundations in their region of origin, later generations increasingly donate their zakat 
in their countries of residence. Furthermore, most of these organizations accept cash 
donations in lieu of Qurbani (animal sacrifice) offerings.  As the younger generations 
of Muslims lost ties with their countries of origin, Eid and Qurbani donations in cash 
alongside zakat have become major fundraising channels for Muslim NGOs (de 




                                                
27 The other four fundamental obligations are the declaration of faith (shahada), prayer (salat), annual 
fasting during the holy month of Ramadan (sawm), and the once-in-a-lifetime pilgrimage to Mecca 
(hajj).  
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Table 4.1: Largest Transnational Muslim NGOs based in UK and USA 
 







Muslim Aid UK 73 million 
LIFE for Relief and Development USA 18 million 
Muslim Hands UK 10.6 million 
Interpal UK 4.2 million 
Helping Hand for Relief and Development USA 4 million 
Human Relief Foundation UK 3.5 million 
Human Appeal International UK 3.2 million 
 
As the Islamic NGOs activities described above demonstrate, the humanitarian 
aspect of aid and the religious aspect of Umma are interwoven in Islamic relief 
organizations’ discourses and practices. Islamic NGOs’ discourses are grounded in 
religion, as it is evident by their references to “Islamic traditions and concepts such as 
zakat, sadaqa and hadiths rather than the Millennium Development Goals, the 
Universal Human Rights Declaration or the Human Development Index” (Petersen 
2011: 15). The global Muslim solidarity ideal motivates the organizations and their 
donors and volunteers to mobilize for Umma’s well-being, protection and the 
advancement of its interests.  
The rhetoric of Umma in Islamic movements is not a recent one. Having its roots 
in the Qur’an, the term has been used in modern Islamic discourse, from the 
nineteenth-century pan-Islamist movement of Jamal al Din al-Afghani throughout 
many twentieth century movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Iranian Revolution (Halliday 2002: 21). As a blanket term that covers all countries, 
regions and societies in which Muslims live as a majority, the idea of Umma assumes 
a unifying cultural bond among the global community of Muslims, and it has 
maintained its appeal as a discursive ideal. Although the strong nationalisms of the 
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20the century have complicated the coexistence of “local” and “global,” the 
flexibility and expediency of the concept still provide a vision of shared identity and 
tradition beyond the immediate experiences of Muslim communities. In the words of 
An-Naim (2007: 25), the imagination and shared identity of Umma is “sufficiently 
present in the consciousness of present generations of Muslims to be mobilized in 
support of overlapping national and global citizenship.” Petersen (2011: 139) vividly 
reports IICO and IIROSA’s leaders’ concerns about the state of the Umma today:  
[Umma is under threat] at different levels: from within, by immoral and ignorant 
Muslims on the one side, and religious extremists and fanatics on the other; and 
from the outside, by ‘an organized invasion’ of Christian NGOs, trying to take 
Muslims away from their religion, as well as by ‘baseless allegations’ launched 
against Muslim NGOs by ‘some people in the West’ in particular after 9/11. 
 
Under attack from all angles, strengthening solidarity among the peoples of the 
Umma is essential according to transnational Islamic NGOs. Thus, almost all of the 
organizations are motivated by a religious solidarity ideal and claim to act on 
Umma’s behalf (Benedetti 2006: 856). The solidarity rhetoric presents itself in two 
ways in the practices of transnational Muslim NGOs. First, NGOs predominantly run 
their projects in Muslim-majority communities, thus a vast majority of the 
beneficiaries are Muslims.28 Second, it leads community-based and transnational 




                                                
28 While this pattern raises questions regarding the aid organizations’ principle of non-discrimination 
obligation based on race, faith or nationality; it should be noted that the majority of beneficiaries in the 
world are Muslim. The concerns about the non-discrimination principle of humanitarian organizations 
“are more acute in contexts that are either religiously mixed or whose religious identity is low key or 
nominal – like parts of Africa or Bosnia” (de Cordier 2009:614). 
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4.3 Transnational Networks and Alliances Among Muslim Faith-Based NGOs 
Transnational alliances among Muslim countries are not a new phenomenon. 
There have been various country level coalitions and intergovernmental 
organizations, which pool the resources of their member countries, combine efforts, 
and voice the interests and well-being of their peoples and of all Muslims in the 
world. The most renowned of intergovernmental Muslim coalitions is the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). OIC is the second largest 
intergovernmental organization after the United Nations with the membership of 57 
states spread over four continents.29 The representatives of the member countries are 
heads of States and governments, Kings, and Foreign, Information, Culture, and 
Tourism ministers. Although OIC works on a global level and represents the global 
Muslim population in the international arena, it is a coalition of states rather than civil 
organizations. 
In the NGO world, the humanitarian sector has been the most prominent in 
forming transnational partnerships. The earliest efforts in coordinating humanitarian 
                                                
29 The Organization was established upon a decision of the Rabat Summit in 1969 following the 
demolishment of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Six months after the event, the First Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in Saudi Arabia during which the OIC General Secretariat 
was established in order to ensure coordination among member states to strengthen Islamic solidarity; 
cooperation in the political, economic, social, cultural and scientific fields; to safeguard the Holy 
Places; to eliminate racial discrimination and all forms of colonialism; and to work for the settlement 
of conflicts and disputes involving member states. The Organization has consultative and cooperative 
relations with United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations. Every year the United 
Nations General assembly adopts a resolution on “Cooperation between the United Nations and the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference”, and requests the U.N. Secretary General to submit a report in 
this question. The General Secretariat of the Organization, its affiliated and specialized institutions, 
and subsidiary bodies have Cooperation Agreements or Protocols of Understanding with several 
international organizations including the Red Cross, World Health Organization (WHO), World 
Intellectual Property Organization, UN Development Programme, UN Environment Programme, and 
UN Population Fund. In addition to the United Nations, organizations such as Non-Aligned 
Movement, League of Arab States, Organization of African Unity, and Economic Cooperation 
Organization have observer status with the OIC.  
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projects date back to the Afghan War. As humanitarian organizations mushroomed in 
mobilization for the protection of Afghan refugees, there emerged the need for 
effective aid coordination. An efficient coordinating structure is indispensable to 
humanitarian aid in order to prevent duplication of aid projects, to improve the 
implementation of relief efforts, to systematize the information collection on the 
actual needs and available resources (Strand 2005: 87). One of the earliest of 
coordinating bodies in the Muslim humanitarian world is the Islamic Coordination 
Council (ICC). ICC was established in 1986 in North-Eastern Pakistan to bring 
together NGOs and Red Crescent organizations from Islamic countries. Its aim was to 
prevent “what they regarded as negative influences on Afghan refugees in Pakistan, 
on women in particular” (Strand 2005:95) and to provide a more unified Islamic aid 
system.  
One of the motivating factors for Islamic humanitarian organizations to build 
partnerships is to limit the dominating presence of Christian organizations30 in 
Muslim majority countries. Alarmed by the proselytizing work of evangelical NGOs 
within Muslim communities, Islamic organizations aimed to block Western NGOs 
and “to enable indigenous Islamic NGOs to obtain international recognition and 
legitimacy, to assert identity, and to acquire knowledge, resources, experience and 
expertise” (Ghandour 2003: 27). On the other hand, many of the Islamic humanitarian 
organizations disagree with this position and establish partnerships with Islamic and 
                                                
30 Ghandour (2002) argues that Christian organizations are usually overlooked when talking about 
Western NGOs as if the Western NGOs were necessarily secular in nature.  Evelyn Bush (2007), in her 
analysis of the Yearbook of International Organizations and the Human Rights Directory, points out 
that the classification of religious organizations is distorted in international NGO databases. Yet, 
Stoddard (2003: 26) states, a quarter of the $2.5 billion US government funding for relief and 
development in 2000 went to four NGOs of which two were Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and World 
Vision, both religious in nature. 
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non-Islamic relief organizations and institutions (Salih 2002: 169). One of the largest 
relief organizations, International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), has projects in 
almost 100 countries. Over the years, it has developed working relationships with 
Western international aid organizations such as the office of the United National High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies, the International Organization of Migration, the Norwegian 
Refugee Council, the Federation of African Voluntary Development Organizations 
(FAVDO), Oxfam, the Refugee Study Program at Oxford University, the Save the 
Children Fund, the International NGO Working Group on Women Refugees, and 
many others.31  
Muslim umbrella organizations and alliances are not only located in the Muslim-
majority countries. Muslim groups have established numerous national and 
transnational umbrella organizations and alliances to safeguard the interests of their 
communities in countries where they constitute minority populations.32 As the largest 
                                                
31 It should also be noted that the exclusionary politics within the humanitarian sector is not one-sided. 
Ghandour (2003: 28) explains the polarization in the humanitarian field: “There is no international 
forum where Islamic NGOs might expect to meet the major private Western humanitarian agencies. At 
times of great crisis, the four major secular NGOs, CARE, Save the Children, Oxfam and MSF, tend to 
take major decisions and decide policy amongst themselves, rather than within international 
coordination bodies, which are deemed too bureaucratic. Those few coordination bodies that do exist, 
such as the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) in Geneva, have practically no 
representation from Islamic NGOs: in 2003, only three of ICVA’s 80-plus membership was recognized 
Islamic NGOs (IIRO, ISRA/IARA and Human Appeal International)”.  
32 In the U.S., American Muslims have established representative bodies, coordinating organizations, 
and political alliances since 1950s. The earliest of those organizations is the Federation of Islamic 
Associations, established by Lebanese immigrants in 1953. Keeping its distance to any political or 
social entity, the FIA focused on preserving the immigrant Muslims’ religious identity, developing a 
sense of Islamic fellowship, and obtaining equal recognition of the American Muslims in the greater 
American society (Ghanea Bassiri 1997: 25).  Subsequent umbrella organizations and alliances have 
widened the scope of their motivations and projects. Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) not 
only fosters unity among Muslim communities by developing educational, social and outreach 
programs, but also engages in political lobbying and encouraging Muslims to run for electoral office. 
Similarly, American Muslim Council (AMC), Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), and American 
Muslim Alliance (AMA) seek to increase the participation of American Muslims in the U.S. political 
and public policy arenas, to foster grassroots organizations, and to promote an accurate portrayal of 
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religious minority group in Europe, Muslim groups have established coordinating 
bodies that are aimed at greater activism and community participation (Mandaville 
2003: 138). In U.K., France, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Norway, and Denmark, Muslim communities formed regional, national, and 
local organizations. Some of these organizations provide cultural, religious, and 
economic assistance to Muslim communities by linking grassroots organizations, 
mosques and cultural associations.33 Others focus specifically on coordinating social 
aid and humanitarian relief projects. 34  There are student federations that are 
established to represent the voices and interests of Muslim student communities.35 In 
the wake of September 11, 2001 more umbrella organizations and watch groups were 
established to fight against Islamophobia and monitor the media to ensure a fair and 
balanced reporting of Muslims in popular culture. 36  While some of these 
                                                                                                                                      
Muslims in the media (Leonard 2003). Leonard, Karen (2003) “American Muslim Politics: Discourses 
and Practices” Ethnicities, 3(2): 147 – 181. 
33 In the UK, The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) represents over 380 grassroots community 
organizations, mosques, professional bodies, and cultural associations in England, Wales, and 
Scotland. www.salaam.co.uk. Union of Islamic Communities in Italy (UCOII) is the main 
representative body of Muslim communities in Italy. www.islam-ucoii.it. National Federation of the 
Muslims of France (FNMF) aims to meet the religious, cultural, education, social and humanitarian 
needs of Muslims in France. The Union of the Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF) trains religious 
leaders and educated Muslim youths in France. www.uoif-online.com. Turkisch-Islamische Union 
(DITIB) is the largest Muslim non-profit organization in Germany that brings together hundreds of 
member associations throughout the country. United Islamic Communities in Sweden (FIFS) was 
created in 1974 in Sweden to support Muslim communities economically and culturally. Islamic 
Foundation of the Netherlands, the Foundation Islamic Center, Unin of Moroccan Muslims 
Organization, and World Islamic Mission (WIM) control the mosques and cultural centers in the 
Netherlands.  
34 UK Islamic Mission, for example, is a nationwide organization with over 40 branches and Islamic 
Centers working all over British Isles. It offers a range of services including welfare and relief to 
individuals and communities. www.ukim.org 
35 The Federation of Student Islamic Societies in the UK and Eire is the premier Muslim Student 
representative body in the United Kingdom and Ireland. www.fosis.demon.co.uk. Etudiants 
Musulmans de France (EMF) is the umbrella organization for student groups in France. 
www.emf.asso.fr. 
36 For instance, The Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR), the Muslim Public Affairs 
Committee (MPAC) in UK. 
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organizations are national in scope and representation,37 others act transnationally by 
offering welfare services and relief assistance to communities outside Europe.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The case study of this dissertation, the Union of the NGOs of the Islamic World 
(UNIW), is one of the largest transnational Islamic NGO networks. With its 198 
member NGOs countries, it covers forty-eight countries in five continents. But it does 
not differ from previous transnational Islamic NGO alliances due to its sheer size: it 
stands out among transnational networks because of its organizational identity and 
mission. 
First, UNIW is not just a coordinating body. Although most of its members work 
in humanitarian/social aid and religious service provision, UNIW does not 
characterize itself as an aid network. It does coordinate Islamic humanitarian 
organizations by facilitating communication and information exchange among its 
members. However, its stated main objective is to “help serve Islam’s revival, welfare 
and future.” The humanitarian/social aid provision serves as a means to attain the 
primary goal of Islamic renaissance through welfare.  
Second, although it strives to ensure global religious unity, it does not 
characterize itself as an Islamic solidarity alliance. Again, ensuring religious 
solidarity among Muslim peoples is a key goal for UNIW but it defines itself as “the 
first global Islamic civil society coalition” or “the representative of global Islamic 
                                                
37 The Islamic Cultural Center in the U.K. acts on behalf of all British Muslims vis-à-vis the British 




civil society” rather than a religious alliance. In other words, contrary to previous 
networks and partnerships, UNIW frames its raison d'être within a civil society 
discourse. All mission statements, press releases, and declarations issued by UNIW 
repeatedly underline the need to revitalize the civil societies of Muslim countries and 
to bring them together as a united bloc. The self-defined civil society coalition 
character of UNIW sets it apart from other Islamic alliances.  
The next two chapters discuss these two components respectively. I start Chapter 
5 with an introduction to UNIW’s history, mission, and organizational structure. In 
the remainder of the chapter, I discuss the role of religion in the discourses and 
activities of UNIW and its member NGOs. In Chapter 6, I move on to analyze 
UNIW’s foremost discursive opportunity structure: civil society.  After a discussion 
of civil society theories as well as the Islam and civil society debate, I focus on 
UNIW’s interpretation of civil society. Here, I discuss the member organizations’ 
views of civil society, the ways in which they negotiate the religious and liberal 
frameworks, as well as the way in which they justify their civil society claims despite 















“IT’S NOT A HOBBY, IT’S RELIGIOUS DUTY”:  
 
THE UNION OF THE NGOS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD (UNIW) 
 
 
The previous chapter traced the trajectory of Muslim NGOs from community-
level charities to transnational organizations and networks. The Union of the NGOs 
of the Islamic World (UNIW) is a significant example of such networks. It is a 
transnational Islamic network whose members are Muslim faith-based non-
governmental organizations. Both UNIW and its member NGOs derive their mission 
and identity from Islamic religion and tradition, and their projects purposely target 
areas with a strong Islamic presence. While the organizational structures, membership 
models, funding patterns, and even the individual projects demonstrate isomorphism 
with their secular counterparts, the frequent emphasis on their religious character 
prompts the question: How does religion factor in the Muslim faith-based 
organizations’ identities, missions and modes of operation? How does faith and 
practice interact? What are the ways in which Muslim faith-based organizations make 
Islamic religion and traditions relevant to their principles of conduct?  
This chapter discusses the UNIW and its member NGOs in detail. I start the 
chapter with a brief history of the UNIW, its mission, and its organizational structure. 
Next, I introduce its member organizations and their foremost activity areas. 
Throughout the chapter, I discuss the extent to which religious discourse is employed 
in their goals, projects, and organizational identities. 
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SECTION I: THE UNION OF THE NGOs OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD 
 
5.1 History and Mission 
 
The Union of the NGOs of the Islamic World is one of the largest Muslim faith-
based NGO coalitions. It was founded in 2005 at an international meeting held in 
Istanbul, Turkey. The meeting, “International NGOs of the Islamic World 
Conference: Research for a New Vision in a Changing World” brought together more 
than three hundred NGO leaders, academics, and journalists from forty countries. The 
decision to launch a global NGO coalition was made in the last session of the 
conference with participants’ votes. Necmi Sadikoglu, Turkey Voluntary 
Organizations Foundation (TGTV) Chairman of Board of Directors was appointed as 
UNIW’s General Secretary for the first three year period.  
The Union of the NGOs of the Islamic World declares its mission as:  
• ensuring a sustainable progress, unity, and coordination among the non-
governmental organizations of the Islamic world; contributing to the 
realization of an environment of justice and peace, and stability in the entire 
world 
• enhancing the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and 
communities 
• strengthening the civil society based on participatory and pluralistic principles 
by doing collaborative technical and social activities 
• working towards disseminating information about the Islamic culture and 
values 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, UNIW’s main goal is to “help serve 
Islam’s revival, welfare and future.” Even though their objectives such as enhancing 
welfare, peace, justice, accountability, freedoms and liberties are comparable to those 
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of their Western counterparts, the Union and its member organizations specifically 
work with Muslim populations around the world.  For the founders of UNIW and its 
member NGOs, the religious duty of serving humanity surpasses national boundaries 
and requires them to serve the Islamic world in general.  
It should be noted that neither UNIW nor its member NGOs define the “Islamic 
World” geographically. Globalization, immigration and deterritorialization have 
blurred the “connection between a religion, a pristine culture, a specific society and a 
territory” (Roy 2004: 24). Thus, Islam is no longer ascribed to a specific geography, 
nor is Umma restricted to national territories. UNIW’s Secretary General, Necmi 
Sadikoglu, explains the borders of Umma (global community of believers): 
All right, but where is exactly the Muslim World? Is it just Muslim countries? 
No. Muslim world has deepened and extended in terms of geography and 
demography with the changes after Cold War. Wherever Muslims live, it is called 
Islamic world from now on. 38 
 
The borders of the Islamic World might be blurry to the founders of UNIW, but 
the state of despair it is in is not. The plight of the Umma is the leading concern for 
UNIW’s leaders and member NGOs. It is “dispersed, disintegrated, poverty 
stricken”39 and under Western political and cultural siege. For the Iraqi people the 
results of the occupation have been abuses, killings, tortures, displacements, and 
sectarian conflict;40 Afghan people have been living in catastrophic situations under 
US-led occupation following thirty years of successive wars;41 Kashmiri people’s 
                                                
38 Necmi Sadikoglu, (UNIW Secretary General), 2010 Introductory Meeting, Ankara, Turkey. 
39 Interviewee 7 (UNIW executive committee member), personal interview by author, September 4, 
2009. 
40 Dr. Muthanna Haris al Dhari (Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq, President) Official Visit to 
UNIW headquarters, 2009, Istanbul. 
41 Muhamad Haroun al Khatibi (Afghanistan Social Reform and Development Society, Foreign 
Relations Chair), Official Visit to UNIW Headquarters, 2011, Istanbul.  
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rights are violated;42 in Eastern Turkistan Muslims face human rights violations under 
the Han rule;43 Palestinians live under an unjustified and illegal embargo;44 and 
Muslims living in U.S. and Europe face religious discrimination.45 Thus, according to 
its founders, UNIW’s foremost goal is to unite all Muslims to contribute to the 
solutions: 
An independent state of Palestine with its capital city of Quds, an eastern 
Turkistan free of injustice and oppression, a Kashmir free from sixty years 
occupation, an Iraq and Afghanistan free from the occupation and chaos and an 
Islamic World with welfare, peace, stability and development lies in the 
realization of this vision.46  
 
In that, vitalizing and consolidating civil societies of the Islamic World is the key 
to solving Umma’s pressing problems. UNIW leaders assert that civil society is the 
“rising currency of the century and it is only civil society that can fight against the 
injustices the Muslim world faces.” 47  NGO leaders argue that civil society 
organizations are in the unique position of being the most active, dynamic and 
flexible of social actors in the contemporary world. They maintain that NGOs possess 
a great deal of political power and can be major forces of mobilization. Thus, they 
assert that extant NGOs should reorganize, pool their resources, support their local 
constituencies, and take the lead to overcome the social, economic and political 
infirmities that make Islamic countries vulnerable to foreign interventions.  
 
                                                
42 Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai, (Kashmiri-American Council Executive Director), Islamic Society of North 
America 2009 Annual Convention, Washington D.C.  
43 Necmi Sadikoglu, (UNIW Secretary General), New Hegira Year Message, 2009, Istanbul.  
44 Necmi Sadikoglu, (UNIW Secretary General), International Union of Muslim Scholars General 
Council Press Conference, 2010, Istanbul. 
45 Necmi Sadikoglu, (UNIW Secretary General), Introductory Meeting, 2010, Ankara. 
46 Necmi Sadikoglu, (UNIW Secretary General), Pakistan Consultation Meeting, 2010, Istanbul.  
47 Interviewee 4, (UNIW Executive Committee Member), personal interview by author, June 12, 2008. 
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5.2 Organizational Structure 
UNIW’s leaders use the terms alliance, coalition, union, and network 
interchangeably when referring to the organization but it is officially registered as an 
umbrella organization: a coalition of independently incorporated NGOs. All of its 
member organizations have similar interests but they have their own governing 
boards, funds, and members. UNIW acts as a common platform for its members “to 
facilitate discussion and debate, to reach common understandings and strategies, and 
perhaps to manifest collective action on those strategies” (Young 2001: 293).  
In 2005 UNIW opened representative branches and country offices. Since 2007, it 
has been working on projects that support the regional and local organizations, 
charities, and voluntary organizations and that establish joint working groups. 
The organizational structure of UNIW consists of a general assembly, a council, 
commissions, consultancies, and an advisory board. UNIW facilitates 
communication, interaction, and information flow among its members through its 
commissions and its periodical council meetings. UNIW’s commissions group 
member NGOs with similar interests and issue areas. Members of these commissions 
exchange information and expertise, and develop action plans.  
UNIW’s council is composed of NGO leaders from twenty countries48 and meets 
every three months in a different country. The meetings are open to all members, and 
bring together large numbers of member NGOs from neighboring countries for two to 
four days. A typical council meeting starts with opening speeches by the Secretary 
General, followed by presentations from commissions and member organizations 
                                                
48 UNIW’s council, which has remained intact since its establishment, consists of NGO leaders from 
twenty Islamic countries: Turkey, Kuwait, Egypt, Malaysia, USA, Sudan, Azerbaijan, Syria, Yemen, 
UK, Iran, Indonesia, Bosnia, Somali, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Palestine. 
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about the state of ongoing or previous projects. In the remainder of the meetings, 
participants are briefed about financial matters of the Union, official procedures, and 
upcoming meetings. The most important agenda items of council meetings are the 
status reports from the poverty and war inflicted regions of the Muslim world. These 
reports are followed by interactive discussions from the floor during which action 
plans are debated.  
The council meetings are followed by four to seven day visits to a member NGO 
in a neighboring country. The delegation pays official visits to local or national 
government authorities, visit the local NGO’s office, and hear briefings about the 
social, cultural and economic conditions of Muslim populations in that country.  
Table 5.1: UNIW’s Commissions (by chairing NGO and number of members)49  
 
Commission Title Commission Chair # of 
Members 
Culture and Education 
Commission 





Financial and Administrative 
Affairs Commission 
The Foundation of Volunteer 
Organizations of Turkey (Turkey) 
 
6  
Research, Development and 
Scientific Research Commission 
 
Arabian Research Center (Egypt) 11 
Human Rights and Freedoms 
Commission 
 
Jamiyyat al-Islah (Bahrain) 10 
Women, Families and Youth 
Commission 
 
Komite Kemanusian (Indonesia) 14 
Social – Humanitarian Affairs and 
Solidarity Commission 
Global Peace Mission (Malaysia) 12 
 
 
                                                
49 This table is built based on the information from UNIW’s organizational schema. 
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5.3 UNIW’S Member NGOs 
By the end of 2011, UNIW’s membership base has reached to 198 non-
governmental organizations from forty-eight countries.50 Spanning five continents, 
UNIW demonstrates significant diversity in geographical distribution, areas of work, 
membership size, funding sources and political influence.51 There are international 
relief organizations, local organizations, youth and alumni associations, and human 
rights and peace organizations within its composition. UNIW’s members include 
international relief organizations, such as Islamic and Muslim Relief based in UK, 
European Muslim Union based in Germany, the International Islamic Relief 
Organization based in Saudi Arabia, the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation based 
in Turkey and the Eurasian International Development Association based in 
Azerbaijan. There are local organizations, such as the Zam Zam Foundation in 
Somalia, the Cambodian Muslim Intellectual Alliance, and Al-Awn Development and 
Relief Association of Ethiopia. There are also youth and alumni associations such as 
Assembly of Muslim Youth in Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Youth Movement of 
Malaysia, the National Union of Kuwait Students, and the All Ceylon Young Men’s 
Muslim Association in Sri Lanka. Finally, there are human rights and peace 
organizations such as the National Organization for Defending Rights and Freedoms 
based in Yemen, the Global Peace Mission in Malaysia and the Awareness and 
Consolidation Association in Lebanon. Many of the member organizations are 
registered with or hold consultative membership to the U.N. Economic and Social 
                                                
50 For a full list of UNIW’s member NGOs and their countries of origin, see Appendix A.  
51 Since UNIW is a Turkey based initiative, it has built efficient networks among the Turkish Faith-
based organizations. This explains the large number of Turkey based organizations in UNIW’s 
member base.  For a detailed analysis of the mutually profitable ties between UNIW, Turkish faith-
based NGOs and the Turkish national authorities, see Chapter 7.  
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Council.  Most of the international NGOs in the Union, which work on emergency 
relief and poverty eradication, cooperate with UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO, WAMY, 
Global Medic, the European Commission for Humanitarian Aid, and Red Cross.  
 
TABLE 5.2: UNIW’s MEMBERS (by country of origin)52 
 
Country  # of 
organizations 
 Country # of 
organizations 
Afghanistan 1  Maldives 1 
Albania 3  Mongolia 1 
Algeria 1  Montenegro 1 
Azerbaijan 1  Mauritania 1 
Bahrain 2  Morocco 15 
Bangladesh 7  Netherlands 1 
Bosnia 2  Palestine 3 
Britain 2  Pakistan 3 
Burkina Faso 2  Russia 1 
Cambodia 1  Saudi Arabia 2 
Cameroon 1  Seychelles 1 
Chad 1  Senegal 1 
Egypt 1  Serbia 1 
Ethiopia 1  Sierra Leone 1 
Germany 2  Somalia 4 
Indonesia 3  South Africa 1 
Iran 7  Sri Lanka 3 
Ivory Coast 1  Sudan 4 
Kazakhstan 1  Switzerland 1 
Kosovo 2  Syria 2 
Kuwait 3  Turkey 81 
Lebanon 10  USA 2 
Macedonia 3  Yemen 2 
Malaysia 7    
 
 
What bring such a wide array of organizations together are their self-defined 
identities as faith-based organizations and their shared concerns over the Muslim 
world. Faith-based organizations have become significant actors in the humanitarian 
                                                
52 This table is built based on the information from UNIW’s members list. 
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aid and development sector in the last two decades. Faith-based or religious NGOs 
are formal organizations whose identity and mission are self-consciously derived 
from the teachings of one or more religious or spiritual traditions (Berger 2003: 16). 
Although religious NGOs carry out projects in diverse activity areas, they share 
defining characteristics such as being affiliated with religious bodies, having mission 
statements with explicit references to theology, acquiring financial support from 
religious sources, or basing decision making processes on religious values (Ferris 
2005: 312 – 313). UNIW’s membership base is composed of Muslim faith-based 
organizations, which are:  
[non-governmental organizations that] were founded by Muslims, and whose 
action is, to varying degrees and in various forms, inspired and legitimated by the 
Islamic religion or at least certain tenets thereof (de Cordier 2009: 609). 
 
All members of UNIW have (1) mission statements that explicitly identify Islamic 
doctrine or tradition as the ideological framework, (2) agendas that focus on the 
mobilization of Muslim populations, (3) activities that aim to disseminate theological 
information and (4) activities that are exclusively aimed at Muslim persons or 
groups.53 
The donors of projects are Muslims, organizations frame their projects within a 
religious discourse, and beneficiaries are Muslim communities around the world.54 
                                                
53 While there is not a single widely accepted definition, faith-based organizations are characterized by 
their core philosophy, programmatic approach, funding source, and membership. For the purposes of 
this chapter, I propose a four point criteria based on the organizations’ mission statement, mobilization 
agenda, theological objectives and the target population. The first three of these points are loosely 
based on Evelyn Bush’s (2007: 1655) criteria to measure religious mobilization in global civil society. 
The fourth point is based on a self-identified characteristic that all 185 members of UNIW share. 
54 The substantial presence of religion as a common link between the donors, organizations and 
beneficiaries has led the development sector to claim that ‘cultural proximity’ is key to success on the 
field. The concept postulates that the symbolic sense of community is essential to the aid process as it 
“[ensures] easier and safer access to Muslim countries and areas, and provides logistical advantages 
through religious solidarity with national and local governments and local communities; ensures that 
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Although the extent to which religious faith is reflected in the activities and projects 
of Muslim organizations varies, the focus remains almost exclusively on 
implementing projects in and providing services to areas with a strong Islamic 
presence. In addition to Muslim majority countries, transnational Muslim 
organizations distribute aid in countries where Muslims constitute minority 
populations.55 The humanitarian NGOs of the coalition are concerned about poverty 
and its effects: hunger, malnutrition, lack of access to safe potable water, illiteracy, 
lack of access to health service, social isolation and exploitation. Those who work 
with families and children call attention to threats to traditional family structure and 
the increase in drug abuse in Muslim societies. Most organizations that are concerned 
about the dissolution of Islamic values in the modern world offer religious 
socialization programs. The development organizations implement ‘sustainable 
livelihood’ projects to tackle the root causes of poverty. The following section 
discusses each activity area in detail and demonstrates the extent to which religion is 










                                                                                                                                      
aid is provided effectively and that the services offered are sensitive to religious needs; and creates 
positive relations between (local and expatriate) staff and beneficiaries through shared beliefs and 
respect for religious values and practices” (Palmer 2011: 98). 
55 For instance, IHH distributes periodical food aid, iftar (fast-breaking) packages and runs orphan 
programs in Muslim communities in Cuba, Haiti, Ecuador and Peru in Americas where Muslims 
constitute less than %0.1 of the countries’ population. 
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SECTION II: MUSLIM NGOs AS FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 
 
5.4 Humanitarianism, Social Aid and Faith 
 
As mentioned above, faith-based organizations are increasingly recognized in the 
international humanitarian aid system and have become significant actors in the 
Muslim world.56 Although faith-based and secular humanitarian NGOs reveal many 
similarities in terms of the projects and conditions they deal with, faith-based NGOs 
distinguish themselves through their discourse. Whereas secular NGOs employ a 
rights-based language in their actions, faith-based NGOs routinely invoke a language 
of religious duty and obligation when explaining individual civic action. For the 
members of Muslim NGOs, civil society is not a liberal category framed by a 
language of rights, but refers to a morally loaded category framed by the duty-
oriented language of religion (Falk 2001). The notion of hizmet (service to God and 
humanity) pertains to religious duty in assistance to fellow Muslims in particular and 
to humanity in general. To perform such a duty in the form of humanitarian action “is 
a way of receiving help from heaven, of erasing sins, and of meriting paradise” 
(Krafess 2005: 327). An executive committee member of UNIW explains the 
connection between engaging in humanitarian activities and one’s prospects in the 
afterlife as: 
In Islam there is a strong tradition of foundations. For centuries people established 
foundations, small or large, to provide help in all kinds of issues. The culture of 
Islam encourages that. People know that if they do a good deed in this world, they 
will be rewarded in the afterworld. This is what nourishes civil society today. It is 
                                                
56 In Yemen, Islamic Relief runs the Al Mazrak camp, providing more than 19,000 refugees with 
shelter, food, water and healthcare. International Islamic Relief Organization offered iftar meals to 
more than 25,000 families in Africa, Asia and the Middle East in 2010. (Petersen 2010)  
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not a hobby for us. It is about being human, being a Muslim, being concerned 
about the afterlife.57 
 
Muslim humanitarian/social aid organizations frequently refer to the Qura’nic 
ayat (verses) and hadith (the collection of traditions attributed to the Prophet 
Muhammad that include his sayings and acts) to explain the rationale behind the most 
popular charitable projects. Some of the projects adopted across the board are urgent 
food aid programs, orphan care programs, shelter and clothing programs, vocational 
training programs and assistance in drilling wells and canals in water shortage areas. 
Each of these projects has their roots in Islamic theology, as they are explicitly 
encouraged in the Qur’an and hadiths. For instance, Qur’an (Surah 13: 29) 
encourages charitable acts in verses such as “For those who believe and do charitable 
works is every blessedness and a beautiful place of final return”. Similarly, Surah 
2:83 states “[and be good] to the orphans and the very poor, speak kindly to men, 
make prayer, and give in charity." Charitable giving is not only ordered to the 
members of the Islamic faith, but also suggested as a way to erase sins and obtaining 
God’s satisfaction: “Alms extinguish sins exactly as water extinguishes fire”.58 Food 
aid is encouraged in hadith as “the best of alms is to feed the hungry”.59 Similarly, 
sharing one’s food is commended in hadith as “He who sleeps with a full stomach 
knowing his neighbor is hungry is not a believer”.60 NGOs which run water provision 
programs frequently refer to Prophet’s hadith on the issue: “Whoever digs a well will 
                                                
57 Interviewee 7 (UNIW executive committee member), personal interview by author, September 4, 
2009. 
58  Al Bukhari, Sahih Al Jami’e, Hadith No. 2951, in Krafess 2005: 329. 
59 Al Baihaki, Chouab Al Iman, Hadith No. 3367, in Krafess 2005: 332. 
60 Al Baihaki Chouab Al Iman, Hadith No. 3389, in Krafess 2005: 333. 
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be rewarded until the Day of Judgment every time a human, a jinn 61 or an animal 
drinks from that well”.62 Drawing on these texts, Saudi Arabia based International 
Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) states in its 2006 report: 
IIROSA drives its inspiration from the blessed land of the Two Holy Mosques, 
adopting the prophetic guidance in relieving the distressed, helping the needy and 
consoling the grieved. It strives to provide food for the hungry, medical care for 
the sick, clothes for the unclothed, helps wipe tears of the orphans, provides 
shelter, social and educational care for those who have lost their homes due to 
wars or natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods and drought (IIRO 2006: 
8).63 
 
Food aid programs are omnipresent in the world of Muslim NGOs, especially 
during the Muslim holidays of Ramadan and Eid-ul-Adha (Festival of Sacrifice). 
Local and international organizations establish mobile and temporary soup kitchens, 
food deliveries to the crisis regions, fast-breaking dinner organizations during 
Ramadan and arrangements for animal sacrifices and meat deliveries for Muslim 
families around the world during the Feast of Sacrifice. Meat deliveries and animal 
sacrifices are powerful projects for Muslim NGOs as they are a religious obligation in 
Islam. Muslim NGOs emphasize the significance of this practice in their calls for 
donors by arguing that it is imperative for any Muslim to share his or her fortune with 
the poor by donating money for animal sacrifices around the world. One NGO 
arranges animal sacrifices in over a hundred countries within the four days of Eid-ul-
Adha. Another one does so in forty-five countries during the same days. These 
                                                
61 The Arabic term jinn refers to invisible beings made out of fire. They are intelligent beings and 
imperceptible to humans. More important in Islamic folklore than in theology, Jinns are capable of 
salvation or damnation (El-Zein 2005: 421).   
62 Al Bukhari, Sahih Al Jami’e, Hadith No. 5757, in Krafess 2005: 334. 
63 International Islamic Relief Organization (2006) Annual Report (Achievements and Activites of 
Various Programs and Departments) For the Fiscal Year 2005/2006. 
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countries include almost all Muslim countries in addition to Muslim communities in 
Europe, North America, Latin America, East Asia, and even Oceania.  
Similarly, projects that provide safe and clean water have a particular resonance 
among Muslims. For Muslim religious organizations, providing access to water is a 
religious duty mandated by Islamic teachings. Water is a necessary element of 
Muslim purification rituals, most commonly those performed before prayer. 
Additionally, according to the Muslim beliefs and practices “one who founds a public 
fountain on Earth for the poor or passers-by is promised relief in the afterworld.”64 
WEFA (Weltweiter Einsatz für Arme), a humanitarian organization based in Cologne, 
Germany, collects donations to drill wells in areas with water shortages such as 
Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Chad. The project advertises 
that “for 110 Euros a donor can sponsor a surface, hand operated well in his/her name 
or the name of a deceased family member in Bangladesh.”65 
Most humanitarian organizations run projects that provide clean water and 
sanitation services to water shortage areas in Africa and Southeast Asia. Water and 
sanitation services are typical projects for both faith-based and non-faith based 
organizations. The common objectives of these projects are to prevent hygiene related 
deaths and preventable diseases, to decrease the cost of obtaining an unpredictable 
supply of water, to decrease the daily burden of carrying water, and consequently, to 
improve girls’ chances of getting an education or women’s prospects of keeping jobs.  
 
                                                
64  Interviewee 15 (WEFA spokesperson), personal interview by author, January 4, 2009. The 
interviewee is paraphrasing the hadith on water use: “He who sinks a well in Rawma will go to 
Paradise” (Al Hafid, Al Fith, Vol. 5, p. 510, in Krafess 2005:335) 
65 Weltweiter Einsatz für Arme. http://www.wefa.org/de/projekte/wasserbrunnen.html. (Accessed June 
3, 2011) 
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5.5 Orphan Care Programs 
Watching over orphans in disaster and conflict areas is of utmost importance to 
Muslim NGOs as it is considered a religious duty for Muslims. "Whoever supports an 
orphan from among his own or any other family, he will be as close to me in Heaven 
as these fingers are close to each other"66 is a statement attributed to the Prophet 
Muhammad as related in a hadith. In addition to several hadith, which require 
kindness to orphans, Muhammad himself is believed to have been an orphan. Stories 
about the Prophet’s life and such hadiths are popular sources of inspiration for 
Muslim humanitarian/social aid organizations that run orphan care programs. These 
programs consist of building and managing orphanage facilities, providing food, 
clothes, shelter as well as educational and sanitary services to children made orphan 
by wars, natural disasters and occupations.  
While the orphan care programs of Muslim NGOs are very similar to those of 
secular or Christian NGOs, Muslim organizations follow a route that is different than 
most non-faith based organizations. Respectful of the Islamic law that “advises to 
provide a home environment to orphans with their blood relatives rather than 
accommodating them in one’s own home”,67 Muslim NGOs choose to put orphan 
children up exclusively with their distant relatives or in orphanages in the local 
community. This route, in their perspective, blocks the risk of assimilation posed by 
the actions of Christian missionaries in Africa: 
When we go to these areas we see many NGOs from everywhere. While a lot of 
them are sincere in helping these children, we also see many organizations that 
work under the title ‘NGO’ but they are in fact Christian missionary 
                                                
66 Al Hafid, Fath al Bary, Hadith No. 5034. Vol. 9, in Krafess 2005: 333. 
67 Interviewee 52 (Malaysian Global Peace Mission spokesperson), personal interview by author, May 
18, 2010. 
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organizations. They adopt these children and put them up with families in Europe 
and North America. We believe that this leads to cultural and religious 
assimilation. These children are uprooted; they forget where they come from, who 
they are. We specifically intend to keep these children where they are. We put 
them up either with extended family members, if they have a relative in the area 
we ask them to take the child in. Or we put the children in the orphanage facilities 
we build in the area. That way, they stay where they are, maintain their roots in 
their culture and do not forget that they are Muslims.68  
 
Numerous Qur’anic ayat and hadith that encourage help for orphans, the specter 
of assimilation by Christian missionaries in Muslim communities, and the obligation 
to take care of Umma’s children make orphan care one of the most popular programs 
for Muslim NGOs and donors. Organizations either place the children in orphanages 
and meet their needs collectively or place them with distant relatives and implement 
one to one sponsorship. One of the largest and oldest Muslim humanitarian 
organizations, Islamic Relief, supports over 27,000 orphans in more than 20 countries 
worldwide. Being a more established organization, Islamic Relief’s projects have 
wider objectives and reach. In line with the Millennium Development Goals, the 
orphan sponsorship program aims to eradicate child poverty, reduce child mortality 
and ensure primary education in disaster and conflict stricken areas. To that end, the 
organization provides orphans and their families sponsorship to cover food, shelter, 
healthcare and education costs. The sponsorship includes a monthly financial 
assistance, Ramadan and Qurbani food parcels, vaccinations, regular health checks 
and follow up school and home visits. At the beginning of each school year, 
sponsored orphans receive school uniforms and school bags filled with books and 
stationery. Orphans who are enrolled in the educational programs receive computer 
                                                
68 Interviewee 6 (IHH spokesperson), personal interview by author, July 3, 2008. 
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skills and English lessons. Older orphans receive vocational training to improve 
computer, sewing and handicraft skills.  
The social and cultural ramifications of the Bosnian conflict are still at the center 
of Muslim NGOs’ attention. The orphan care programs in Bosnia started in 1993, two 
years before the Bosnian conflict ended. Similar to the orphan care programs in other 
areas, Islamic Relief initially provided aid in the form of food, shelter, water and 
sanitation facilities, health care and educational support to the children of the war 
zone. In 2005, it launched a Housing Loans project in Drenica, which provides 
interest-free loans to orphans and their families to repair and reconstruct houses that 
were damaged during the 1996-1999 conflict. In 2006, the organization initiated a 
psychosocial trauma project in Sarajevo and Tuzla to help orphans and their 
caregivers cope with the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder. Islamic Relief also 
runs a Summer School program in this area to help orphans recover from the war with 
access to social, educational and recreational activities.  
 
5.6 Family, Women, and Children 
As the foundation of the Islamic sociocultural structure and the fundamental 
social unit, the family institution is central to Islamic social order. It reproduces and 
disseminates codes of social morality, transmits Islamic values through generations, 
prevents illicit sexual activity, secures a peaceful emotional and psychological 
atmosphere for men and women, tightens the bond between generations and ensures 
the expansion of the Umma. 
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Marriage is not only encouraged in the Qur’an but also considered a duty for a 
man who has the means to pay the dowry and to support a wife and children 
(Wiktorowicz and Farouki 2000: 689-91). Qur’an explains in detail the structure and 
function of the family, principles of choosing a spouse, conditions of marriage and 
financial maintenance of the household, conditions of divorce or dissolution of 
marriage, rules of child support and custody, and rules for remarriage. In the same 
vein, according to Islamic traditions, any obstacle, such as exorbitant dowries or 
economic injustice, should be combated in defense of family and marriage institutions 
(Wiktorowicz and Farouki 2000). 
UNIW’s member NGOs are mainly concerned about delayed marriage age, 
reduction in birth rate, rising divorce rate, dissolution of ties across generations, 
increasing isolation of the nuclear family in metropolitan areas due to the pressures of 
liberal capitalist globalization and “westoxification”.69 For concerned NGO leaders, 
such trends lead younger generations to be fascinated by prevailing attitudes of 
consumerism, remaining ungrounded in their own traditions and unaware of the 
possibility of a culturally rich Islamic life.  
In order to keep young generations closely connected to the community, UNIW’s 
members provide extra venues of socialization and moral education for children and 
teenagers. Several member NGOs that focus on women, family and children offer day 
care facilities for younger children, as well as organizing picnics, art and culture trips, 
movie hours, book clubs, tea times and sports events for teenagers. The main 
                                                
69 Westoxification (gharbzadegi in Farsi), refers to the corruptive influence of the Western cultural, 
political and economic domination . The term was coined by Jalal al-Ahmad and became a key 
element of the Khomeini era of Iranian politics. The westoxification discourse has informed and 
mobilized both anti-imperialist and conservative religious movements in Iran (Najmabadi 1991).  
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objective of these activities is to help generate a peer group for children and young 
adults within the community, and “to encourage them to socialize with kids from the 
neighborhood rather than random ones they meet at internet cafes or arcades.”70 
UNIW’s members uniformly value the survival of the family institution in 
Muslim societies and agree on women’s vital role in keeping marriages and families 
intact. Some NGOs organize projects to educate marriage-age women and newly 
married women about the role and responsibilities of spouses, as well as the keys to 
leading a successful marriage. Erdem-Der, a member NGO based in Istanbul, Turkey, 
has held nine-week long seminar series every year for single young women titled “Is 
Your Dowry Ready?”  In the program director’s words:  
We use dowry as a pun to get attention. We teach young women skills and 
information that will be useful their entire married life. We know of so many 
couples that stay engaged for years and divorce in the first six months of the 
marriage. We have to do our part to stop marriages from dissolving at this rate.71  
 
The seminar topics include home economics, interior decoration, skin care, 
makeup and wardrobe as well as religious education, conditions of an Islamic 
marriage, and constructive communication methods between spouses.  
NGOs that work on women and family uphold the mother’s role as the essential 
building block of the Islamic family structure and the guardian of its moral order 
(Kadioglu 1994). The woman’s position as mother is highly praised, since raising 
virtuous and morally grounded children for the future of the individual family, the 
community and the Umma is considered the most rewarding task. Therefore, 
motherhood transcends the private sphere of the family to the civil sphere of Muslim 
                                                
70 Interviewee 36, (Gul-Der spokesperson), personal interview by author, December 12, 2009 
71 Interviewee 39, (Erdem-Der spokesperson), personal interview by author, December 7, 2009.  
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society, reinforced with the legitimacy of social responsibility. One NGO member 
expressed her concerns about the devalued role of motherhood in modern society:  
Motherhood is more important than being a high-level executive; you are raising a 
person. But it is not valued as much anymore and that is very dangerous. After all, 
the hand that rocks the cradle runs the world. 72 
 
Regardless of their particular areas of activity, most Muslim NGOs share 
concerns and develop projects for the well being of the family structure in their 
societies. Since the survival of the family and its moral values is one of the key 
priorities of Muslim organizations, most members of the UNIW offer assistance to 
families in crisis. Marriage counseling, reproductive health assistance, financial 
support, and vocational training are some of the wide-ranging programs offered by 
the organizations to local communities. 
 
5.7 Religious Education 
Muslim NGOs that work in the field of education respond to UNIW’s concerns 
about the dissolution of Islamic values and the dispersion of the Umma. In countries 
where the state does not provide religious or Islamic education, NGOs take it upon 
themselves to offer Qur’anic and moral education courses to local communities. Most 
of these courses are designed for children of primary school age. The common 
curriculum in these courses emphasizes Islamic studies and a greater understanding of 
Islamic principles governing the day-to-day lives of Muslims. The Qur’an, Islamic 
law (fiqh), the Prophet’s sayings (hadith) and traditions (sunna), and interpretation of 
the Qur’an (tafseer) constitute the majority of curricula. 
                                                
72 Interviewee 36, (Gul-Der spokesperson), personal interview by author, December 12, 2009. 
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Educational projects devised for students of high school and college age are 
mostly limited to providing financial assistance in the form of scholarships. NGOs 
that fund students from modest backgrounds are not limited to the organizations that 
work in the educational field. Various NGOs act as bridges between private donors 
and students in need. Although some NGOs do not seek to establish personal 
relationships with the students, most organizations involve students in their events in 
order to create a community. They frequently pay home visits to students, hold 
community events such as picnics, dinners, seminars and establish connections with 
similar organizations. In that sense, educational scholarships serve as a means to form 
strong links with the students and the local communities. 
Exchange programs for college-age Muslim students are held in high regard by 
UNIW. For member NGOs, hosting college level students from the Middle East, 
Africa, the Balkans or Central Asia through exchange programs materializes UNIW’s 
foremost goal of uniting the Umma by bringing together the future leaders of the 
Islamic world. The declaration issued by the 150 participants from 25 countries at 
UNIW’s 4th Youth Gathering articulated the mission to achieve unity, solidarity and 
mutual understanding among Muslim youth as follows:  
We strongly emphasize the development of the youth, with respect to their 
profession to materialize their Islamic visions. We will have to start encouraging 
Muslim talents to be part of a cross border organization that would gather 
competent people and help them serve the Islamic World, wherever and whenever 
required. 73 
 
For the organizations that work with youth run transnational exchange programs, 
promoting the unified Umma ideal is an essential goal. In fact, “we are one nation” is 
                                                




uttered frequently during meetings and events that bring together young people from 
different parts of the Muslim world.74 Transgressing the racial, language and national 
barriers facing the future of the Umma, students are encouraged to imagine 




While Muslim faith-based organizations run projects very similar to those of non-
faith organizations, the religious emphasis in their actions differentiates them from 
the typical development organizations. Muslim NGOs’ extensive efforts in addressing 
socioeconomic needs of communities in need are termed in ‘alternative development’ 
perspective as ‘Social Islam”. It is argued that integrating socioeconomic need and 
religious values allow these NGOs to “serve as institutions for the production, 
articulation and dissemination of values” and to “offer a model of Islam in practice to 
combat Western approaches and values” (Wiktorowicz and Farouki 2000: 686). 
Most Muslim humanitarian NGOs under UNIW employ the long-term 
development-oriented jargon emblematic of development NGOs in the West. The 
International Islamic Charitable Organization of Kuwait, for instance, has the mission 
of “providing global and humanitarian aid, aiming and assisting the poor communities 
and helping them develop their resources in the most efficient ways so that they 
become self-sufficient [sic].”75 
                                                
74 “We are one nation” The Pen Magazine. Interviews from 3rd Youth Gathering, 2009. (Accessed June 
9th, 2011) http://www.thepenmagazine.net/we-are-one-nation/ 
75 International Islamic Charitable Organization of Kuwait. http://www.iico.org/home-page-eng/index-
eng.htm. (Accessed June 1, 2011) 
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However, the focus of most Muslim humanitarian organizations remains short 
term and charity-oriented. Easily implemented charity-oriented projects which 
provide services in the form of material or financial aid and health services are 
favored over the longer-term projects oriented towards the achievement of social and 
economic rights, self-sustainability and the elimination of the root causes of poverty. 
There is a recent trend in the Muslim NGO practices that demonstrate a move towards 
sustainable development projects. Some organizations run vocational training 
programs such as donating fishery boats and motor taxis to needy families, providing 
trainings in farming and carpentry, tailoring, painting, embroidery, etc. Yet, these 
projects do not invest in the infrastructure to facilitate long-term development.  The 
majority of longer-term projects are in the healthcare field. In collaboration with state 
agencies and transnational humanitarian networks, NGOs build health facilities, set 
up mobile clinics, medical buses, permanent hospitals, temporary tent hospitals; 
deliver medication and medical equipment aid; and provide health services such as 
health screenings, voluntary health personnel, and cataract surgeries. 
Why do Muslim NGOs limit their projects to short-term social aid goals? Bayat 
(2002) provides several answers: (1) Islamist ideology does not provide an alternative 
order that mobilizes community members. Therefore, community members are seen 
as welfare recipients rather than active participants in the making of their 
communities; (2) this leads organizations to act paternalistically and on behalf of the 
communities they work with; (3) as a consequence, beneficiaries do not claim 
responsibility in assessing “the quality and adequacy of services or the accountability 
of the organizations” (Bayat 2002: 18).  
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Treating community members as welfare recipients rather than partners in 
sustainable development, inevitably leads to project duplication in most activity areas. 
One of the reasons of project duplication is suboptimal coordination, which is a 
problem in all humanitarian circles, Western or non-Western. Poor communications, 
lack of professionalism, inadequacy of collaborative networks and coordinating 
bodies, and unfamiliarity with the specifics of the target community result in wasted 
provisions, especially aftermath of natural disasters. Another reason behind project 
duplication is rooted in organizations’ inexperience in the bureaucracy and 
implementation of humanitarian projects. It is an endemic problem in international 
projects, particularly longer-term social aid programs such as water provision and 
orphan care. Most Muslim humanitarian organizations are fairly new and thus lack 
the personnel and funds to research and develop projects from the ground up. 
Therefore, they opt for already tried and tested models from more experienced 
organizations. Rather than dovetailing their operations, these organizations end up 
replicating the same, occasionally outdated projects.   
It is also maintained that “traditional donors want to see a large part or preferably 
all of their donations being used directly in projects and not on overheads or on 
something as amorphous as ‘advocacy’ even if this produces tangible results in the 
long-run” (Khan et al 2009: 6). The pressure from donors to see the immediate results 
of their funds forces organizations to carry out short-term social aid programs rather 
than long-term development projects which would maintain self-reliance. 
The authority of donors is also posited as the reason why certain projects are 
preferred over others which may be more vital to the needs of the community. 
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Muslim organizations perceive their donors as conservative individuals who would 
not fund controversial projects. While orphan care and water provision programs are 
run by almost all organizations, projects that are more controversial but very pressing 
such as reproductive health and HIV/AIDS are not implemented as extensively as 
needed. In the same way, the need for women’s shelters is largely overlooked on 
account of traditional family dynamics.  
 
5.9 Conclusion 
As the discussion above indicates, religion provides UNIW and its member NGOs 
their overarching ideational frame.  The project descriptions and mission statements 
demonstrate that religion shapes UNIW’s and its members NGOs’ value systems, 
worldviews and ideological commitments. As a transnational non-state actor, UNIW 
is motivated by the normative ideal of consolidating global Islamic solidarity. 
UNIW’s and its member NGOs’ staff, volunteers, and membership base are similarly 
motivated by religious solidarity and Islamic revival. In other words, UNIW is a truly 
value-oriented network that is motivated by normative ideals.  
While UNIW appears to be a typical solidarity network, it does not identify itself 
as a religious solidarity alliance. If UNIW acted only as a network of religiously 
motivated Islamic groups, it would be rather ineffective and short-lived. Therefore, it 
choses to deviate from previous religious alliances and strategically defines itself as a 
civil society coalition instead. I argue that this is an instrumental choice because 
UNIW makes strategic use of its opportunity structures to gain power and legitimacy, 
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to attain its political goals, and to sustain the engagement of its member NGOs in the 
coalition. 
One of the opportunity structures available to UNIW is the legitimacy provided 
by the civil society identity and discourse. By adopting the civil society discourse and 
identity, UNIW claims legitimacy as a serious actor acting on behalf of global 
Muslim community in the international arena. I flesh out this argument by borrowing 
the concept of discursive opportunity structure from Koopman and Olzak (2004) and 
Ferree et al. (2002). The discursive opportunity structure of civil society provides 
UNIW a normative toolbox and an ideation pool that is deployed in pursuit of their 
political objective of global religious solidarity. They attain 1) visibility, 2) 
resonance, and 3) legitimacy in the international public. In other words, UNIW 
strategically frames itself as a civil society coalition because it provides legitimacy to 
their mission and identity; it resonates with the norms of transnational non-state 
politics; and allows them to publicize their ideational objectives. In the next chapter, I 
analyze the ways in which UNIW employs the civil society discourse.  I start with a 
critical discussion of civil society in the mainstream, Anglo-American literature and 
examine the compatibility of Islam and civil society debate. Next, I identify UNIW’s 
selective use of civil society ‘toolbox’ as a legitimating tool. I conclude with the 
analysis of the instrumental benefits of UNIW’s civil society discourse with regards 












































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   






Burkina Faso    59  
   
   









   










Palestine    ~98 
Djibouti    96.9  Syria    99.2 
Chad    55.8  Lebanon    59.3 
Ethiopia    33.9  Iraq    ~99 
Ivory Coast    36.7  Turkey    97.8 
Ghana    15.9  Yemen    99.1 
Liberia    12.2  Jordan    98.2 
Cameroon    17.9  Egypt    94.6 
Kenya    7  Libya    96.6 
Somalia    98.5       
Malawi    12.8  
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   










Tunisia    99.5 
Tanzania    30.2  Azerbaijan    99.2 
Uganda    12.1  Georgia    9.9 
Mauritania    99.1  Adjara    30 













Madagascar    1.1  Crimea    
      Abkhazia    
   
   
   









Sudan    71.3  Dagestan    
Pakistan    96.3  Ingushetia    
Bangladesh    89.6  Chechnya    
Thailand-Patani    5.8  Kabardino-Balkar    
Philippines-
Moro 
   5.1  Karachay-Cherkess    
Sri Lanka    8.5       
Nepal    4.2  
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   







Ossetia    15 
Jammu Kashmir    30.69  Adygea    25 
Azad Kashmir    ~75  Bosnia-Herzegovina    ~40 
Indonesia-Aceh    88.2  Macedonia    33.1 









 Vietnam    ~0.07  Albania    79.9 Myanmar    ~4  Bulgaria    12.2 
Tajikistan    84.1  Romania    0.3 
Tatarstan    53.2  Hungary    0.2 
Kazakhstan    56.4  Serbia-Sandjak    3.2 
Kyrgyzstan    86.3  Montenegro    17.7 
Mongolia    5  Cuba    0.1 
Afghanistan    99.7  Haiti    <0.1 
 
                                                
76 The table is built on the information from IHH’s Monthly Bulletin 2001 (46): July, August, 
September; Pew Research Center’s Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim 




“CIVIL SOCIETY IS THE RISING CURRENCY IN POLITICS TODAY”:  
 
DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITIES OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY FRAMEWORK 
 
UNIW as a transnational Islamic network is similar to its predecessors in that its 
primary aim is to consolidate world’s Muslim populations and mobilize them to solve 
Muslim world’s economic, social and political problems. While UNIW is a typical 
religious solidarity network to a large extent, it diverges from its predecessors as it 
highlights its civil society character above all. UNIW’s leaders and its member NGOs 
choose to frame their efforts within the discourse of civil society. I argue in this 
chapter that this is a strategic decision. UNIW uses the ideational tools of the civil 
society discourse as it allows the network and its members to access additional 
channels of power. One of the main channels of power is the discursive opportunity 
structure of the civil society framework. As the sociological institutionalist and 
constructivist literatures suggest, the prevailing political culture of transnational 
politics considers civil society framework as the most legitimate form of collective 
action. Therefore, by claiming their civil society identity, UNIW and its member 
NGOs achieve legitimacy in the international public discourse, resonate with the 
claims of other transnational non-state actors, and gain international visibility.  
UNIW’s leaders frame the network’s identity and message within the contours of 
the prevalent civil society discourse. In the process, however, they draw selectively 
from “the normative toolbox and ideational resource pool” (Adamson 2005: 554) of 
civil society. As most overused concepts in academic scholarship, civil society has 
become a “sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect” (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 
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275) of civic action. Most civil society discussions in scholarly literature draw 
simultaneously from various traditions; they employ its communitarian characteristics 
as much as its reactionary aspects. Therefore, even the mainstream academic 
literature and policy circles present a highly ambiguous understanding of civil 
society. UNIW is not at all unique in its selective use of civil society’s discursive 
elements. UNIW’s leaders and member NGOs conveniently use liberal norms of civil 
society framework in pursuit of their conservative goals.  
In order to identify the particular ways in which UNIW negotiates the 
contradictions of civil society framework and seize its discursive opportunities, I start 
the chapter with an overview of the civil society idea’s trajectory in Western 
scholarly tradition. Next, I present the Islam and civil society debate in the literature. 
In the second section of the chapter, I identify the discursive opportunity structures of 
civil society. I argue that civil society discourse and identity allow UNIW to claim 
legitimacy as a credible political actor, to frame its message in ways that resonate 
with the norms of transnational non-state politics, and to attain public visibility in 
international platforms.  
The findings of the chapter fill a gap in the study of transnational non-state actors. 
Constructivist scholarship on transnational non-state activism has paid a 
disproportionate attention to secular networks that promote liberal norms. Numerous 
empirical studies explored the normative motivations of transnational advocacy 
networks, international NGOs, and transnational NGO coalitions that promote human 
rights, environmental protection, social justice and so on. These works were very 
fruitful in laying the foundations of the constructivist perspective as well as the study 
 122 
of transnational non-state politics. The majority of scholarship has overlooked non-
secular networks, particularly Islamist ones, that promote conservative norms. 
However, as UNIW demonstrates, there is an ever-increasing movement among 
previously informal religious groups to adopt formal NGO structures and form 
transnational networks and alliances. These faith-based networks effortlessly 
negotiate across the conservative/liberal divide and make instrumental use of the 
liberal civil society discourse’s ideational tools towards their conservative goals. 
Therefore, I argue that a well-rounded scholarship of transnational non-state politics 
necessitate the inclusion of conservative networks in its body of work. 
 
6.1 Civil Society: An Ambiguous Concept  
 
Civil society has been one of the most debated and ambiguous concepts within 
and across several academic disciplines. Its capacity, normative values, and political 
function have stimulated much debate in both social science scholarship and policy 
circles. The ambiguity of the concept starts at drawing its boundaries. While some 
theorists draw the borders of civil society around autonomous institutions, others 
include any social activity outside of the state. Kumar (1993: 282), for example, 
suggests a narrower definition of civil society as “the arena of non-state institutions 
and practices which enjoy a high degree of autonomy.” Positioning civil society in 
relation to state, Keane (1988: 3) defines it as “the realm of social (privately owned, 
market directed, voluntary run or friendship based) activities which are legally 
recognized and guaranteed by the state.” Cohen and Arato (1992: ix) extend this 
definition to “a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed 
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above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations 
(especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public 
communication.” As the boundaries of the definition are pushed further to include 
‘communitarian’ institutions, the term encompasses a variety of actors, ranging from 
business organizations, political groups, and media institutions to churches, family 
networks, neighborhoods and schools. Therefore, the meaning and function of civil 
society carry a high degree of ambiguity even within the mainstream political theory. 
Foley and Edwards (1996: 38) aptly illustrate the ambiguous character of the civil 
society idea in a list of questions:     
 
[Does] it, for instance, include business (“the market”) as well as voluntary 
organizations, or does the market constitute a separate “private” sphere? If we 
exclude the market, should we nevertheless include economic associations – trade 
groups, professional organizations, labor unions, and the like? What about 
political organizations? Does it make sense, following Gramsci, to distinguish 
“civil” from “political” society? If so, how are we to distinguish between political 
associations per se and the political activities of groups in civil society, from 
interest groups to religious bolides, which are intermittently mobilized in pursuit 




The lack of a precise definition and thus a coherent theory of civil society has 
given rise to endless debates, to such an extent that some scholars like Giddens 
(1990) dispute its utility altogether. Similarly, Luhmann (1990) takes issue with the 
concept’s semantic overextension and normative content. He argues that it has lost its 
political and analytical value. The ambiguity of civil society’s meaning is a valid 




The changing content or coverage of the term – what it was not; the tension 
between normative and descriptive, idealistic and empiricist, subjective and 
objective implications of the concept; and the relative emphasis on the private and 
the public or the individual and the social.  
 
 
Civil society’s prevalence as an operational concept has been quite sporadic in the 
history of social theory. Theorists transformed the function and elements of civil 
society depending on the particular social and political conditions of the historical 
period. The idea of civil society started as synonymous with the state, yet concluded 
in a demarcation between itself and the state. While civil society was introduced 
originally as a political force against despotic states, in the course of political history 
its status and function have evolved to those of an actor in opposition to the 
totalitarian regimes of Eastern Europe and Latin America in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
Today, civil society is distinctively characterized as a ‘third force’ that is able to 
organize itself, functions outside the state and puts pressure on the state. 
The common thread that runs through the multiple phases of the evolution of the 
civil society concept is its restorative character. Each definition has proposed civil 
society as the panacea to the social and political problems of the particular era. In 
classical thought, societas civilis protected the public against the despotic and 
barbaric rule of the state. In the 18th and 19th centuries, with the rise of the nation-
state and the market economy, civil society came to be defined in relation to the 
division of labor, the mass production of commodities, and private property relations 
(Colas 2002: 33). For the thinkers of this period, civil society ensured a rights-based 
economic society, private property, and individualism. In the middle of the 19th 
century, civil society concept briefly disappeared from social theory. In a period of 
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strong nation-states, industrial capitalism and bureaucracy, issues of democracy and 
liberty were replaced by those of social mobility, poverty, and class conflict 
(Alexander 2001: 17). In the 20th century, Gramsci (1971) revived the concept and 
theorized it as a cultural space between state and society. According to Gramsci, civil 
society enabled the hegemony of ruling classes with the consent of the subordinate 
ones. Gramsci considered civil society as the key agent in organizing hegemony. 
Nevertheless, he argued that civil society could serve as a temporary and strategic 
tool in revolutionary struggle. Therefore from classical philosophy to Gramsci, civil 
society was conceptualized vis-à-vis the despotic state and market capitalism. 
Even though these perspectives theorized the concept in the context of 
confrontation between the state and society, they still presumed a symbiotic 
relationship between civil society and the state. It was during the anti-totalitarian 
movements of 1970s and 1980s in Latin America and Eastern Europe that theorists 
started to locate civil society explicitly in a position against the state. For Latin 
American thinkers, civil society held the potential to bring together entrepreneurs, 
church groups, and labor movements in their opposition to the regime. According to 
this perspective, civil society enables self-organization and individual responsibility 
through voluntary associations, interest groups, political organizations, and local 
communities. The works of Eastern European writers such as Vajda (1988), Konrad 
(1984), and Havel (1988) contributed to the understanding of civil society as the key 
to individual rights and freedoms, independent thinking, debate, and democratic 
governance. 
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In the post-Westphalian era of global politics, civil society has come to denote 
self-organizing or autonomous forms of associational life beyond state supervision. 
Here, civil society is attributed a key role in constituting participatory democracy and 
substituting the state in carrying out long-term solutions to social problems. The non-
profit, voluntary third-sector which is composed of interest groups, grassroots 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and so on, is invited to provide 
solutions to global crises, “ranging from environmental problems to poverty, from 
unequal development to warfare, conflicts and social injustice which are considered 
too difficult for individual nation-state to respond” (Keyman 2005: 7-8). In this way, 
civil society is regarded as the basic reference point for the stability of democracy and 
development. It is posited as a cure-all remedy for participatory democracy, public 
deliberation, human progress, rule of law, material welfare, active citizenship, and 
individual rights and freedoms.  
While the politics of civil society were conceived as limited to national or 
regional scales until the end of Cold War, the interconnected nature of the 
globalization process has extended its domain. Politics is no longer conceptualized as 
a nationally bounded activity populated by national actors. As the boundaries and 
interdependencies of politics transcend local/national territories toward 
regional/global spheres, actors multiply and transform as well. Today, it is argued that 
the transnational organization of political actors carries the possibility for a global 
civil society. Global civil society is attributed an ipso facto positivity as well: 
advocates such as Scholte (1997: 25-28) argue that it bears the possibility to secure 
material welfare across the globe, to promote civic education, to give voice to 
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marginalized groups, to provide a debating platform for alternative perspectives, and 
to enhance social cohesion.  
The ambiguity of the current civil society discourse also arises from the tendency 
in the literature to draw from various theoretical traditions. Civil society discussions 
today make “as much reference to de Tocqueville and Adam Smith as to Gramsci and 
Hegel, thus making civil society the subject matter of both liberal and leftist political 
theory” (Abdelrahman 2004: 19). An alternative classification to the chronological 
trajectory above is Foley and Edwards’ (1996) taxonomy of civil society traditions: 
Civil Society I and Civil Society II. The first strand conceptualizes civil society in 
terms of civic networks and associational life. This perspective defines civil society 
as the networks of civil associations that produce trust and social capital. Therefore, 
the universe of civil society is composed of traditional secondary associations 
including parent-teacher associations, sports clubs, and churches, even weekly 
bowling leagues (Putnam 1995). The latter strand conceptualizes civil society as a 
political actor in alternative to the state. Rooted in the anticommunist movements in 
the 1970s and 1980s, this perspective sees civil society as an autonomous and 
resistant sphere of action that restrains state power and facilitates the transition to 
democracy. As a normative project to be realized, this view of civil society promises 
individual rights and freedoms, active citizenship and a democratic society.  
Either way, civil society is associated with Enlightenment ideals, individualism 
and the existence of autonomous institutions. It is conceptualized as a formation 
whose prerequisites are derived from Western political and historical conditions. In 
other words, the scholarly literature associates civil society with “what the West has”. 
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Almost all perspectives described above overlook, if not outright reject, non-Western 
formations of civil society, specifically those in the Muslim world.    
 
6.2 Civil Society and Islam 
The proponents of the incompatibility between Islam and civil society argument 
often quote the powerful prose of Serif Mardin (1995) who argues that civil society is 
a “Western dream”. According to Mardin, civil society is a western dream because it 
has emerged from Western Europe’s social history and therefore it does not have an 
Islamic equivalent. In this perspective, Western Europe’s social and cultural elements 
such as moral autonomy, civic associations, and the rise of an independent 
bourgeoisie are the historical building blocks of the civil society ideal. The Muslim 
dream, on the other hand, “shifted to the ideal of a social equilibrium created under 
the aegis of a just prince” (Mardin 1995: 285). The charismatic authority of a ruler, 
rather than the rationalized and self-referential rule of law, was dreamt to ensure 
social cohesion: 
 
The dream itself, the ability to dream the dream, is the expression of a unique 
premise concerning the components of a social system, a premise that also 
assumed more precise outlines within modern European history. That postulate is 
the idea that social relations are both sustained and energized by autonomous, 
secular collectives with legal personality operating within a frame of rationalized 
and self-referential law (Mardin 1995: 278). 
 
 
Individual self-creation and human agency, hence modern citizenship, remain 
elusive for Muslim societies in practice. They may acquire the institutional forms of 
Western modernity, Mardin argues, yet the Muslim dream remains tied to collective 
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rights rather than individual rights. Therefore, “the dream of Western society has not 
become the dream of Muslim societies” (Mardin 1995: 295). 
The elusiveness of human agency and individual rights is a frequent point of 
discussion in the Islam and civil society debate. Of particular significance is Gellner’s 
oft-cited argument on Islam, secularization and individualism. Gellner agrees with 
Mardin that the autonomous institutions and associations model does not 
satisfactorily gauge the state of civil society in Muslim contexts. The model captures 
only one of the values assigned to civil society: autonomy from the state. The critical 
point is not that such associations did not exist but that they did not provide 
individual self-creation. He illustrates his point by referencing the “internally well-
organized, self-administering and partly or wholly autonomous sub-communities” 
which allowed individuals independence from the king yet did not ensure human 
agency. These groups “maintained their cohesion, internal discipline and solidarity” 
through kinship rules, relationships, and obligations. In other words, the tyranny of 
kinship replaced the tyranny of kings. Therefore, the existence of autonomous 
associations is but one of the conditions of civil society. The essential building bloc 
of civil society, for Gellner, is for the individual to enter associations and choose 
identities “freely rather than imposed by birth or by awesome ritual” (Gellner 
1994:42). The modern self who is unencumbered by his clan, caste, religion or oath is 
the pre-requisite building block of civil society. In Gellner’s view, civil society is an 
outcome of modernity, and the human result of modernization is the ‘Modular 
Man’77: 
                                                
77 Gellner (1994: 97) picks a metaphor from the furniture industry to describe the modern individual 
who is unbound by his clan, caste, religion or oath: “you can buy one bit which will function on its 
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Modular man is capable of combining into effective associations and institutions, 
without these being total, many-stranded, underwritten by ritual and made stable 
through being linked to a whole inside set of relationships, all of these being ties 
in with each other and so immobilized. He can combine into specific-purpose, ad-
hoc, limited association, without binding himself by some blood ritual. He can 
leave an association when he comes to disagree with its policy, without being 
open to an accusation of high treason.  
 
 
Modernization and the concurrent process of secularization in the West dissolved 
communal loyalties, hence produced the modular man. Islam, on the other hand, 
Gellner argues, remained secularization resistant. Islam’s control over the 
populations has not diminished because of its “scripturalism, pervasive rule-
orientation and Puritanism, regulation though not sacralization of economic life, 
monotheism, restrained ritualism and religious though not political individualism” 
(Gellner 1994: 199). This explains, in Gellner’s view, the incompatibility of Islam 
and civil society.  
Gellner is not alone in arguing that the existence of civil society and its 
institutional arrangements in non-Western, specifically Islamic, contexts are 
problematic, if not impossible. Arrays of Orientalist scholars have vigorously argued 
that the very existence of civil societies in Muslim contexts is an oxymoron. For Watt 
(1968: 120 – 123), the totalistic character of Islam requires a totalitarian state that is 
hostile to the emergence of a functioning civil society. According to John Hall (1985: 
89), Islam as a religion is essentially “monotheism with a tribal face” that blocks the 
development of a true civil society and democracy. Crone (1986) argues that Islamic 
civilization refuses to legitimize political authority. Islam, according to this 
                                                                                                                                      
own, but when your needs, income or space available augment, you can buy another bit. It will fit in 
with the one acquired previously, and the whole thing will still have a coherence, aesthetically and 
technically. You can combine and recombine the bits at will.” 
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perspective, discourages the formation of groups that might resist despotism since 
“Islamic law knows no corporate legal persons; Islamic history shows no councils or 
communes, no synods or parliaments, nor any other kind of elective or representative 
assembly” (Lewis 1994: 45-46). As a consequence, Springborg (1975: 87) argues, 
social associations in Muslim societies are “informal, personalistic, and relatively 
inefficient as a means of winning support and extracting resources from the 
populace”. Mobilizing the indispensability of civil society for democratization 
argument, some analysts have argued that Islam is inherently incompatible with 
democracy (Sorensen 1993; Huntington 1993; Tibi 1998). Kramer (2001), for 
instance, insists that an Islamic civil society can only be a breeding ground for 
Islamic radicalism and jihadists rather than democratic institutions and modern 
citizenship. 
An increasing number of voices have started to raise their criticisms in 1990s 
(Hann and Dunn 1996: Norton 1995), in response to the proponents of the 
incompatibility argument. One strand of scholarship refers to the historical precedents 
of civil society in the Muslim world. Pointing to the civil nature of institutions such as 
guilds, bazaars, trusts, and foundations in Islamic history (Esposito and Burgat 2003), 
these scholars argue that these institutions are the possible equivalents of civil society 
in pre-modern Arab and Middle Eastern cities. In their perspective, despite the 
absence of bureaucratic organizational models and individual autonomy, these 
institutions provided a counterbalance to the power of the state (Ibrahim 1998; 
Zubaida 1992) and enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy from the state (Kamali 
2001).  
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Another strand of literature that studies contemporary civil action in Muslim 
societies suggests that informal sectors of social networks and personal ties serve as 
functional civil societies in these contexts. These analyses consider spheres that are 
typically left out of civil society discussions within the boundaries of politics. Civic 
activism, according to this view, should not only be sought in the formal political 
structures of political parties, legal institutions, bureaucratic NGOs, but primarily in 
the politics of daily life (Bayat 2002). Tribal forms of collective responsibility and 
mutual aid in Yemen (Carapico 1997), familial ties and support networks in Cairo 
(Singerman 1995), daily struggles of squatters, the unemployed and street-vendors in 
Tehran (Bayat 1998) serve as viable civil societies in the repressive political climates 
of most Muslim states.  
Alongside the vivid informal networks, the Muslim societies of the Middle East 
and North Africa have also “witnessed an explosion of associational activity” since 
1980s (Yom 2005: 16). The brisk revival of numerous membership-based 
professional groups, non-governmental organizations, public interest associations, 
and think tanks across the region demonstrate a vibrant civil society sector. 
The mushrooming of NGOs in Muslim countries, specifically in the Middle East, 
is derivative of the political and economic dynamics in the region. First, the 
implementation of structural adjustment policies and neoliberal economic programs 
resulted in massive migration to urban centers, which were not equipped to serve the 
unprecedented needs of such populations. The social effects of industrialization, 
migration and urbanization remained unaddressed by states. Local and national 
governments’ inability to provide services such as housing, healthcare, and food 
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subsidies led NGOs to fill the vacuum (Talhami 2001). The second, political, 
dynamic is directly related to the rise of Islamic activism in the region. As the secular 
states permeated all segments of the religious sphere, moderate Islamist groups 
started to establish institutions alternative to those of the state. Although these NGOs 
are similar to early Islamic charities, they are collective grassroots efforts rather than 
philanthropic endowments.  (Clark 2004: 5-9).  Islamic medical clinics in Egypt are 
one of the most successful examples of Islamic grassroots social-welfare activities. 
Located in or beside mosques throughout the city of Cairo, these clinics provide 
millions of people with “an intermediate form of healthcare between the expensive 
private hospitals and the government’s often inadequate services” (Clark 1995: 11). 
In countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Sudan, where states are absent or in 
crisis, NGOs provide almost all social services. In Gaza Strip and West Bank, for 
instance, Islamic institutions provide “anywhere from 10-40 percent” of all social 
services (Roy 2000). These institutions not only do relief and charity work but also 
provide up to 60 percent of primary health care services, nearly 50 percent of hospital 
care, 100 percent of disability care, 100 percent of all agricultural extension, training 
and research, and 30 percent of educational services (Bayat 2002: 16).  
Another triggering factor behind the civic revival, particularly in Arab countries, 
is the Western academic and policy-making consensus that a dynamic civil society is 
the essential precondition for democratic regime change. Western “political donors, 
bilaterial aid agencies, and multilateral financial institutions in the democracy 
promotion industry” (Yom 2005: 16) have extended substantial diplomatic and 
financial support to Arab civil society with the conviction that increasing pressure 
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from civil society organizations will force the authoritarian governments to accept 
liberal reforms.  
While the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations and voluntary 
associations has resulted in a vibrant civil society in Arab countries, many scholars 
started to question whether this vibrancy is necessarily an indication of diminished 
state power and democratic consolidation (Anderson 1998; Wiktorowicz 2000; 
Albrecht and Shlumberger 2004). The insufficient signals towards steady democratic 
change in 1990s and 2000s brought the role of state back into the discussion. 
Criticizing the false dichotomy between the state and civil society, scholars echo 
institutionalist perspectives that highlight the centrality of states as potent actors that 
structure the dynamics of civil society and socio-economic change (Skocpol 1985). In 
this view, states’ “continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive 
systems” (Skocpol 1985: 7) shape the quality of grassroots activity and associational 
life. Civic engagement and the associational sector mirror the structure of government 
(Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson 2000).  
Accordingly, the explosion of civil society in the Middle East and North Africa 
region, particularly in the authoritarian states, has met with considerable skepticism. 
Nuanced analyses of the state/civil society dynamics (Abdelrahman 2007; 
Heydemann 2007; Jamal 2007; Wiktorowicz 2000) demonstrate that there is a 
complex relationship between civil society and democratic change. While the 
associational forms, such as non-governmental organizations and voluntary 
associations, have mushroomed in the Arab World in the last three decades, the 
authoritarian regimes in these countries aptly adopted cooptation strategies to control 
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dissenting voices in their civil societies (Abdelrahman 2007).  For instance, 
Wiktorowicz (2000) points to the administrative and regulative practices that 
constrain civic organizations across the region. Civil society organizations, 
Wiktorowicz (2004: 13) argues, are “embedded in a web of bureaucratic practices and 
legal codes which allows those in power to monitor and regulate collective activities.” 
As a result, these organizations are boggled down in a system of social control and do 
not facilitate collective empowerment.  Furthermore, states repress organizations that 
threaten their authority, intimidate leading political activists, control the media, and 
pass counterterrorism legislations in order to restrict the reach of civil society 
organizations (Heydemann 2007: 4-10).  
Authoritarian states’ preferential treatment of civic associations result in 
state/civil society relationships that are characterized by clientelism and patronage. 
The civil society organizations and associations that enjoy such benefits are those that 
“support the status quo, advocate conservative reforms, or are simply apolitical” 
(Hawthorne 2004: 3). In that sense, even the advocacy organizations may not 
necessarily constitute political opposition. As Langhour (2004) argues, non-
governmental actors whose mere presence is bound by the availability of funds and 
political opportunities, “advocate the interests of a specific group or the importance of 
a particular principle.” Therefore, in non-democratic contexts, civil society does not 
necessarily facilitate democratic consolidation but may reproduce non-democratic 





SECTION II: UNIW AND CIVIL SOCEITY 
As repeated throughout the dissertation, the primary aim of the Union of the 
NGOs of the Islamic World (UNIW) is to unite the Muslim peoples of the world, 
ensure global religious solidarity, and to help serve Umma’s (global Islamic 
community) revival, welfare and future. Nonetheless, UNIW leaders do not define the 
coalition as an Islamic solidarity alliance but insist on its civil society character. 
UNIW’s executives and members frequently refer to the organization as “the first 
global Islamic civil society coalition”78 or “the representative of global Islamic civil 
society”79.  
UNIW’s identity and objectives might be poles apart from those of the liberal and 
secular non-state actors. Still, both camps converge in perceiving civil society as the 
cure-all remedy to their pressing problems.  UNIW is concerned about the widespread 
poverty, illiteracy, hunger, disease, and human misery in Muslim majority countries. 
It is concerned about the spread of violence and war. It is concerned about the ways 
in which ‘the imperialistic West’ subjugates and exploits the Muslim world, 
propagates its materialistic values and mass culture, and destabilizes Islam. It is 
concerned about the rise of Islamophobia, religious discrimination and intolerance. It 
is concerned about the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Kashmir, East 
Turkistan and Myanmar. It is concerned about the dissolution of Islamic values and 
the dispersion of Umma.  
For UNIW and its members, the only solution to such wide-range problems is to 
unite Muslim populations, pool their material resources, solidify its human capital, 
                                                
78 Interviewee 4, (UNIW Executive Committee Member), personal interview by author, June 12, 2008. 
79 Necmi Sadikoglu, (UNIW Secretary General), International Union of Muslim Scholars General 
Council Press Conference, 2010, Istanbul.  
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and act as an undivided and powerful global actor. They are disillusioned with 
Muslim majority states’ previous attempts at building global alliances. Thus, they 
believe that only civil society has the capacity to materialize this goal. Only civil 
society can revive Islamic values, and provide a shared platform to consolidate an 
influential Muslim voice. Only civil society can restore peace and stability in conflict 
areas. Only civil society can uplift Muslim countries’ struggling economies. Only 
civil society can stand tall against Western imperialism and exploitation. In other 
words, UNIW and its members attribute civil society an ipso facto positivity and 
perceive it as the panacea to Umma’s each and every problem.  
Similar to the ambiguous conceptualization of civil society in Western literature, 
UNIW employs an eclectic discourse as well. In order to evaluate the ways in which 
UNIW utilizes the concept to attain its larger political and cultural goals, one has to 
identify the particulars of its civil society vision. What kind of civil society does 
UNIW refer to? How does UNIW’s understanding of civil society compare and 
contrast with the assumptions of the mainstream civil society discussions? In the next 
sections, I examine the elements of UNIW’s civil society discourse. I particularly 
focus on the ways in which UNIW negotiates the compatibility of Islam and civil 
society debate; the authoritative state/civil society tension; and the question of 










6.3 UNIW’s Conceptualization of Civil Society  
Above all, UNIW’s leaders reject the Western scholarship’s claims that Islam and 
civil society are incompatible. Mentioning the autonomous institutions of pre-modern 
Islamic societies, UNIW’s leaders as well as its member NGOs’ spokespeople echo 
the optimist camp’s arguments about the central role of non-state actors in Islam. 
Saad Eddin Ibrahim expounds the most articulate expression of this argument. 
Ibrahim (1995) cites ‘resilient traditional Arab formations’ such as guilds, 
associations, bazaars, religious scholars (ulama), trusts and foundations (awqaf), and 
Sufi orders as the equivalents of civil society in pre-modern Islamic history. Esposito 
(2003) puts forward a similar argument. He states that these autonomous institutions 
were largely independent from state control and that they played an important role in 
the economic and social life of Muslim cities. Moreover, he argues, the leaders of 
these autonomous institutions acted as mediators between families, tribes and rulers. 
Among all the autonomous institutions of Islamic history, awqaf (religious 
endowments) are considered the precursors of modern faith-based civil society 
organizations. Awqaf (singular: waqf) were pious foundations established for a 
designated social service. Often dedicated to the relief of the poor, awqaf supported 
charitable works as small as building a local fountain or as large as establishing 
schools, universities, hostels, and hospitals (Zubaida 1997). UNIW’s leaders draw 
parallels between awqaf and contemporary social service organizations in terms of 
social responsibility and autonomy. Posed the question of compatibility between civil 
society and Islam, numerous interviewees romantically invoke waqf tradition of the 
‘harmonious Muslim societies of the past’: 
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Islamic society is by nature civil society. Today, the West wants to appropriate 
the culture of civil society under the name of NGOs. But when we look at Islamic 
history, we see awqaf everywhere dedicated even to the most improbable causes: 
soup kitchens, schools, libraries, mosques… Several awqaf were established to 
pay for the funerals of the poor, to distribute ice-cold water during the summer, 
even to feed birds in the winter. Everyone, rich or poor, sought to do his or her 
part.80 
 
UNIW’s founders set out to help Umma solve its problems in early 2000s and 
concluded that consolidating Umma’s civil societies was crucial. At the same time, 
they were not certain about the capacity of Umma’s civil societies. The existence and 
conditions of strong and vigorous civil societies in Muslim countries is not a puzzling 
phenomenon for Western scholarship only. The Turkish founders of UNIW found 
themselves asking the same question in 2003: Is there even a Muslim civil society to 
unite? UNIW’s Deputy Secretary General explains: 
At the beginning, the picture of civil society in the Islamic World was a blurry 
one for us. Is it there? Is it not there? In what capacity? We know that the majority 
of the Islamic World restricts individual rights and freedoms, democratic 
institutions, voluntary associations. What’s more, the state hegemony is very 
dominant. Of course we did have concerns about the capacity of civil society in 
the Muslim World at the time.81 
 
During the three years prior to its launch in 2005, UNIW’s founders built 
networks with the organizations that they were already in contact. They had 
established connections with numerous NGOs throughout the Islamic world by the 
time they organized the international conference on Islamophobia and invited over 
two hundred organizations, academics and journalists. In this process, their initial 
                                                
80 Interviewee 1, (UNIW General Coordinator), personal interview by author, June 4, 2008. 
81 Interviewee 7, (UNIW Deputy Secretary General), personal interview by author, September 4, 2009. 
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concerns about state scrutiny and civil society capacity in Muslim majority countries 
had subsided: 
We realized that in countries with strong leader authority, civil initiatives could 
not do overt cultural and political work. But they have brought together a civil 
base around social aid. There are myriads of orphan care networks, poverty 
alleviation groups. And the states did not object since these are basically service 
organizations. Throughout, they have simultaneously built solidarity networks, 
and produced an intellectual awakening.82 
 
UNIW’s spokespeople’s description of the civil initiatives around the Muslim 
world sheds a light into their perception of what civil society can achieve. Their view 
of civil society’s normative functions and the actual capacity demonstrate wide 
similarities with the de Tocquevillian approach to civil society. In that, civil society is 
championed for its socialization function. Individual involvement in the local 
community and its voluntary associations teaches the “habits of the heart”83 of social 
behavior. By working together in civil associations, individuals cultivate citizenship 
skills and social capital, which is “a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu 1986: 248). Social 
capital generated in these faith-based social aid/humanitarian organizations, a UNIW 
executive explains: 
[…] built an intellectual base, produced mechanisms. They got to know each 
other and built covert solidarity networks. They cultivated cadres, intellectual 
                                                
82 Interviewee 7, (UNIW Deputy Secretary General), personal interview by author, September 4, 2009. 
83 Tocqueville (1969 [1835]: 264) uses the phrase ‘habits of the heart’ to describe his definition of 
‘mores’: “I mean it to apply not only the ‘moeurs’ in the strict sense, which might be called the habits 
of the heart, but also the different notions possessed by men, the various opinions current among them, 
and the sum of ideas that shape mental habits”. According to Tocqueville, Americans’ habits of the 
heart were historically embedded in republicanism and they emphasized virtuous associational activity 
that contributed to the vitality of American civil society. Institutions such as townships, schools, 
religions, and occupations formed “the ‘character of mind’ and ‘habits of the heart’ a democratic 
republic requires. Whatever their more particular purposes, these agencies of civic education inculcate 
the habit of attending to public things. And yet given their multiplicity, they prevent public life from 
dissolving into an undifferentiated whole” (Sandel 1996: 321). 
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circles, and an in-group spirit. These circles are not only composed of the orphans 
and the poor. But more importantly, of those who share the same values, belief 
systems, political aspirations. They are the ones who got together under the 
pretense of service work but cultivated a political base.84  
 
UNIW’s task, according to its spokespeople and its member NGOs, is to 
propagate the social capital internationally in order to build a sense of communal 
responsibility, solidarity, effective cooperation, and collective action: 
When journalists ask us about our purpose, we respond: Our purpose is the Union 
itself. Because this is a structure that brings us together, cement our shared values, 
and ensures solidarity. After all these years, now we know each other. We have 
connected the human capital of Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, 
Syria, Palestine, Lebanon... We are not the helpless, powerless, voiceless Umma 
anymore.85 
 
The key aim of civil society then, according to UNIW’s founders, is to strengthen 
self-organization, horizontal associations, and solidarity to promote collective action 
for the common good. Its position vis-à-vis the state is secondary. In other words, for 
UNIW, civil society does not have to be an antithetical actor against the state:  
What is civil society? It does not have to clash with the official ideology. It might 
oppose at times, it might support at others. What’s important is that it organizes 
itself, it voices its concerns, cultivates a position, alongside the state or despite the 
state.  
 
Along the same lines, according to UNIW executives, overt political action is not 
the sine qua non of civil society either. Service work, in the form of social aid and 
humanitarian action, can substitute overt politics. The critical underlying reason is the 
strictness of political regimes in most Muslim majority countries. In the larger part of 
the Muslim geography, social aid and politics have a more intertwined relationship, 
                                                
84 Interviewee 9, (UNIW Executive Committee Member), personal interview by author, September 13, 
2009. 
85 Interviewee 7, (UNIW Deputy Secretary General), personal interview by author, September 4, 2009. 
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which stems from the specific political conditions of many Islamic states, especially 
in the Gulf region. Although some researchers call attention to the political transition 
that Arab countries have been undergoing,86 paths to free debate and dissent remains 
blocked in many. As a result of strict state surveillance and legal restrictions, most 
Muslim organizations assert that they do not have a political agenda or purpose. 
Limiting their activities to ‘harmless’ areas such as human relief, health care or 
religious education, these organizations claim to be apolitical. Some researchers argue 
that these seemingly apolitical organizations provide civic education and enhance 
individual activism that are lacking in most Muslim states (Ibrahim 1995). Although 
many students of Islam and civil society deem such arguments, which herald a path to 
democratization in Islamic countries, unrealistic, the leaders of Muslim NGOs see 
mobilization around these activities as a conduit to further organized activism in the 
future. One Syrian NGO leader disclosed in a private interview:  
 
Given the political restrictions on what people can and cannot do on political 
grounds, our hands are tied. We are limited to humanitarian work, social aid, 
charity, mosque repairs or Qur’an education at best. But in the process, we are 
pulling together a number of intellectuals and activists who are ill at ease with the 
current state of politics. If and when the political conditions evolve, we are going 
to have a qualified human potential to take on more substantial roles in political 
action.87 
 
Correspondingly, the political conditions of the Muslim geography affect the 
ways in which civil society organizations can pool resources and work in 
partnerships. Humanitarian and/or social aid organizations find that the path to 
                                                
86 Kubba (2000: 86) explains: “Laws in most countries in the Muslim world restrict nongovernmental 
organization, the closure of association and nespapers, continuing human rights violations, and the 
enactment of emergency laws, civil society activity and demands for liberal reforms are on the 
increase. Civil society groups are breaking new ground and finding loopholes in current legislation that 
enable them to operate and develop despite the restrictions.” 
87 Interviewee 10, (Syrian NGO spokesperson), personal interview by author, September 13, 2009.  
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cooperation is more open to them than advocacy organizations. With the amplified 
pressure exerted on Islamic NGOs since 9/11, many large national or international 
Islamic NGOs have been banned from working in some countries on the grounds that 
they are connected with international terrorist networks, and put in designation lists. 
Under the conditions of the post-9/11 world, the ‘space’ for most Islamic NGOs has 
shrunk even more. As a consequence, the seemingly ‘apolitical’ work of the 
humanitarian and/or social aid field has more opportunities for global cooperation 
than the ‘political’ Muslim civil society.  
 
6.4 The Cachet of Civil Society 
As repeated throughout the dissertation, UNIW’s adoption of the civil society 
identity, discourse and organizational structure is a strategic decision. UNIW’s 
leaders and members frame themselves as civil society actors since they perceive the 
civil society discourse and identity as a key opportunity structure which provides 
UNIW additional channels of power and access.  
Discursive opportunity structures, as explained in Chapter 2, are the “institutional 
and cultural access points that actors can seize upon” when engaging strategic 
framing (Ferree et al. 2002: 62). Actors employ the symbolic, cultural and ideational 
resources that exist in a given environment to affect the strategy and success of their 
actions. These resources determine the message’s chances of diffusion in the public 
sphere (Koopmans and Olzak 2004). At the same time, discursive opportunities, 
similar to any type of political opportunity structure, are not objective and self-
evident structural factors. Activists need to perceive these opportunities as available 
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and compare the costs and benefits of each. UNIW’s decisive use of the civil society 
identity and discourse can be understood in this light. While UNIW is effectively a 
religious solidarity network, its leaders perceive the benefits of civil society as an 
opportunity structure. One UNIW executive committee member explains: 
 
Civil society is the rising currency today. If we are to be taken seriously, if the 
voice of the Muslim world is going to be heard in international platforms, we 
have to be civil society organizations and networks. Who listens to community 
leaders, let alone religious figures at the UN anymore?88 
 
UNIW is a norm-oriented non-state network that is motivated by ideational 
factors, particularly religious values and beliefs. However, UNIW’s leaders and 
members are not free standing moral agents driven simply by individual conscience, 
but rather as Adamson (2005: 547) argues “…actors who are deeply embedded within 
particular ideological and geopolitical configuration in world politics.” The world-
culture (Meyer, Boli et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999) that UNIW operates in is 
configured by the “liberal political ideas about the sanctity and autonomy of the 
individual and about democracy as the most desirable and just form of government” 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 166). This liberal democratic configuration prioritizes 
the voluntary societal associations above the individual and below the state as actors 
that complement the states-system and ensure good governance (Falk 1998). In other 
words, civil society is now considered an essential actor, both in domestic and 
international contexts.  
As UNIW leaders infer, the cachet of the civil society title in contemporary world 
politics cannot be underestimated. Intergovermental organizations such as the World 
Bank and governmental agencies such as the USAID exclusively work with 
                                                
88 Interviewee 7, (UNIW Deputy Secretary General), personal interview by author, September 4, 2009. 
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organizations that fit into the associational forms of civil society. Access to states and 
governmental agencies, as well as media organs are more open to particular forms of 
civil society; namely non-government and non-profit organizations. Country regimes, 
which claim to have legitimate governance in the international politics, are eager to 
announce that they have strong and vibrant civil societies.  
The spokesperson of a Sunni NGO in Iran provides a telling illustration of how 
civil society has become one of the essential factors for state legitimacy. Sunnis 
constitute approximately 9 percent of the population in Iran and retain a strong 
presence among Kurds, Turkmen, Afghans, and Baluchis. Since Sunni Islam is not 
recognized under the Shi’a regime (Halliday 1986: 94), Sunnis have experienced 
economic and social discrimination. They have been excluded from high office, 
banned from public displays of a Sunni religion and culture, and are not allowed to 
build mosques in the capital city (Keddie and Richard 2006: 332). Although Sunni 
NGOs are not officially recognized, the Shi’a regime turns a blind eye to the service 
work undertaken by local Sunni organizations and flaunts the country’s ostensibly 
vibrant Sunni civil society in international platforms: 
 
They want us to be and they don’t want us to be at the same time. They don’t 
recognize us officially, but they don’t ban us. Because now the world knows that 
we exist. If they ban us, the entire Islamic world will be against it. So they want 
us to be – at least to show the world that ‘We can tolerate Sunnis, we have this 
many Sunnis in the country living in peace, without problems, they have their 
own rights and everything’. This is a big propaganda item and advertising for 
foreign policy.”89 
 
The civil society discourse can carry an indisputable cachet mainly because the 
boundaries of its definition are so ambiguous. The civil society discourse is 
                                                
89 Interviewee 49 (Jamiyat al-Islah spokesperson), personal interview by author, May 16, 2010. 
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conveniently employed across the political spectrum because every actor can bend the 
definition and adopt the concept. In the Arab world for instance, Bellin (1995: 121) 
explains, civil society concept has become so central that: 
 
State officials use it to promote their projects of mobilization and 
‘modernization’; Islamists use it to angle for a legal share of public space; and 
independent activists and intellectuals use it to expand the boundaries of 
individual liberty. 
 
Similar to the tendency in most analyses on civil society in the literature, UNIW’s 
discourse of civil society is an ambiguous one. As Adamson (2005: 554) states, 
discursive structures “do not provide a consistent script for actors, but rather a 
normative toolbox and ideational pool that can be deployed in pursuit of political 
objective.” Correspondingly, UNIW’s civil society discourse is not coherent or 
consistent. UNIW’s leaders and members pick and choose from the ideational toolbox 
of civil society as they see fit. They simultaneously draw from the communitarian and 
liberal interpretations of civil society, and refer to its associational definitions as 
much as its reactionary characteristics.  
As discussed above, UNIW’s leaders and members are cognizant of the 
opportunity structures of civil society identity and employ the discourse to garner its 
benefits. What are the actual benefits of the civil society discourse? In the next 
section, I identify the advantages of civil society identity and discourse. The emergent 
literature on discursive civil society provides insights. Leading research in this field 
(Ferree et al. 2002; Fuchs 2011; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Koopmans and Statham 
1999) organizes the components of discursive opportunity structures in three strands: 
sociocultural, political, and mass media (Gamson 2004: 249). In light of their 
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arguments, I analyze the ways in which UNIW benefits from the contemporary 
discursive opportunity structures that place particular emphasis on civil society. I 
specifically discuss the reach of UNIW’s organizational identity and message in 
terms of legitimacy, resonance, and public visibility. 
 
6.5 Transnational Discursive Opportunities of the Civil Society Framework 
 
UNIW is an umbrella organization that brings together Islamic humanitarian and 
social aid organizations. UNIW’s primary aim is to establish religious solidarity 
across the globe. However, it does not label itself as an Islamic coalition or a religious 
solidarity initiative. Instead, it chooses to use the civil society label. I explain this 
conscious choice by the discursive opportunity structure framework. I argue that 
UNIW’s leaders adopt the discourse of civil society because it opens up additional 
channels of power to the coalition itself and its member NGOs.  
Discursive opportunity structure is a fairly recent idea in the social movement 
literature. The field is not fully developed yet and the existing research is mostly 
effective in explaining the dimension of opportunities and constraints on a national 
level.  For instance, Koopmans and Olzak  (2004) forcefully examine the discourse of 
extreme right wing movements through the ethnic-cultural framing of national 
identity against the idea of the nation as a political or civic community in Germany. 
Ferree et al. (2002) analyze the frames of the abortion discourse in their comparative 
study in Germany and the US. Again, Koopmans and Statham (1999) illustrate how 
discursive opportunity structures can affect frame resonance in their study on 
immigrants’ claims for citizenship rights in Britain and Germany. While these works 
are successful in analyzing the discursive opportunities of nation-level frames, they 
 148 
are insufficient in analyzing the discursive dimension of transnational activism’s 
opportunities and constraints (Olesen 2011). A satisfactory analysis of discursive 
opportunity structures that are available to UNIW needs to be conducted on a 
transnational level.  As a transnational non-state actor, UNIW positions itself 
alongside other transnational NGO coalitions and advocacy networks, international 
organizations. Similarly, for its leaders, the recipient of UNIW’s message is the 
international public. Therefore, UNIW frames its identity and message to gain 
visibility in the international media, achieve legitimacy in the international public 





Discursive structures are critical determinants of which collective actors and 
claims are more likely to achieve legitimacy in the public discourse (Koopmans and 
Stathman 1999). By framing itself as a civil society initiative, UNIW seizes a type of 
legitimacy that would not be available to informal Islamic networks. The legitimacy 
of civil society identity is especially evident in transnational politics of the post-9/11 
world. Islamic charities and social service organizations have always met with 
suspicion and been exposed to extraordinary levels of scrutiny in much of the non-
Muslim world (Benthall 2007). They have been often deemed to be funding fronts for 
terrorism and jihad in the public mind (Kroessin 2007). These accusations have only 
intensified and gained more political clout since 9/11. Severe anti-terror legislations 
in Europe and the United States designated numerous transnational charitable 
organizations and their country offices terrorist entities. Many Saudi Arabian and 
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Gulf charities, businesses and NGOs were indicted, suspended or shut down 
altogether.90  
These anti-terror legislations have hit the organizations’ funding sources the most. 
Governments have frozen the bank accounts of many Islamic charities and service 
NGOs. Legislations in Europe and the US have also shut down Islamic organizations’ 
fundraising activities. For example, the Saudi government, which is the second-
largest donor to the developing world, yielded to the US pressure and barred all 
NGOs from sending funds abroad in July 2003 (Kroessin 2007). These legislations 
and multilateral measures not only disrupted the organizations’ operations but also 
created a sense of distrust among donors.  As a result, many Islamic charities and 
service organizations experienced sizable drops in their fundraising (Ghazali 2008). 
In sum, Islamic organizations and networks of any type and size have been under 
greater scrutiny since September 11. The atmosphere of distrust created around 
Islamic collective associations of any kind makes it difficult for Islamic NGOs and 
networks to claim legitimacy about their missions and actions. UNIW’s leaders are 
aware of the constraints of the current political climate. While UNIW’s core aim is to 
establish global Islamic solidarity, its founders and executives are cautious about 
accepting membership applications from organizations that could be construed as 
extremists, and in turn could jeopardize UNIW’s legitimacy in the international 
                                                
90 It is important to note that there are discrepancies across European and US treatment of Islamic 
charities. Benthall  (2007) explains this discrepancy by the observer bias. While virtually all major 
Islamic charities in the United States have been closed down, many charities operate successfully 
under the regulation of the Charity Commission in Britain. For example, Interpal, which is a British 
Islamic charity set up to bring aid to Palestinians is a highly regarded organization in Britain and twice 
cleared of wrongdoing by the Charity Commission, it has been designated as a terrorist entity by the 
U.S. government (Benthall 2007: 6). 
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public. During the formative years, UNIW’s leaders were careful about “avoiding 
organizations that had radical leanings”91.  
UNIW leaders are also vigilant about the companies to which they choose to align 
the organization. In order to claim legitimacy as a serious actor, UNIW’s executives 
have applied for accreditation from the European Union, United Nations, 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe. UNIW’s leaders’ attitudes about the identity of the organization 
are unmistakable as demonstrated by the fiery debate at the council meeting in 
Malaysia. In a closed session on the first day of the 9th council meeting in 2009, two 
UNIW members proposed to form an international association of ulama92 association 
alongside UNIW. Members argued that an association that brought together ulamas 
and acted as an advisory body to UNIW’s actions would provide legitimacy to UNIW 
among its constituents in the international Muslim public. The ulama association, 
members argued, would evaluate UNIW’s conduct of affairs from a fiqhi 
(jurisprudence) point of view, issue fatwas (juristic ruling concerning Islamic law) 
about the proposed solutions to Muslim world’s pressing problems, and support 
UNIW’s position as the representative of the Muslim world. Although the meeting’s 
presiders opened the floor to opinions from the rest of the participants, UNIW’s 
executive committee members were quick to shut down the debate stating that 
UNIW’s place is “in the United Nations, not alongside the ulama”.93 
                                                
91 Interviewee 7, (UNIW Deputy Secretary General), personal interview by author, September 4, 2009. 
92 Ulama (sing. alim) are a powerful and respected body of scholars, jurists, and teachers learned in the 
Islamic sciences (Keddie 1972: 2). Trained in Islam and Islamic law, ulama interpret Islam’s sciences, 
doctrines and laws. 
93 UNIW executive committee member (Kuwait), 9th Council Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, May 
16th, 2010.  
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NGO member I (Turkey): I would like to make a suggestion about finding 
solutions to the Islamic World’s problems. We talked about recognition, prestige, 
and respectability. I believe that Umma’s prestige depends on its Ulama. I believe 
that we cannot solve the Islamic World’s problems without the Ulama. I propose 
that we form an international association of Ulama and get them to support UNIW 
as a civil society coalition. They can issue fatwas to endorse UNIW and its 
actions. 
 
NGO member II (Burkina Faso): I second this proposition. A prestigious Ulama 
association can support our identity and mission. Our lawful authority cannot be 
the United Nations. UN has its own agenda, its own politics. Our place is 
alongside the Ulama. 
 
UNIW executive member I (Turkey): I hear your suggestion about getting fatwas 
from Ulama, but we need to think about it very carefully. Framing the problems of 
the Muslim World as Ulama’s concerns will take us back about a hundred years. 
Ulama are concerned with the past, civil society is concerned with the future 
[italics added].   
 
UNIW executive member II (Kuwait): I agree. Our place is of course within the 
UN. We are already in cooperation with the International Union for Muslim 
Scholars, which is directed by Yusuf al- Qaradawi. But we will shoot ourselves in 
the foot if we lean on Ulama for recognition in the international public. 
 
 The debate above perfectly illustrates UNIW’s strategic positioning within the 
civil society discourse to achieve legitimacy in transnational politics. UNIW’s leaders 
are adamant in drawing the organization’s legitimacy from the civil society discourse 
rather than religion. They are convinced that in the current climate of transnational 
politics, only the civil society identity and discourse can allow UNIW a prestigious 
position as a serious actor in the international arena. In other words, according to 
UNIW’s leaders the opportunity structure of the civil society discourse is stronger 









Gaining legitimacy and public visibility is a necessary condition for UNIW’s 
impact. In order to achieve legitimacy and visibility, UNIW’s message has to resonate 
with the international public domain. In Koopmans’ (2005: 164) terms, “the career of 
a discursive message is likely to remain stillborn” if it does not succeed in eliciting 
response from interested parties. UNIW addresses two interested parties: First, 
Muslim NGOs that UNIW aims to unite under its umbrella. Religion and Islamic 
solidarity are powerful codes to mobilize potential Muslim NGOs to join UNIW. 
However, these codes do not generate interest and response from the second 
interested party: international media, transnational non-state actors, 
intergovernmental organizations, as well as states and governments in the West. In 
order to elicit interest from the broader political habitus, UNIW has to frame its 
message and identity in norms that resonate with those of transnational non-state 
politics. Civil society master frame, which draws upon the transnational political 
environment’s widely accepted discursive resources such as active citizenship, 
participatory politics, and voluntarism, allows UNIW to extend its message’s 
resonance.  
Therefore, while UNIW is a religious network that promotes conservative norms, 
it draws from the ideational resources of the civil society toolbox and employs liberal 
norms in order to obtain resonance with the claims of secular transnational non-state 
actors. UNIW simultaneously employs liberal norms such as human rights, anti-
discrimination, and freedom of speech alongside conservative norms such as 
communitarian duty, family loyalty, traditional gender roles and heteronormativity. 
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For example, at UNIW’s 9th Council Meeting the spokesperson of the Women, 
Family and Youth Commission (WFYC) referred to the achievements of women’s 
rights movements around the world in her speech and urged UNIW to devote more 
interest and resources to projects that involve women. The WYFC spokesperson drew 
attention to the dissolution of families under the threat of globalization and Western 
cultural imperialism. She particularly focused on the pressures on women to 
carelessly seek careers and social life to the detriment of their responsibilities towards 
their families. Emphasizing that mother’s role is crucial in raising virtuous and 
morally grounded children, the WYFC spokesperson pointed towards the devalued 
role of motherhood in capitalist societies.  
In the same speech, she also proposed a title change for the commission: a 
reorganization of the title’s keywords to Family, Women, and Youth Commission, in 
order to emphasize members’ priorities. The debate following the proposal is 
indicative of the way in which UNIW selectively employs the ideational resources of 
the liberal civil society discourse alongside conservative values.  
 
WFYC spokesperson: Globalization process is already destroying the family unit. 
Its consumerist ideology and cultural imperialism are disintegrating the members 
of the family. It sets women and children apart from their nuclear families. Our 
title, Women, Family and Youth is a borrowed one and it does not reflect our 
concerns. We should not endorse women’s position in contradiction to the 
wellbeing of the family unit and its values. 
 
UNIW member: It is true, but as we have been discussing since this morning, 
women face severe pressure in many countries. Like our East Turkistan member 
demonstrated in the previous session, young girls in China, as well as in other 
countries, are subject to assimilationist policies. They cannot don the veil, they 
cannot pray, they are forced to work outside their homes and villages. We have to 
pay attention to women’s problems. Like you said, we should not overlook 
women’s rights movement’s achievements on this issue. 
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WFYC spokesperson: Exactly. But again, this is a family values issue. The reason 
why we are proposing a title change is that the current title prioritizes women over 
families. This is a feminist discourse and it is not suitable. Instead of espousing a 
feminist perspective on this issue, we should prioritize the well being of families.   
 
As this debate demonstrates, UNIW members’ primary concern here is promoting 
women’s primary role as the essential building block of the Islamic family unit 
(Kadioglu 1994). They support women’s responsibility to keep marriages and 
families intact, and guard the family unit’s moral order against the threats from 
capitalist globalization and westoxification. At the same time, they employ liberal 
norms such as women’s autonomy and self-determination in order to salvage the 
stability of the family unit and women’s role as mothers. Similarly, UNIW members 
use the freedom of expression norm to voice their grievances about Muslim 
minorities’ educational rights in Europe; anti-discrimination and human rights norms 
to raise international awareness about the rise of Islamophobia; individual self-
determination norm to oppose Muslim orphan children’s adoption by Western 
families and resulting cultural assimilation.   
 
6.5.3 Public visibility 
 
The legitimacy provided to UNIW by its civil society character increases its 
chances of gaining visibility in the international arena. UNIW aims to influence the 
international public by drawing attention to the Muslim World’s issues. However, in 
addition to the distrust surrounding Muslim groups’ causes, UNIW is also bound by 
the inadequate access to communicative channels. The space available to groups 
“who aim to get their message across in the public discourse” is an uneven field 
(Koopmans 2005: 163). Within the competitive space for public visibility, advocacy 
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movements are already in a disadvantaged position compared to legitimate capital of 
states (Beck 2006: 105-6).   Among these advocacy movements, claim makers that 
appear as legitimate, organized bodies are bestowed with more credibility. In the 
pecking order of transnational public visibility, informal religious groups and 
networks face further isolation and alienation. In that sense, as its leaders are 
convinced, if UNIW wants to publicize its claims and be a participating actor in 
Muslim World’s affairs, it has to assume the civil society identity. The legitimacy of 
the civil society character is imperative not only to gain access to international media, 
but also to gain access to policy makers. The most illustrating example is UNIW’s 
work against Islamophobia. 
Increasing awareness about the rise of Islamophobia around the world after 9/11 
is one of the most prominent of UNIW’s pursuits in the sphere of political advocacy. 
Following the events of September 11, 2001, Muslim groups consistently reported 
increased hostility and discrimination, especially in North America and most EU 
countries. Stereotypical and sensationalist depictions of Muslims in mass media, 
negative images of Muslims promoted by the news sources and political leaders, 
religiously motivated abuse experienced by Muslim groups, and exclusory political 
practices are addressed by UNIW’s member NGOs in assembly meetings and internal 
summits. 
UNIW lists “fighting Islamophobia around the world” as its leading mission. It 
works to organize and mobilize public opinion to raise awareness in the international 
community of the dangers of Islamophobia, and calls to develop mechanisms against 
defamation of religions and discrimination against Muslims. With the use of its 
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supposed mandate as the “voice of Muslim civil society,” UNIW officially responds 
to activities that insult, discriminate, or violate the human rights of Muslims because 
of their faith.  
In order to expose Islamophobia in the international community and media, 
UNIW holds international conferences with the participation of political leaders, 
academics, media personalities, international organizations and representatives of its 
member NGOs. In December 2007, UNIW organized a high profile international 
conference on Islamophobia in Istanbul, Turkey. Turkish Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan opened the conference and the OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin 
Ihsanoglu gave the keynote speech. The Final Communiqué announced the launch of 
a Monitoring Center Committee to inform international decision-making 
mechanisms, press organs and the international community with periodical reports. 
Since the establishment of the committee, the UNIW General Secretariat has issued 
statements; met the political leadership of numerous European countries, the leaders 
of international organizations and think-tanks; addressed letters to the United Nations 
and the European Union; organized workshops and symposiums; and made 
démarches to the Danish embassy following the caricature controversy, and to the 
Dutch embassy regarding the release of the film Fitna by a Dutch parliamentarian.  
Combating Islamophobia and raising awareness about the conditions of Muslim 
minorities are not newfangled efforts for Muslim community leaders or solidarity 
groups. Neither problem has a short history. In fact, UNIW’s leaders and the officers 
of many of UNIW’s member had been active in mobilizing their immediate 
communities around these issues before they established formal organizations. 
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However, they find that their voices are heard more loudly since they transformed 
their informal religiously motivated communities into formal organizations and 
established transnational networks.  They receive more attention in the international 
media, they get easier access to intergovernmental organizations and national 
government agencies, and they present their positing in a more organized and 
efficient way by centralizing the message. By claiming the legitimacy of their civil 
society character, by framing their grievances in ways that resonate with the norms of 
the international public, and by ‘speaking as one voice’, they increase the public 
visibility of their message. 
 
6. 6 Conclusion 
 
Why are the previously informal Islamist networks transforming into formal 
NGOs? More specifically, why does UNIW, effectively a religious solidarity alliance, 
adopt the discourse of civil society? What are the additional benefits of the civil 
society language? In this chapter, I employ the discursive opportunity structure 
framework to answer these questions. I argue that UNIW’s strategic decision to frame 
itself as a civil society initiative allows it to claim legitimacy as a serious actor in 
transnational politics and therefore pursue its global Islamic solidarity objective more 
forcefully. The coalition shapes its organizational identity and ideological message in 
ways that garner attention in international platforms, that facilitate international 
visibility, and that bestow credibility to its stated goals.  
UNIW’s leaders choose to position the coalition within the transnational non-state 
actor, particularly the civil society, sphere because they perceive the benefits of civil 
society as an opportunity structure. UNIW’s leaders and member NGOs, similar to 
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any norm-motivated actor, are embedded within the particular ideological 
configuration of world politics. The contemporary world-culture, in which UNIW is 
embedded, asserts that civil society is the sine qua non of good governance, 
participatory democracy, public deliberation, rule of law, material welfare, individual 
rights and freedoms, and state legitimacy. In other words, civil society carries the 
cachet of a cure-all remedy in transnational politics today. A multiplicity of actors, 
ranging from state officials, intergovernmental organizations, supragovernmental aid 
agencies to intellectuals, journalists, independent activists, extol the promises of civil 
society.  
Any political actor can employ the civil society concept in any argument so 
effortlessly because the boundaries of its definition are very ambiguous. Civil society 
discussions in the academic literature make as much reference to the concept’s 
communitarian interpretations as to its liberal ones. They draw from civil society’s 
associational definitions as much as its reactionary characteristics. In transnational 
non-state politics, civil society has become a normative toolbox and an ideational 
pool from which actors can pick and choose in pursuit of their particular political 
objectives, rather than a coherent and consistent concept. UNIW employs a similar 
rhetoric of civil society. UNIW leaders’ and member NGOs’ references to the 
purposes and promises of civil society draw as much from the liberal toolbox as the 
conservative value set. In fact, UNIW makes its conservative claims using the liberal 
discursive opportunities of civil society, such as human rights, freedom of religious 
expression, anti-discrimination.  
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This finding points to an oversight in constructivist scholarship on transnational 
non-state actors. Constructivist scholars have been prolific in analyzing secular 
international NGOs, transnational advocacy networks, and NGO coalitions that 
promote liberal norms. It has been mostly silent about non-liberal networks, 
particularly those that espouse political Islam. However, religious networks that 
promote conservative norms constitute a large section of civil society.  The 
underlying reason is the assumption that Islamist and liberal discourses are competing 
normative claims in world politics. However, as UNIW’s hybrid civil society 
discourse demonstrates that there are spheres of intersection between these seemingly 
contradictory discursive frameworks. Therefore, I argue that the study of 
transnational non-state actors should move beyond the instrumental/ideational as well 
as liberal/conservative divide and explore the convergences. 
In the next chapter, I analyze how the civil society discourse and organizational 
identity allows UNIW to engage in mutually beneficial relationships with the Turkish 
state and government agencies. By exploring the geopolitical opportunity structures 
that are made available to UNIW by Turkey’s pro-Islamic government since 2002, I 











“THE EPICENTER OF GLOBAL ISLAM”: 
 
GEOPOLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
 
This chapter analyzes the geopolitical opportunity structures that enable UNIW to 
extend its membership base, build widespread networks and act as a global political 
actor in the international arena. These geopolitical opportunity structures are rooted in 
the main tenets of Turkish foreign policy strategy. Turkey’s foreign policy strategy 
has gone through a significant transformation with the pro-Islamic Justice and 
Development Party’s (AKP) rise to power in 2002. Throughout the three terms of its 
rule, AKP aimed to position Turkey as a regional leader and a global power. 
According to the policy’s architects, this leadership role requires Turkey to establish 
economic and cultural ties with its interconnected regions. The use of soft power as a 
means to form cultural ties in these regions is a main tenet of this foreign policy 
strategy. To that end, the government prioritized cultivating stronger relationships 
with the countries in the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia and Balkans. In this 
process, the AKP government has extended substantial support to UNIW as the 
organization’s mission, which is to consolidate Muslim civil societies across the 
globe and act as a representative to the Muslim world in general, complements the 
government’s geopolitical goals.   
In this chapter I trace UNIW’s trajectory in conjunction with AKP’s rise to power 
and discuss the ways in which its interests intersect with the government’s foreign 
policy vision. I argue that UNIW, as a global Muslim NGO coalition led by Turkish 
pro-Islamic organizations, act as a soft-power instrument to the AKP government’s 
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foreign policy vision of positioning Turkey as a strategic leader. In the last section of 
the chapter, in two case studies I discuss UNIW as a catalyst in cultivating relations 
with Africa through humanitarian aid, and in incorporating Turkey as an actor in the 
Israeli-Palestine conflict.  
The empirical analysis in this chapter challenges the assumptions of constructivist 
scholarship on state/transnational non-state actor relationship. In contradiction to 
constructivist literature’s unbalanced emphasis on the power of transnational non-
state actors over states, the findings of this chapter demonstrate that states and non-
state actors have a more complex and interdependent character. On the one hand the 
Turkish government and its agencies facilitate the development and performance of 
UNIW. On the other hand, UNIW complements the state’s geopolitical goals by 
furthering Turkey’s interests in the international arena. In other words, the 
material/security interests of the state and the ideational concerns of the transnational 
non-state actor dovetail in mutually beneficial ways.  
 
7.1 Engagements with the Government  
 
As a transnational non-state actor, UNIW is a civil coalition: its leaders are not 
state officials, its executive committee is composed of urban, educated, middle-class 
professionals; and its member NGOs are not dependent on state for personnel, 
funding, or management (Shieh & Schwartz 2009). Therefore, at the outset UNIW is 
not a state-dependent or government-operated organization. However, its history and 
operations cannot be understood independently from the politics of the Turkish state. 
To the contrary, UNIW is rooted in the decades long mobilization of political Islam in 
Turkey.  
 162 
The Turkish state took over all religious affairs and institutions during the 
transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic in 1924. Between 1924 
and 1960s, the disenfranchised religious brotherhoods transformed from loosely 
organized local communities to legally operating foundations and associations. 
Particularly between 1980s and 1990s, these foundations and associations gained 
prominence and increased in number thanks to the donations of pious businessmen. In 
its first term in the early 2000s, the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
granted these organizations the “public service associations” status that allowed 
foundations and associations financial autonomy and tax exemption. A wide range of 
Islamist foundations, service provision organizations and conservative businessmen’s 
associations were among the organizations that enjoyed the benefits of this special 
status. These conservative, right-wing and nationalist organizations generated a 
strong pro-Islamic civil society in Turkey by running social, educational, cultural and 
humanitarian programs among the urban poor; by advocating issues of religious 
freedom; and by representing the economic interests of small and medium-size 
Islamist enterprises (Onis 1997).  
UNIW as an umbrella organization is an offshoot of this pro-Islamic civil society 
mobilization in Turkey. During 1990s, over a hundred pro-Islamic associations and 
foundations consolidated under the Foundation of Volunteer Organizations of Turkey 
(TGTV). For the first ten years of its formation, TGTV worked on the issues of the 
Islamic community in the country’s restraining secular political environment. It 
mainly organized conferences and meetings to negotiate religious rights and freedoms 
with the secular ideology. Until AKP government’s rule, these meetings were largely 
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domestic in scope and attendance. With the political and financial support of the 
conservative ruling party and its government agencies, TGTV found unprecedented 
opportunities to broaden the agendas and reach of these meetings to an international 
level, particularly to the Muslim-majority geographies. As described in detail in 
Chapter 5, UNIW was established in one of these international meetings held in this 
period. The meeting, “The International Conference of Non-Governmental 
organizations of the Islamic World: Searching for a New Vision in a Changing 
World” was held in 2005 with the attendance of over three hundred non-
governmental organizations, academics and journalists from forty countries. The 
ruling government’s support for this meeting was not simply limited to logistic 
assistance. Not only numerous members of the Parliament were present in the 
meeting, the Chairman of the Parliament and the Foreign Minister of the government 
gave the opening speeches on the first day. TGTV’s Board of Directors and the 
conference attendees voted to establish The Union of the Non-Governmental 
Organizations of the Islamic World (UNIW) in the last session.  
UNIW’s speedy growth cannot be fully understood without taking the political 
opportunity structures available to the organization during AKP government’s rule. 
UNIW’s opportunity structures are not only limited to domestic political factors such 
as the availability of elite allies and institutional access.94 Equally, if not more 
                                                
94 The availability of elite alliances within the state system and institutional access are undoubtedly 
important for UNIW’s performance. While UNIW’s leaders and its member NGOs frequently 
emphasize that they are civil society initiatives that work independent of any government or state 
authority, they still acknowledge organic affiliations with the members of the ruling government. One 
UNIW executive explains:  “Obviously, TGTV’s composition produced state officials over time. 
Today, there are ministers in the government who moved up of our ranks. Our friends are the 
government today. But it should be clear: this is not a stepping-stone. We are in it to serve the Muslim 
world, not for upward mobility.” Interviewee 7 (UNIW executive committee member), personal 
interview by author, September 4, 2009. 
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important, are the geopolitical opportunity structures that became available to UNIW 
with the AKP government’s drastic redirection of Turkish foreign policy strategy. In 
the next section, I provide a brief background of AKP’s rise of power and the main 
tenets of its foreign policy vision.  
 
7.2 Turkish Foreign Policy and Neo-Ottomanism 
 
The Islamic political parties of Turkey have always clashed with the strictly 
secular political ideology of the Republic. Particularly the political parties that grew 
out of the National Outlook (Milli Görüs) movement, which espoused that Islamic 
identity should be represented in the Parliament, have shared the same fate. The 
movement’s ventures into party politics have been banned several times on the 
grounds of exploiting religion for political purposes (Gulalp 2001). The first two 
parties, namely the National Order party (Milli Nizam Partisi) and the National 
Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) were banned following the military coups in 
1971 and 1980s respectively. The Turkish constitutional Court banned the two 
successor parties: Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in 1998 and the Virtue Party (Fazilet 
Partisi) in 2001. Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) quickly replaced Virtue Party in the 
same year but the movement experienced a generational and ideological rift in the 
meantime. Disillusioned by the Felicity Party’s loss of credibility and its 
undemocratic, centralized and nontransparent structure, a modernist faction of 
younger Islamic activists, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul broke 
away and formed the AKP (Ozbudun 2006).  
The leaders of the AKP defined the party’s political and economic stance so as to 
appeal to a broader electorate rather than the former National Outlook parties’ voter 
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base. The leaders frequently repeated that AKP was not a successor of the National 
Outlook movement and that the party was located at the center of Turkish political 
spectrum. AKP also branded itself as conservative democrat rather than Islamist or 
Muslim democrat (Keyman 2010). Drawing parallels with Christian democracy and 
Western conservatism, AKP offered a discourse of economic liberalism, upward 
social mobility, and economic growth merged with conservative values of religion, 
family, tradition and past grandeur (Kalaycioglu 2007).  
AKP’s discourse struck a chord with Turkish voters’ expectations and the party 
won the 2002 general elections by a landslide, only 14 months after its establishment. 
It attracted over a third of the vote and came to power as the first single party 
government after a decade of consecutive coalition governments. AKP also won the 
July 2007 general elections by increasing its vote share to 47% and taking out 340 out 
of 550 seats in the Grand National Assembly to form a single-party government for a 
second term. It won a third term in the 2011 parliamentary elections by winning just a 
shade under 50 percent of the popular vote.  
 
Turkish Foreign Policy 
Throughout the three terms of the AKP government, Turkish foreign policy 
underwent a paradigm shift. With the Republican goal of making Turkey a full, equal 
member of the Western European community of nations, Kemalist foreign policy had 
pursued an exclusively Western oriented path and distanced itself from the Middle 
East. The main tenets of Turkish foreign policy for the most of the republican history 
emphasized avoiding interference in the domestic affairs of the Middle East countries 
and in inter-country relations in the region. During the Cold War period, Turkey 
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decidedly steered clear of regional problems such as the Arab-Israeli, inter-Arab, and 
Iran-Iraq conflicts (Karaosmanoglu 1983). 
With the end of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy moved from 
unidimensionality and isolationism to a diversified and multidimensional alliance 
pattern (Ataman 2002). Under the leadership of Turgut Ozal between 1989 and 1993, 
Turkey established more salient relationships in the Caucus, initiated bilateral 
cooperation with Turkic Republics, improved commercial and economic 
collaborations, and started joint projects in industrial, agricultural, energy and service 
sectors. Turkey also developed an interest in the Balkans by participating in 
peacekeeping and stabilization operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and by initiating 
closer political, economic and military ties with Albania, Macedonia, Romania and 
Bulgaria (Karaosmanoglu 2000; Uzgel 2001).  
AKP’s foreign policy vision is an extension of this post-Cold War approach which 
prioritizes “maintaining its geo-strategic importance in global politics, ensuring 
regional stability, preventing ethnic conflicts from spilling over into its territory and 
gaining new markets to fuel its strategy of export-based growth” (Sayari 2000: 180). 
Unlike the foreign policy visions of the previous Turkish governments, however, 
AKP’s strategy involves building stronger relationships with the Middle East and the 
broader Muslim geography. In other words, AKP government’s geostrategic vision 
builds on the post Cold-War approach but stands out as a more ambitious and 






Neo-Ottomanism was first evoked during the Turgut Ozal era of the early 1990s as 
a solution to the aggravated ethnic conflict between the Kurdish separatists and the 
Turkish state. Highlighting the cultural plurality of the Ottoman Empire, Ozal era’s 
neo-Ottomanism favored a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural composition that 
accommodated multiple identities, including the Kurdish identity (Yavuz 1998). 
During AKP government’s tenure, the contours of neo-Ottomanism were crystallized 
which over the years shaped Turkey’s foreign policy vision.  
At the crux of the neo-Ottomanist vision is the argument that as the successor of 
the Ottoman Empire, Turkey holds a particular responsibility to the formerly Ottoman 
geographies. Inspired by Ottoman Empire’s centuries long rule of multiple regions, 
AKP’s top policymakers regard Turkey as a morally responsible “leader of Muslim 
and Turkic worlds and a central power in Eurasia” (Murinson 2006: 947). Therefore, 
AKP’s vision transcends the Ottoman territories and suggests cultivating relations 
with Africa, Asia as well as the West.  
AKP’s neo-Ottomanist geo-strategy is indebted to Ahmet Davutoglu, who was a 
professor of international relations before moving to politics. Davutoglu initially 
served as the chief foreign policy advisor, and was appointed as the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in 2009. In his book “Strategic Depth”, Davutoglu (2001) articulates 
his strategic vision, which came to shape Turkey’s foreign policy since 2002. 
According to Davutoglu, a country’s strategic depth depends on its historical and 
geographical depth. He defines historical depth as being ‘at the epicenter of historic 
events’, a characteristic shared by eight former empires:  
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During the transit from the 19th to the 20th century; there were eight multi-
national empires across Eurasia: Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, 
Germany, China, Japan and Turkey. Now these countries are experiencing very 
similar problems with their prospective regions. As these countries possess 
historical depth, they form spheres of influence. If they fail to do this, they then 
experience various problems.95 
 
For Davutoglu, Turkey’s strategic depth is reinforced also by its unique 
geographical depth. Davutoglu argues that Turkey should act simultaneously at 
multiple levels:  
 
“Turkey is not just any old Mediterranean country. One important characteristic 
that distinguishes Turkey from, say Romania and Greece is that Turkey is at the 
same time a Middle Eastern and Caucasian country … Indeed, Turkey is as much a 
Black Sea country as it is a Mediterranean one. This geographical depth places 
Turkey right at the epicenter of many geopolitical areas of influence”. 96 
 
The “strategic depth’ doctrine suggests that Turkey’s key historical and 
geographical position calls for a more “central” role. Rather than its Cold-War era 
position at the peripheries of the European Union, NATO, or Asia, Turkey should be 
located at the core of Afro-Eurasia (Onis and Yilmaz 2009: 9). By forming 
simultaneous alliances in its immediate geopolitical neighborhood, Turkey should 
claim a global strategic role. In other words, Turkey should seek active engagements 
in the Middle East, Central Asia and Balkans to counterbalance its unidimensional 
dependency on the European Union and the United States. In this framework, in 
addition to continuing deep engagements with the European Union and the United 
States, Turkey should also cultivate stronger relationships with Middle Eastern states, 
                                                
95 'The “Strategic Depth” that Turkey Needs', An Interview with Ahmet Davutoglu, The Turkish Daily 
News, 15 September 2001. 
96 Ibid. 
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as well as non-state actors, in order to resolve its regional disputes in its immediate 
neighborhood.  
In that respect, “zero problems with neighbors” lay at the core of Davutoglu’s 
vision. To that effect, the AKP government took major steps in cultivating deeper 
relationships in the region. In this period, Turkey reestablished economic and political 
cooperations with Syria and attempted to play the role of an intermediary between 
Syria and Israel to reopen peace talks. Turkey also mediated between Syria and Egypt 
during the recent Gazan crisis.97 Also in the Middle East, the AKP government took 
steps to stabilize relations with Iran, and facilitated dialogue with the international 
community over nuclear issues, signed an agreement about the transportation of 
Iranian and Turkmen gas through Turkey to European markets. Turkey improved 
relations with Georgia specifically through the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline projects; signed free customs agreements with Jordan, 
Lebanon and Syria; secured nuclear and natural energy deals with Russia; recognized 
the Kurdistan Regional Government, negotiated between Sunni and Shiite factions in 
Iraq, and strengthened cooperation with the Iraqi federal government; sent troops to 
the NATO mission in Afghanistan; took active part in the UN’s Alliance of 
                                                
97 Turkey’s strategic depth policy was put to test during the Arab revolutions of 2011. Turkey’s 
reaction to Arab Spring has revealed the inconsistencies of Turkish foreign policy. For example, the 
Turkish government supported democracy unequivocally in Tunisia and Egypt. Turkey’s reaction to 
the uprisings in Syria and Libya, on the other hand, was not as straightforward. Tocci (2011: 3) 
explains the difference in attitudes by state interests: “In Egypt, the implicit strategic rivalry between 
Turkey and the Egyptian regime and the absence of large Turkish investments all pushed Turkey into 
supporting the Tahrir revolution. By contrast, in Libya, the $15 billion worth of Turkish investments 
and the 250,000 Turkish citizens to be repatriated contributed to Turkey’s caution. In Syria, the fear of 
instability along the 877 kilometer Turkish-Syrian border and of the sectarian ramifications of the 
Syrian uprising (particularly as regards the Kurdish question) led Turkey to adopt a pro-status quo and 
wait-and-see approach”. In other words, the discord between normative and realpolitik dimensions of 
the foreign policy strategies came to light during the Arab Spring. Turkey was in support of democracy 
when norms matched the interests.   
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Civilizations initiative and the Organization of the Arabic Union, and a leadership 
position in the Organization of the Islamic Conference.    
 
7.3 UNIW: Soft Power Instrument to Turkish Foreign Policy  
 
A main tenet of the strategic depth doctrine is the use of soft power. Soft power, 
according to the architects of the Turkish foreign policy, is “the political, economic, 
diplomatic and cultural influence in formerly Ottoman territories as well as other 
regions where Turkey has strategic and national interests” (Taspinar 2008: 15). The 
strategic depth policy is not merely geopolitical power; Turkey has to strengthen its 
economic ties with its interconnected regions, and makes use of its identity card if it 
is to be a regional leader and a global power. In other words, global leadership 
requires strong trade and cultural relationships.   
Turkey’s leadership ideal in the formerly Ottoman geographies finds its best ally in 
UNIW. The ideologues of UNIW repeatedly allude to Turkey’s imperial legacy in the 
Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. As mentioned before, UNIW’s leaders 
frequently express their concerns about the state of dispersion and desperation these 
regions find themselves today. As a coalition of Muslim civil societies, the borders of 
UNIW’s ambitions are drawn around the regions and societies in which Muslims live 
as a majority. For the leaders of the UNIW, the dispersed and poverty stricken 
Muslim world needs a strong leader to help consolidate and prosper as a united block. 
Turkey, according to the Turkish founders of UNIW, stands out as the natural leader: 
   
Turkey is in a different position compared to the rest of the Muslim world. The 
idea that Istanbul is the capital of Islam today is a historical fact. It has its roots in 
the Ottoman Empire. We were in a leadership position at the time and the 
geography we abandoned houses about fifty states now. They have embraced our 
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leadership for centuries, but we got scattered in the wind. But today, on every 
criterion, be it cultural, economic, or political, Turkey comes forward as the 
natural leader of the Muslim geography.98 
 
Similar to the AKP government’s stance on Turkey’s position in world politics, 
UNIW leaders argue that Turkey has the geopolitical capacity to assume a leadership 
position. However, Turkey’s geopolitical position is only part of this rationale. For 
UNIW’s leaders, what is equally, if not more, important is Turkey’s moral 
responsibility towards the Muslim world. As discussed at length in Chapter 5, 
assistance to fellow Muslims and service to humanity are framed in terms of the duty-
oriented language of religion. Therefore, for UNIW’s Turkish leaders, Turkey is not 
only the best candidate for Muslim leadership, but it is morally obligated to assume 
the position: 
 
Turkey looms as a “rising star” in protecting the Muslim World’s rights, 
transferring its messages to the global public, and helping it struggle with the 
political and diplomatic hardships after 9/11. Such a course saddles Turkey with a 
historic responsibility.99 
 
UNIW’s spokespeople frequently allude to the imperial past as a cultural link 
among the former Ottoman geopolitical sphere. At the same time, they are emphatic 
about its symbolic value. UNIW’s leaders echo Davutoglu as they separate neo-
Ottomanist ideology from restoring an actual imperial order in the Middle East and 
the Balkans. In their perspective, “the age of empires has long gone and it is 
nonsensical to suggest an imperial political order”.100 Yet, they argue, Turkey can 
                                                
98 Interviewee 40 (TGTV spokesperson), personal interview by author, February 11, 2010. 
99 Interviewee 31 (IMH spokesperson), personal interview by author, January 12,2010.  
100 Interviewee 7 (UNIW executive committee member), personal interview by author, September 4, 
2009. 
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lead the way to form a united front, a political bloc composed of the Muslim countries 
and populations via its soft power:  
 
States can only go so far. The Turkish state can build roads, wells, hospitals, 
schools in these countries but how is it going to bond with those people in a 
profound way? You need civil society, real people, to establish personal, cultural 
ties.101 
 
In that respect, civil society organizations constitute a unique power base. UNIW 
itself serves as an invaluable soft power instrument to Turkish government’s foreign 
policy vision. In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the ways in which UNIW’s 
ideational interests and the AKP government’s instrumental interests coincide. I 
discuss this point by analyzing two specific case studies: 1) UNIW’s role in 
cultivating relations with African nations through humanitarian aid, and 2) UNIW’s 
Turkish member NGOs’ directly political role in incorporating Turkey as an 
interested party in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 
7.3.1 Case Study 1: Tying Africa to Turkey through Humanitarian Work 
 
Turkey’s increasing interest in cultivating relations with countries beyond its 
immediate geography found its ideal collaborator in the Turkish Muslim NGOs that 
work in the humanitarian aid system, specifically in Africa. The AKP government’s 
aspirations about forming bonds with African countries and establishing new export 
markets coincide with Turkish Muslim NGOs’ endeavor of recreating the links with 
the Muslim communities in Africa. For the NGOs that have been struggling to reach 
Muslim communities beyond the Middle East and the Balkans, helping Muslims in 
                                                
101 Interviewee 40 (TGTV spokesperson), personal interview by author, February 11, 2010. 
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Africa is simply fulfilling a duty that has been dropped since the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire: 
 
We were made to forget Africa; we have to remember it once again. Africa is very 
close to us, deeply close. We have a lot of history there, we have legacy, we have 
relatives. In the remotest places of Ethiopia we met people who call themselves 
Turkish. They want to call themselves Turkish. They recall and cherish our bond, 
why don’t we?102 
 
In that respect, the AKP government, small and medium scale businessmen backed 
by Ankara, and the faith-based humanitarian organizations work in tandem to develop 
strong political, economic, and cultural ties with Africa. The commencement of 
interest in Africa did not start during AKP’s term in government. The first steps 
towards developing closer ties with African countries were taken in 1998, by the then 
Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz. The “Opening Up to Africa” policy of the Yilmaz 
government espoused cultivating diplomatic, economic, political and cultural 
relations. However, it was the AKP government that put the policy into action (Ozkan 
2008: 22).  
The government announced 2005 “the Year of Africa” during which Prime 
Minister Erdogan visited Ethiopia and South Africa, Turkey obtained “observer 
status” in the African Union, and accredited its ambassador in Ethiopia as its official 
representative to the pan-African organization. The African Union has declared 
Turkey a “strategic partner” at its January 2008 meeting. In August 2008, the first 
Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit was held in Istanbul with the attendance of fifty 
countries. The resulting “Istanbul Declaration on Africa - Turkey Partnership” 
outlined priorities for cooperation on trade and investment, agriculture and water 
                                                
102 Interviewee 6 (IHH spokesperson), personal interview by author, July 3, 2008. 
 174 
resources management, health, peace and security, infrastructure and energy, culture 
and education, media and communications, and environmental concerns. In October 
2008, Turkey was elected to one of the non-permanent seats on the UN Security 
Council with the support of African countries, which voted en bloc in favor of 
Turkey’s candidacy. In 2010, Abdullah Gul paid the first presidential level visit to 
Cameroon and Congo, with an entourage of 140 businessmen and NGO leaders.  
The collaboration between the AKP government, the small and medium scale 
Anatolian businesses and the faith-based Turkish NGOs pave the way for increasing 
investment in and trade with African countries. Turkish exports to Africa have leapt 
from $1.5 billion in 2001 to over $10 billion in 2009. The AKP government has 
stated its trade volume with Africa to reach $30 billion by 2010.103 
Turkish investment in Africa is coupled with development assistance backed by 
state agencies. The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency 
(TIKA) handle a considerable amount of developmental help from Turkey to Africa. 
Turgut Ozal founded TIKA in 1992 as a state agency, similar to USAID, “to assist in 
the development of the newly independent states [of the post-Soviet Asia] by 
furthering cooperation in economic, commercial, technological, social, cultural and 
education exchanges” (Cohen 2005: 103). 
Although TIKA was established to build relationships with the former communist 
states of Central Asia and Eastern Europe, in recent years it expanded its scope to a 
larger portion of the developing world. In 2009, for example, TIKA implemented 
45% of its projects in Central Asia and the Caucuses, 27% in the Balkans and East 




Europe, and 25% in the Middle East and Africa.104 Of these regions, the greatest 
increase in project density was in Africa. From its regional offices in Addis Ababa, 
Khartoum, and Dakar, TIKA runs development projects in thirty-seven African 
countries through technical assistance and expert personnel support in education, 
health and agriculture, as well as infrastructure. 
UNIW’s member NGOs deliver the majority of social aid from Turkey to Africa 
independently. They collaborate with TIKA in projects that require infrastructure, 
such as developmental aid and health services. UNIW’s Turkish executives have been 
collaborating with TIKA in implementing agricultural projects in Africa since 2008. 
TIKA itself has been running agricultural development projects in thirteen African 
countries. In addition to running agricultural projects in Africa, TIKA trains African 
agricultural engineers in Turkey, hosts high level officials of agricultural sector from 
East and West African countries105 to give briefings about general agricultural policy, 
the structure of the Ministry of Agriculture and agricultural activities of the Turkish 
government, and to demonstrate implementations on the field. Through TIKA’s 
African Agricultural Development program, UNIW executives team up with Turkish 
agricultural engineers and run agricultural productivity studies in Sudan.106 
TIKA and Turkish NGOs work in cooperation in extending health services to 
Africa due to the required technology and human capacity to run effective health 
projects overseas. TIKA collaborates with various Turkish NGOs to manage the flow 
of volunteer medical professionals from Turkey to Africa; build health facilities, set 
                                                
104 TIKA 2009 Annual Report,  http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/Faaliyet Raporu  
105 The participant countries to TIKA’s Agricultural Cooperation and Training Program are Burkina 
Faso, Djibouti, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Union of Comoros, Madagascar, Mali, Senegal, and Tanzania. 
For more information on the program, see: http://www.tika.gov.tr/EN/Icerik.ASP?ID=354.  
106 Interviewee 6 (IHH spokesperson), personal interview by author, July 3, 2008. 
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up mobile clinics, medical buses, permanent hospitals, temporary tent hospitals; 
deliver medication and medical equipment aid; undertake health screenings; and 
perform surgeries.  
The most systematized and publicized health project in Africa is the “Cataract 
Project”, undertaken by TIKA and IHH since 2005.  Cataract is the leading cause of 
blindness in Africa. More than 6 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa are blind 
(Resnikoff et al. 2002). Due to the exigency of HIV AIDS and malaria treatments and 
child care services, eye care and cataract prevention programs face a lack of 
commitment from African governments. Therefore, NGOs provide more extensive 
eye care services in Africa than state-run institutions (Etya’ale 2004). IHH has been 
running the cataract project since 2005 with the slogan: “If you see them, they will 
see the world”.107 Sudan is selected as the location base of the project. IHH has 
opened two permanent eye clinics in Khartoum, and established mobile clinics and 
eye camps in the rural areas of Sudan away from the capital city. The campaign aims 
to fix vision problems of 100,000 Africans, and as of September 2010, the foundation 
has operated cataract surgeries on 43,381 people and delivered eye examinations to 
156,524 people in Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Chad, Ghana, Mali, Burkina Faso, Togo 
and Nigeria.108  
Independent of TIKA, UNIW’s Turkish member NGOs deliver social aid; 
distribute educational materials; run orphan care and vocational training programs; 
and drill wells and canals in water shortage areas. For UNIW’s Turkish NGOs, the 
conditions of African Muslims are more complex than mere poverty. According to 
                                                
107   IHH Project Reports: http://www.ihh.org.tr/mazlum-bakislarin-riyasiz-tesekkurleri-icin-e2-80-
a6/en/ 
108 IHH Annual Project Reports, http://www.ihh.org.tr/rapor-ve-belgeler/ 
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the IHH officials, poverty is coupled with discrimination against Muslim minorities in 
countries ruled by Christian governments. For instance, IHH draws attention to the 
resource allocation based on minority size in Malawi. In the 1998 census, the Muslim 
minority is recorded as comprising 12% of the population, which is not considered 
large enough to allocate funds for religious education in schools of Muslim 
communities. In 2007, IHH extended support to the Muslim activists in Malawi to 
register a larger number of Muslim populations at the 2008 census. 
In addition to the extreme poverty the population is subject to, IHH is concerned 
about the missionary activities in Malawi as well as in the rest of the African 
continent. IHH’s fieldworkers argue that African Muslims have “associated the white 
man with the Christian colonizer and the missionaries”109. Thus they maintain that it 
is critical to convey to African Muslims that there are “white Muslims” in the rest of 
the world whom they can trust. Highly critical of the food-for-faith programs of 
Christian missionaries in the continent, IHH officials contend that Muslims all over 
the world have an obligation to help African Muslims in establishing their religious 
identity. One solution, IHH suggests, is to build mosques in Muslim villages. In the 
2007 Qur’ban report, IHH calls for donations to build mosques in Malawi:  
 
The existence of a mosque is very important in this geography because a mosque 
endorses the Islamic character of a community. Missionaries hesitate in going into 
villages that have mosques. A Muslim community that has a mosque can hold its 
head up high there. 110 
 
In addition to promoting humanitarian NGOs in their individual work and opening 
up channels to cooperate with state agencies, the Turkish government supplements its 
                                                
109 Interviewee 6 (IHH spokesperson), personal interview by author, July 3, 2008. 
110 IHH Annual Project Reports, http://www.ihh.org.tr/rapor-ve-belgeler/ 
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Africa policy by sustaining religious connections through the Department of 
Religious Affairs. In November 2006, the Directorate of Religious Affairs hosted the 
Summit for Religious Leaders of Muslim Countries and Communities of Africa. The 
overarching theme of the conference was the historical bonds between the African 
continent and Turkey dating back to the Ottoman era.111 The Turkish Religious 
Affairs Directorate Head Ali Bardakoglu called for the mobilization of Turkish public 
opinion and civil initiative to extend assistance to Africa in health, infrastructure and 
religious education.112 Frequently alluding to the Ottoman legacy in Africa113, African 
leaders expressed their interests in having more Turkish schools to compensate for the 
lack of religious education in Africa114 and building Turkish style mosques in African 
countries.115 Following the summit, Turkey offered religious education scholarships 
to African students in Turkish Imam-Hatip Schools (vocational religious high 
schools). In 2007/2008 academic year, Kayseri Imam Hatip schools hosted 263 
African students who received courses in Turkish language, tafsir, hadith, Islamic 
Law and Islamic Theology 116.  
                                                
111  Department of Religious Affairs: http://diyanet8.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/Diyanet-Isleri-
Baskanligi-Duyuru-339.aspx 
112 Zaman, Turkish daily newspaper: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-37948-diyanet-says-
turkish-ngos-should-help-africa.html 
113Zaman, Turkish daily newspaper, “African Islamic Convention Calls for Cooperation to Resolve 
Problems":http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-37894-african-islamic-convention-calls-for-
cooperation-to-resolve-problems.html 
114 Zaman, Turkish daily newspaper, “African Leaders Ask for More Turkish Schools”: 
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-37916-african-aqua-aqualeaders-ask-for-more-turkish-
schools.html 
115  Zaman, Turkish daily newspaper, “African Islamic Convention Calls for Cooperation”: 
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-37894-african-islamic-convention-calls-for-cooperation-
to-resolve-problems.html 




The emphasis of the AKP government’s foreign policy vision on finding new 
export markets, positioning Turkey as a leading actor in its immediate region, and 
recreating its connections with Africa’s predominantly Muslim countries offer a key 
role to Turkish faith-based NGOs. As Davutoglu states above, this venture requires 
soft power elements over and above economic and political vigor. The social and 
cultural bonds reinstated by the achievements of humanitarian and social aid 
organizations lay the groundwork for further economic and political engagement 
between Turkey and African countries. For the Turkish faith-based NGOs of UNIW, 
the presumed moral responsibility emanating from ‘imperial legacy’ converges with 
the religious duty of serving fellow Muslims. Drawing upon religious solidarity and 
the Ottoman legacy, Turkish organizations form social and cultural ties with African 
nations. In that respect, Turkish faith-based organizations function as agents of soft 
power to the AKP government’s economic and political influence in Africa.   
 
7.3.2 Case Study 2: Politics of Soft Power: Israeli-Palestinian Conflict  
 
On the direct political front, Turkish faith-based organizations take up a more 
pivotal role, particularly in crisis regions of Turkey’s immediate geography. The 
recent crises with Israel over Turkey’s involvement in the Palestinian conflict are 
significant in illustrating the close engagements between civil society organizations 
and the government. The AKP government has repeatedly declared its intention and 
ability to be the mediator in Israeli-Palestinian conflict during its tenure and, indeed, 
made grand gestures on the international stage. Although most interested parties of 
the conflict, including the Arabs themselves, voice wariness about Erdogan’s populist 
outbursts and are skeptical about the material results of Turkey’s activism on this 
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issue, the AKP government was successful in raising the profile of the Palestine 
problem in the domestic scene.  
Although AKP government’s overtures about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are 
interpreted as a major shift in Turkey’s stance about the issue, Turkish-Israeli 
relations have always been highly fluctuating. Turkey has always been sympathetic to 
the Palestinian cause and its relationship with Israel took hits after the 1967 Israeli-
Arab War and in 1980, when Israel declared Jerusalem its capital.  Tensions also rose 
during the first and second Palestinian intifadas117 (Crisis Report 2010: 3). On the 
other hand, Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the State of Israel in 
1949 and diplomats were exchanged in 1952. During 1990s, the two countries signed 
lucrative business, tourism and military partnership deals. After the start of the 
Madrid and Oslo Arab-Israeli talks, Turkey upgraded its diplomatic envoy to 
ambassadorial level in 1992. Two years later, Israel and Turkey signed the Secret 
Security agreement for the exchange of intelligence and a joint initiative against 
terrorism. Throughout the 1990s, Turkey signed numerous military contracts with 
Israel. AKP government’s military and economic relationships with Israel were no 
different. Cooperation in military and intelligence-sharing remained intact, and in 
2008 the trade volume between Turkey and Israel reached to $3.3 billion dollars. 
Turkey-Israel relations took a downturn after Hamas won the Palestinian 
legislative elections in January 2006. In the aftermath of Hamas’ victory, AKP 
government received its leader, Khalid Mashal, and provided Hamas with a high 
profile endorsement (Onis and Yilmaz 2009: 19). The relations took another hit 
                                                
117 During Israeli occupations of West Bank towns in April 2002, the then prime minister Bülent Ecevit 
described the act as “committing genocide before the eyes of the world”. Turkish Daily News, Daily 
Newspaper, 13 April 2002. 
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during Israel’s Lebanon campaign in 2006 and Gaza campaign in 2008. They reached 
a lower point when Prime Minister Erdogan stormed off the stage at the 2009 World 
Economic Forum in Davos after a heated debate on Gaza with Shimon Perez. The 
tumultuous relationship between Turkey and Israel aggravated even more after the 
May 2010 Flotilla crisis.  
Assuming a mediator role in Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the AKP government first 
took action to consult the Ottoman archives to settle the land ownership disputes. In 
his book, Strategic Depth, Davutoglu (2001: 333) states that “no political problem in 
the region can be resolved without utilizing Ottoman archives” and argues that 
Turkey should be an actor in the Middle East peace process on account of its Ottoman 
legacy in the geography. Davutoglu’s suggestion to consult the Ottoman archives in 
order to resolve the dispute over land ownership in the West Bank, Jerusalem and the 
Gaza Strip through 1916 was later taken up by the then Foreign Minister, Abdullah 
Gul, in 2006. In response to the domestic and international criticism about intervening 
in Palestine affairs, Gul stated: 
 
Who is more [entitled] to be involved in Palestine than I? The [land] registrations, 
the archives of Palestine, Israel, Jerusalem, all this geographic area, are in my 
possession. Last year we handed the documents related to the land registrations of 
all this area to the Palestinians as a gift. The archives, land registry, maps are all in 
our possession. We have all the truths; how can I be not involved?118 
 
The potential of utilizing Ottoman land registry archives in the land ownership 
dispute is later resumed by the UNIW. In the 9th Council Meeting in Malaysia, the 
Palestine Platform, a subgroup of civil society organizations, proposed a three-year 
study of the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul. The project is going to be conducted by a 
                                                
118 Vatan, Daily Newspaper, March 1, 2006. 
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committee of twenty-five academics. According to the project proposal, Ottoman 
Treasury Archives, which keep records of titles and privileges, trusts, gifts, charitable 
and religious foundations, court documents, land deeds, applicable laws, historical 
demographics, tax and crops information, will provide the required evidence to settle 
land ownership disputes in the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Both the 
Palestine Platform committee and the UNIW board perceive the project as a matter of 
duty towards the former Ottoman geographies: 
 
This project will restore our cultural and civilizational legacy. By extending our 
help in this matter, we will be able to fulfill our mission to the people of Palestine 
and materialize their expectations as the descendants of this region’s sovereign 
power for centuries.119 
 
On other occasions, the government parceled out strategic roles to the civil society 
organizations in its position towards the major players of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. The AKP government has pronounced its sympathies to Hamas as a 
legitimate actor in the Middle East on occasion. Inviting Khaled Mashal to Turkey 
was indeed an attempt at mediating between Hamas leadership and Israel. However, 
this move was harshly criticized by Western governments, which considered Abbas 
Mahmud of Fatah as the sole actor and led to a crisis in Turkish-Israeli relations. 
Consequently, the AKP government chose to downplay its relations with Hamas on a 
state level, yet opened the way to the likeminded civil society organizations to bring 
Hamas to the table. 
Three days after the government attempted to play the mediator role between 
Shimon Perez and Mahmud Abbas in Ankara and right before the Annapolis 
Meetings in the United States in November 2007, the UNIW, Palestinian Solidarity 
                                                
119 UNIW Palestine Platform Committee, Ottoman Archives Report, May 2009. 
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Association of Turkey and TGTV organized a high profile al-Quds International 
Forum Meeting in Istanbul with the help of the government’s logistical and 
organizational resources. The meeting brought together 5000 participants and 
dominated by Hamas and Hezbollah. Among the attendees were Sheikh Yusuf al-
Qaradawi, president of the International Union for Muslim Union; Sheikh Raed 
Salah, the head of Al-Aqsa foundation; Jerusalem’s Mufti Ikrima Sabri; Jerusalem 
Bishop Attallah Hanna; Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, the Turkish Sec. Gen. of OIC, George 
Galloway, British Parliamentarian, and the former Prime Minister of Egypt, Aziz 
Sidqi. In the Istanbul Declaration issued at the end of the three-day meeting, the 
message was clear: Israel and Fatah cannot achieve peace without Hamas’ 
involvement. 
While holding a pro-Hamas meeting in Turkey created distress for the Turkish 
government in domestic and international platforms, it was overshadowed by the 
high-profile Annapolis Meetings that took place merely ten days later. The Flotilla 
Crisis, on the other hand, was not as easy to mitigate and caused as much a crisis 
between the government and the NGOs that organized it, as it did between Israel and 
Turkey. 
In May 2010, the Free Gaza Movement and the Humanitarian Relief Foundation 
(IHH) organized a six-ship flotilla to “make a deliberately attention-grabbing effort” 
to deliver  10,000 tons of humanitarian aid to 1.5 millions Palestinians in Gaza and to 
break Israel’s blockade of the territory. In recent years, humanitarian aid groups have 
sent supply ships and activists to Gaza. The Free Gaza Movement itself has organized 
at least five voyages since 2007. The flotillas carry aid and activists from a wide 
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range of countries. While the earlier ones were allowed to reach Gaza, others were 
directed and landed at the port of Ashdod by Israel before delivery to Gaza.  
On May 22, 2010, a six-ship flotilla including Mavi Marmara, owned by IHH, 
sailed to Gaza. 700 activists from 38 countries participated in the mission. On May 
31st, 130 km from the Israeli coast in international waters, Israeli navy demanded the 
convoy to reroute to Ashdod. When the convoy refused to reroute, it was raided by 
Israeli commandos. The confrontation resulted in eight Turks and one Turkish-
American killed, more than 20 passengers and 10 commandos injured. The incident 
sparked an unprecedented crisis in Turkey-Israeli relations. Turkey recalled its 
ambassador to Israel, cancelled joint military exercises with Israel, scaled back 
previously extensive intelligence cooperation and banned Israeli military flights over 
its airspace (Crisis Report 2010: 8). Turkey demanded an Israeli apology, 
compensation for the victims, return of the ships and an international investigation. 
Israel publicly blamed the incident on IHH, yet put the blame on the Turkish 
government in private. (Crisis Report 2010: 8).  
Prime Minister Erdogan has long supported IHH’s central aim to end the Gaza 
blockade. Although IHH primarily leans towards the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi), it 
has organic links to the National Action Party and the AKP. Several officials of AKP 
sit on IHH’s advisory board or are otherwise close to it. (Crisis Report 2010: 5). 
Several AKP deputies joined in a controversial January 2009 land convoy to bring aid 
to Gaza through Egypt. 
In the midst of the international crisis, the Turkish government stated that it had 
initial concerns about the Mavi Marmara mission. AKP officials declared that they 
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could not stop Mavi Marmara from sailing because it was reflagged from Turkey to 
Comoros Islands and that the government lacked the legal jurisdiction over the 
mission. Instead, the government stopped its parliamentarians and officials from 
joining. Senior government officials affirmed that they “communicated extensively 
with IHH before the Mavi Marmara left port. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu 
called IHH leader Bülent Yıldırım to try to persuade him not to go directly to Gaza” 
(Crisis Report 2010: 6). 
Although the political aftershocks are still being felt in the international relations 
realm, IHH and several UNIW members consider the operation successful 
considering its ramifications. The net result of the political scandal and human 
casualties was the heightened attention to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. While the 
AKP government, led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s outbursts on the 
subject in diplomatic settings, has drawn attention to the Palestinian crisis in the 
international arena, a political undertaking of this magnitude is too controversial on a 
state level. Delegating, albeit covertly, civil society initiatives to maneuver in the 
blurry waters of political humanitarian action instead serves the government’s goal of 
bringing the issue under the spotlight. In that respect, the Mavi Marmara affair 
proved that civil society groups make potent political actors for the government’s 









7.4 Conclusion  
 
What kinds of benefits do the discursive framework and the organizational format 
of civil society provide to UNIW and its member NGOs? Why does UNIW 
unwaveringly emphasize its civil society characteristic? In this chapter I approach 
these questions from a state/non-state actor relationship perspective. Constructivist 
and sociological institutionalist literatures cast non-state actors the role of altruistic 
groups that are driven by principled beliefs, values, and ideologies. Much of the 
scholarship in this area disproportionately focuses on transnational non-state actors’ 
clout over states. Numerous empirical studies on transnational networks and alliances 
that advocate human rights, environmental protection and social justice pose the 
question: “How powerful are transnational non-state actors against states?”  
I argue in this chapter that this is a skewed question. States and transnational non-
state actors have a more complex and interdependent relationship. Not only do states 
enable as much as constrain the actions of transnational non-state actors, occasionally 
they have dovetailing interests. Therefore, the ideational/materialist taxonomy that 
the constructivist literature places states and non-state actors does not fully present 
the actual relationships between the two.  
UNIW’s relationship with the Turkish state is a case in point. There have been 
several attempts at forming transnational alliances among Muslim countries and 
establishing coalitions among Muslim NGOs. However, until recently such networks, 
coalitions, and umbrella organizations remained largely regional, short-lived and 
issue based. Despite its short history, UNIW has demonstrated considerable success 
in recruiting members, mobilizing social capital from diverse parts of the globe, and 
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rapidly becoming one of the largest NGO coalitions in the Muslim world. The 
findings of this chapter demonstrate that one of the key explanatory factors of its 
growth is its interdependent relationship with the Turkish government.  
I analyze this relationship by using the geopolitical opportunity structures 
framework. Since 2002, Turkey’s pro-Islamic AKP government has been promoting a 
foreign policy strategy that matches UNIW’s particular interests. This foreign policy 
vision aims to transform Turkey from a peripheral actor into a central one. The AKP 
government casts Turkey a regional, if not global role, by locating the country at the 
core of Afro-Eurasia rather than restricting its position at the peripheries of the 
European Union, NATO, or Asia. The architects of this policy maintain that Turkey 
should claim a global strategic role by forming simultaneous alliances in its 
immediate geopolitical neighborhood. Therefore, they seek active engagements in the 
Middle East and Central Asia in particular, and the larger Islamic World in general. 
One critical component of this strategy is the use of soft power in addition to 
cultivating economic and political relationships. Turkey’s foreign policy directors 
emphasize the importance of establishing social and cultural ties with these regions. 
In that respect, civil society organizations emerge as invaluable soft power 
instruments. The AKP government provides UNIW and its influential Turkish NGOs 
exceptional support. Government agencies extend material assistance, broker 
international connections, and in some cases covertly delegate these NGOs political 
roles. 
Turkish government’s interest in employing UNIW as a soft power instrument to 
its foreign policy strategy is advantageous for the latter in ideational ways as well. 
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Turkey’s attempt at leadership in the Islamic World remedies UNIW’s concerns 
about the disintegrated and dispersed state of the Umma. According to UNIW’s 
leaders, it is imperative for the Muslim World to consolidate and attain global 
solidarity. The government’s geopolitical interests as demonstrated by its foreign 
policy strategy and UNIW’s normative interests interlock in mutually beneficial 
ways. This finding leads me to argue that the academic scholarship should direct its 
focus to the interdependencies between states and transnational non-state actors.  
In the next chapter, I track the instrumental dimensions of UNIW’s organization 
and performance by analyzing its intra-organizational dynamics. UNIW is primarily a 
norm-driven network. It recruits and mobilizes members from all over the world due 
to its value-based motivations. All of UNIW’s members agree that the Islamic World 
should join forces and operate as a united actor. On the other hand, shared values and 
ideational concerns are not sufficient to ensure the continuation and efficiency of the 
coalition. By using the institutional opportunity structures framework, I analyze the 




STAKEHOLDERS AND SHAREHOLDERS: 
 
INSTITUTIONAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
 
Constructivist literature disproportionately focuses on the ideational motivations of 
transnational non-state actors and overlooks the instrumental dimensions of networks. 
While UNIW is a norm-motivated transnational NGO coalition because it is 
mobilized by the shared religious identities, values and goals, it is also sustained by 
the interest-based intra-organizational dynamics. This chapter analyzes UNIW’s 
institutional opportunity structures in order to explain the interest-based motivations 
within the organization. 
Kriesi (2004) conceptualizes institutional opportunity structures as the institutional 
arrangements that either constrain or facilitate non-state actors’ success. His model 
maps out the conditions of institutional opportunities at a domestic level. Institutional 
opportunities, according to Kriesi, are determined by two key factors: the openness of 
the political system, and the exclusive or integrative strategies adopted by authorities 
vis-à-vis non-state actors. If these institutional opportunities are unfavorable at a 
domestic level, non-state actors exit the national level and turn to institutional 
opportunities at the international level (Adamson 2005). Transnational advocacy 
networks, international NGOs, and transnational NGO coalitions enable non-state 
actors to make their claims beyond the constraints of the domestic institutional 
arrangements. They can form alliances with transnational NGO coalitions, such as 
UNIW, to gain visibility and credibility for their cause and to mobilize the collective 
power to pressure their national governments from outside (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
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Forming partnerships with transnational organizations also provides them access to 
information, resources, organizational expertise, management skills, and further 
contacts to help them with their cause.  
Therefore, in the contemporary multi-systems of political advocacy, domestic non-
state actors can utilize the institutional and discursive resources of transnational 
networks and alliances. However this relationship has two implications. First one is 
related to the competitive world of transnational non-state politics. In the marketplace 
of transnational politics, some local movements garner more attention in the 
international sphere while others remain isolated (Bob 2005). In order to attract 
interest from transnational allies, domestic non-state actors have to frame their 
messages and structure their organizational models to fit the ideological and 
organizational identities of potential supporters. In other words, if domestic political 
entrepreneurs choose to form alliances with transnational coalitions, they have to 
compromise and frame their message to match the ideological position of the 
transnational coalition.  
The second implication is related to the instrumental dynamics within these 
transnational NGO coalitions. Cooperative relationships such as coalitions and 
multimember organizations require more member involvement than loose informal 
networks. This causes a collective action problem. For an individual NGO, 
membership in the coalition entails the investment of time, staff and resources. In 
order to ensure deeper commitment from all its members, the coalition has to offer 
sufficient benefits to outweigh the costs. What the member ‘receives back from its 
participation’ directly influences its level of engagement with the network. In that 
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respect, UNIW’s members are simultaneously stake-holders and share-holders: “They 
are stake-holders, insofar as they have in common a number of general principles and 
values that refer to concrete stakes in the struggle of global politics. But they are also 
share-holders, inasmuch as they bargain the degree of their engagement according to 
the degree of the satisfaction of their specific interest” (Marchetti & Pianta  2006: 5).  
Normative goals and ideas are fundamental to the formation of any form of 
transnational civil society network. Transnational networks and coalitions are 
motivated by shared values, worldviews and ideological commitments. UNIW is, 
then, a typical norm based network in that shared religious identity is fundamental to 
the formation and reproduction of network ties. Yet, the sustainability of long-term 
and effective networks has an instrumental aspect. In that sense, UNIW serves the 
reciprocity norm of social networks (Putnam 2000: 19). Member NGOs enhance 
UNIW’s social capital by increasing its representative power. UNIW enhances the 
members’ social capital by facilitating coordination and cooperation for mutual 
benefit, and creating added value for all involved.  
In this chapter, I undertake an instrumental reading of UNIW by analyzing the 
institutional opportunity structures it provides to its members. I focus on the 
expectations of member NGOs in entering the network and the benefits they reap 
from their involvement. I specifically focus on the notions of credibility, legitimacy, 
boomerang effect, and information sharing. Next, I discuss the ways in which 
member NGOs shape their ideological positions and organizational structures to 
match UNIW’s expectations in order to receive support. I use the NGOs that are 
involved in the East Turkistan independence movement as the case study. By 
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analyzing how East Turkistan members frame their message to fit UNIW’s 
ideological stance, I demonstrate the weight of interests in norm-based networks.  
 
8.1 Leverage, Legitimacy and the Boomerang Effect 
 
The advantages of being in active partnership with UNIW are far more significant 
for the small, grassroots organizations with miniscule funds and organizational 
power. Member NGOs benefit from and meet their individual needs by participating 
in a large-scale alliance that shares resources, information and expertise, which 
decrease costs as a result of group specialization. First, the combined strength of the 
coalition provides the least powerful organizations channels of institutional access 
they would otherwise be unable to obtain. Small organizations gain access to material 
resources, new information and strategies, which they utilize to increase their 
standing and reputation in the domestic arena (Tarrow 2005: 3). External links to 
more powerful transnational actors and networks allows the weak groups to increase 
their credibility and legitimacy. The added-value of their partnership in a 
transnational coalition presents the small organizations better leverage to amplify the 
visibility of their issues and to influence state practices directly, resulting in what 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) call the “boomerang effect”.  
The instrumental benefits of transnational networks and coalitions are not restricted 
to weaker organizations. While small and resource poor organizations benefit from 
being in partnership with transnational NGO coalitions, the coalition itself increases 
its legitimacy and representative power by increasing its size (Price 2003: 595). In 
fact, UNIW's claim to be the spokesperson of the Islamic World is primarily based on 
the size of its membership base. The size of the coalition allows UNIW 
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representatives to claim more credibility to speak on behalf of countless Muslim 
groups in an official capacity. UNIW's Secretary General introduces the UNIW 
delegation as the representatives of the largest Islamic civil society coalition in the 
world when visiting the local and national governments of foreign countries.  
A noteworthy example of this pattern is the case of the Cambodian Muslim 
Intellectual Alliance (CMIA) – a member of UNIW from Cambodia. CMIA is a fairly 
small organization that works on poverty alleviation through fundraising for building 
schools, health care centers, mosques, orphanages and the promotion of Islamic 
education systems within the Muslim minority in Cambodia, which makes up 8% of 
the population.  The funds, organizational capacity, infrastructure, thus the outreach 
of CMIA is so limited that it mostly relies on the financial and organizational support 
of larger neighbor organizations in Malaysia to carry out its projects. The 
organization has inadequate connections with the local government and virtually none 
with the national government to receive support for its projects. CMIA’s limited 
resources lead to insufficient integration to and effectiveness within the Muslim 
community to a large extent.  
UNIW’s council meetings are held in a different country each time and a select 
delegation from the meeting travels to a neighboring country to visit members and 
provide support. In the following days of the 9th council meeting in Malaysia, a 
UNIW delegation of 30 member NGOs, traveled to Cambodia to visit CMIA, meet 
with the local Muslim population and pay official visits to the Cambodian 
government “on behalf of the global Muslim civil society”120. 
                                                
120 Necmi Sadikoglu, UNIW Secretary General, Meeting with the Cambodian Secretary of State, May 
2010. 
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On the first day of the visit in Phnom Penh, the UNIW delegation along with Mr. 
Mohd Farid Hosen, the executive director of CMIA, met with Bun Uy, the Secretary 
of Sate of the Office of the Council of Ministers in the Cambodian Parliament. 
During the three hour meeting, the UNIW delegation discussed the situation of the 
Muslim minority in Cambodia, expressed their interest in assisting Muslim 
communities in Cambodia, agreed on funding two school projects and a local radio 
station in Phnom Penh, and sponsoring high school education of select Muslim 
students abroad. The UNIW delegation recommended CMIA to be the intermediary 
to the relations with the Cambodian government and to the supervision of the agreed 
upon projects. The executive director of CMIA and the Secretary of the State made an 
appointment for a private meeting in the following week to discuss further projects 
regarding Muslim communities in Cambodia.  
On the second day of the visit, CMIA hosted the UNIW delegation in a Muslim 
village 50 km out of Phnom Penh. Various member NGOs of UNIW collaborate with 
CMIA in extending social aid since 2007, yet this was the first official visit by UNIW 
or any foreign NGOs to the village. During the visit, UNIW representatives met with 
the Muslim community; and distributed social aid, booklets and Qur’an in Khmer. In 
their address, UNIW representatives praised CMIA, highlighted the organization’s 
significance for the coalition and described CMIA “as a vital bridge between the 
Umma and the Muslim minority in Cambodia”121.  
The almost overnight success of CMIA in raising its profile confirms what Necmi 
Sadikoglu, the Secretary General of UNIW, expressed as to the reason why the 
UNIW delegation visits a fairly small member organization: “We want to 
                                                
121Necmi Sadikoglu, UNIW Secretary General, Address to the Muslim village, May 25, 2010. 
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demonstrate our support for our member, to reassure them that they are not alone, 
make sure that Muslims are not abandoned in this remote part of the world.”122  
Endorsing CMIA to the national government and the community it works with 
provided the organization a newfound legitimacy and political leverage. CMIA also 
extended its networks and obtained a key role in overseeing the progress of multiple 
projects with international collaborators.  
 
8.2 Information Sharing 
 
Information sharing is at the core of transnational networks and coalitions. One of 
the key features that set contemporary transnational NGO coalitions such as UNIW 
apart from their predecessors is their capacity to use new communication 
technologies to facilitate information flow.  While consistent personal contact is 
fundamental to form a collective identity and to facilitate collaborations among 
members, communication technologies prove to be very important in disseminating 
information and maintaining partnerships. A thorough and well-run website is a given 
for most Western NGOs and coalitions but it is still a distinctive merit for many small 
organizations in the Muslim World. Although most member NGOs of UNIW have 
websites, they are largely limited to providing basic contact information, mission 
statements, a small number of pictures from their fieldwork and mostly out-of-date 
news. Only a few of UNIW’s members, such as the Islamic Relief and IHH, are well 
funded and well staffed to keep updated and efficient websites. UNIW as the 
umbrella organization, on the other hand, keeps a well designed and efficient website 
to inform its members of its up-to-date activities, logistic information on future 
                                                
122Necmi Sadikoglu, UNIW Secretary General, personal interview with author, May 21, 2010. 
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summits and conferences, meeting minutes, press releases. The secretary general’s 
speeches and analyses of particular events around the Muslim World are published on 
the website almost daily. While the coalition does not expect its members to fully 
commit to its views, detailed opinion pieces stating the position of UNIW’s executive 
branch on each issue set the political agenda for the members around the world. Due 
to the sheer size of its membership, UNIW has the capacity to bring a local crisis 
situation or a human rights violation to the attention of 193 NGOs in 46 countries and 
their own networks around the world.  
The production, exchange and strategic use of information in a consistent and 
structured manner is key to the success of UNIW for two reasons: harnessing 
expertise through pooling resources and framing. 
The first is related to the instrumental dimension of coalition building and 
participation. Gathering information, creating solutions and developing action plans 
about specific issues are costly for most NGOs. Organizations decrease research and 
development costs by pooling information about common issue areas, and by 
exchanging projects specifically devised for similar problems. In addition to sharing 
experience about projects, member organizations also benefit from exchanging 
organizational know-how, management skill, and contacts. Especially smaller 
organizations with scarce material resources and insufficient personnel obtain 
organizational knowledge by interacting with the more established ones.  
UNIW’s commissions, which group member organizations with similar interests 
and issue areas, operate as training platforms for smaller organizations. The 
commissions serve two leading purposes. First, they bring together organizations with 
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skills, knowledge and expertise about specific issue areas in order to mobilize their 
collective resources towards UNIW’s overarching concerns such as Islamophobia, 
crisis regions and religious revival. Each commission brainstorms and develops 
action plans about aspects of these broad topics in pertinence to their specific 
expertise. Second, members of commissions convene to exchange information and 
experience about their common issue areas. All members of the commission benefit 
from the experience and research capacities of larger organizations. For example, 
members of one of the most active commissions -Women, Families and Youth 
Commission- convene periodically and discuss the similar issues they face in their 
home countries and exchange notes on the individual programs they have developed 
on problems such as the dissolution of family, increasing drug use, rising divorce rate, 
domestic violence, family planning and children’s socialization. The commission has 
organized five international meetings since 2006 in Turkey, Morocco and Indonesia. 
In line with UNIW’s distrust in the Western family model, which they consider 
impersonal and prone to degeneration, the organizations endorse the Muslim family 
model that is deeply rooted in the communitarian ideal.123 The projects and activities 
of the member organizations promote extended families and women’s role as the 
nurturing mother of the family unit and discourage abortion and birth control methods 
intended for family planning. Organizations pool their resources and expertise in 
developing projects counter to the family planning programs mostly introduced by 
Western transnational organizations that operate in their countries.  
                                                




The latter –framing – is related to the meaning-making dimension of transnational 
coalitions. Social movement literature has been prolific in offering the conceptual 
tools to understand the ways in which activists and organizations shape issues at stake 
and devise tactics and strategies to result in change. Social movement theories assert, 
however, that effective framing is possible when the participants are homogenous and 
have consistent interaction. It is difficult for transnational coalitions with 
heterogeneous membership to create joint issue and identity frames. In that regard, 
UNIW’s periodic council meetings are invaluable in providing discursive processes 
for the members to share their observations, experiences and “realities” to articulate 
common frames (Benford and Snow 2000: 623).  
UNIW facilitates communication, interaction and information flow among its 
members through its periodical council meetings. Held every three months, Council 
meetings bring together large numbers of member organizations for two to four days. 
So far, UNIW has organized eleven council meetings in different locations. 
Predictably, not all 187 of UNIW’s members have the financial resources or 
dedicated staff to attend council meetings around the world. Therefore, each council 
meeting is held in a different country each time in order to facilitate the participation 
of resource poor organizations in neighboring countries. For example, the council 
meeting in Kosovo has received larger participation from members in the Balkans and 
Europe. Similarly, the meeting in Indonesia was mostly participated by the 
organizations in Southeast Asia. This system is also beneficial for the organizations 
that live and work in the same geography which are subject to similar social, cultural 
and political conditions. In the duration of the council meetings, organizations from 
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the same region find the opportunity to meet, establish relationships and develop 
collaborations.   
 
8.3 Increasing Visibility and Awareness 
 
The first step for any local movement organization towards attaining goals is to 
raise awareness about its issues.  While they strive to change their situation 
domestically, an increasing number of movements seek international allies when they 
cannot find access to domestic channels of participation. Local movements reach 
outside their states for support when “channels between domestic groups and their 
governments are blocked or hampered or where such channels are ineffective for 
resolving a conflict” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12). External support can increase 
recognition for the local movement in the international arena, add legitimacy to the 
local group and their cause, facilitate policy change, and pressure repressive 
governments.  Local movements seek external support through “targeted lobbying of 
prospective supporters” and “raising international awareness through media” (Bob 
2005: 23-4). The first involves direct personal contact in venues like international 
conferences to forge global linkages. The second involves international media and 
other channels of communication to generate awareness about the movement’s causes 
and activities.  
UNIW serves as an ideal platform for local movements to boost recognition among 
international audiences. UNIW, by self-definition, works to publicize the 
humanitarian condition of Muslim populations in the international arena. The UNIW 
body works most efficiently in raising awareness about the issues of Muslim 
populations around the world, monitoring crisis regions in the Islamic world and 
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putting the most pressing ones on the agenda in order mobilize its members towards 
solutions. In the words of UNIW’s Secretary General: 
 
We have to think about our brothers under persecution and constraint we have to 
pray for them and above all we have to work harder in unity and solidarity for them. 
We should not forget the Palestinian Issue is not the Palestinians' problem alone. 
The bloodshed in Iraq is not Iraq's pain alone. The unending injustice and 
lawlessness in Kashmir is not a problem to be resolved by Kashmir alone. 
Similarly, the tragedies taking place Eastern Turkistan, Cyprus, Karabakh, 
Caucasus, Kosovo, Darfur, Philippines, Burma and Thailand are all our problems. 
We should consider them so by order of our faith. That is to say our objective is to 
raise awareness of this. Reviving means resisting. It means waking and 
awakening.124  
 
Accordingly, UNIW works efficiently in putting these issues in the international 
spotlight. It organizes international conferences and symposiums, contact 
intergovernmental organizations and supranational unions in Muslim minorities’ 
behalf, endorse local NGOs in their own countries, and releases declarations to the 
international media organs. 
 
8.4 The Marketplace of Transnational Advocacy: Who Deserves the Spotlight? 
 
Despite UNIW’s stated interest in helping and raising awareness about the 
conditions of Muslim populations everywhere, not all movements receive the same 
level of attention. The world of transnational advocacy or solidarity networks is more 
of a marketplace than an equal opportunity environment for local movements (Bob 
2005). Whereas some movements successfully tap into the agenda of transnational 
publics, draw attention and obtain name recognition, others remain isolated and are 
doomed to obscurity. For instance, while the movements in Tibet, East Timor, and 
                                                
124 Necmi Sadikoglu, UNIW Secretary General, Address to the 5th Council meeting, Kuwait, August 
2008.  
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Sudan have been under transnational public’s spotlight, similar movements in East 
Turkistan, Indonesian Aceh and West Papua remain isolated (Bob 2005: 2).  
UNIW is not different than any other transnational platform in that it has limited 
attention and resources to bestow the same importance to every crisis situation in the 
Muslim world. The secretary general repeats in his every speech, press release and 
opinion piece that they are “concerned about the troubles of Muslim populations 
wherever they are”125. Even then, some issues take precedence over others.  In the last 
session of the two-day council meeting in Malaysia, which was dominated by the 
review of current and proposed projects about the Palestinian situation, the 
representative of the Moro Muslims group from South Philippines took the stage for 
the first time. In the mere ten minutes allocated, he introduced the ongoing dispute 
between Moro Muslims and the Republic of Philippines government; explained the 
complex composition of the liberation movement; the frictions between the 
combatant Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the insurgent Moro National Liberation 
Front, multiple Moro civil society initiatives; and indicated their struggle to draw the 
attention of the international Islamic community to the humanitarian and social crises 
of the Moro people. Pointing at the attention given to the Palestinian conflict by 
UNIW as well as other international platforms, he complained: 
 
“I know you are better informed about what is going on in Palestine. Even my 
kids are better informed about the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Our people, on the 
other hand, are suffering more without the knowledge of the international 
community.”126 
 
                                                
125 Necmi Sadikoglu, (UNIW Secretary General), Pakistan Consultation Meeting, 2010, Istanbul.  
126 Zekeriya Abdullah, spokesperson for the Moro Muslims in UNIW, May 2010, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia.  
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In order to get on the radar of the international community and transnational 
political platforms, local movements have to “market” themselves to the transnational 
public by framing their causes to match the goals, tactics, ethics, culture and 
organizational needs of the potential supporters. Their message and views have to be 
compatible with the groups from whom they seek ideological and material assistance. 
That means the competitive marketing for the local groups that seek UNIW’s 
attention is: 
 
[...] a  matter of maneuver rather than position; of observing and responding to 
one’s audience rather then blindly making one’s case; of stress and form as much 
as content; of seizing opportunities and capitalizing on accidents as much as 
preplanning. (Bob 2005: 28). 
 
Local movements or organizations that do not fully conform to UNIW’s 
organizational identity find it more difficult to get backing. UNIW is highly vigilant 
about maintaining its credibility as a representative of the transnational Muslim civil 
society. Thus, the leaders of the organization avoid controversy and are cautious 
about taking up direct confrontation with national governments. In order to secure the 
organization’s legitimacy as a respectable actor in global politics, the leaders are 
guarded against equating UNIW’s name with terrorism or any kind of violence. A key 
reason, therefore, that the Moro Muslims remain on the periphery of UNIW’s agenda 
is the armed insurgency tactics that the factions of the movement use intermittently. 
East Turkistan problem, on the other hand, fits the bill perfectly. In the next section I 
discuss the East Turkistan case in detail. I start with a brief overview of the historical 
conflict between Muslim Uyghurs and Chinese regimes. Next, I move on to introduce 
Uyghur Muslims’ grievances and their transnational political advocacy efforts. In the 
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last section, I discuss how the Uyghur groups in UNIW frame their grievances in 
order to match UNIW’s primary concerns, such as religious persecution, freedom of 
religious expression and Islamophobia. 
 
8.4.1 Case Study: East Turkistan Conflict  
 
Muslim Uyghurs are an ethnic minority in Xinjiang, the most western province of 
China. While the Chinese authority calls the region the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, Uyghur nationalists call it East Turkistan or Uyghuristan. China conquered 
and integrated the region in the 1750s and declared it a province in 1884. After the 
collapse of the Quing Dynasty, Uyghurs enjoyed two brief periods of independence; 
first in 1931 -1933 and second in 1944 - 1949. Following the communist victory in 
1949, Xinjiang was capitulated to the People’s Republic of China. However, since the 
region was considered more as a strategic buffer zone against its neighbors than a 
fully integrated province, the state did not colonize or settle Xinjiang initially (Magid 
1998).  
The Great Leap Forward (1958 – 1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966 - 1976), 
constructed by Mao as vehicles for China’s modernization, pursued policies of 
integrating and assimilating the minority nationalities (Clarke 2011: 70). According 
to the centralist program of modernization, Islam was seen one of the “backward 
customs” and ethnicity was considered an “obstacle to progress” (Bovingdon 2004b: 
123). All over China, anything perceived as different was considered 
counterrevolutionary and attacked. As in Tibet and other non-Han regions, traditional 
minority beliefs and customs were banned in Xinjiang. Religious practices and regalia 
were forbidden; mosques were destroyed and Muslim population were forced to eat 
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pork or raise pigs. Intellectuals, elites and religious leaders were either killed or sent 
to labor camps. To ensure complete cultural homogenization, the party banned local 
languages in favor of Chinese (Bovingdon 2004b).  
The party’s cultural policies towards non-Han minorities improved after Mao’s 
death, yet the economic and political subjugation continued. As ethnic separatist 
ideologies gained strength thanks to the ethnic discrimination in memory, the party 
took steps in improving the economic conditions of minorities. However, the 
investment in economic policies in minority regions produced a converse effect. The 
new employment opportunities created by the economic programs resulted in a larger 
flow of Han-Chinese to Xinjiang (Qiang and Xin 2003). As a result, Uyghurs have 
gradually become outnumbered in the region. 
The CCP mandated migration flows have changed the demographic composition of 
the Xinjiang region drastically increasing the Han population from roughly 5% in 
1949 to over 40% in 1978. The influx of migrants has aggravated the preexisting 
conflicts between the Han Chinese and the Uyghurs over their religious, cultural, and 
social differences (Gladney 2004c: 220). As the migrants settled and claimed land, 
led to over-cultivation of land and over-use of water resources in the area. Preferential 
recruitment policies forced Uyghurs to compete with Han Chinese over limited jobs. 
Uyghur resentment exacerbated as they found themselves having to compete with 
Han Chinese over financial and natural resources (Rudelson 1997: 36-8).   
In 1999, the CCP introduced the Western Development Project, more popularly 
known as the Open Up the West Project, to alleviate the economic disparity between 
the Eastern and Western provinces (Loughlin and Pannell 2001). It was assumed that 
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boosting economic development and ameliorating the living standards, which housed 
the non-Han ethnicities, would decrease the rising ethnic nationalism in these 
provinces (Goodman 2004). However, the outcome of these economic policies 
produced the contrary outcome.  
The economic development policy increased Han migration from rural areas to 
Xinjiang (Bachman 2004).  The preferential treatment of Han Chinese in job 
recruitment and the stratification of the labor market blocked Uyghurs’ integration 
into the economic and social system (Pannelll and Schmidt 2006). Han Chinese were 
in an advantageous position in not only the private sector jobs but also, and more 
importantly, in state-sectors jobs partly due to Uyghurs’ low levels of education and 
lack of Mandarin skills. The economic inequality professed itself in residential 
segregation, unequal opportunities in education and health care, which led to further 
marginalization and alienation for Uyghurs (Amnesty International 1999). The 
increase in inequality between Hans and Uyghurs added to the disillusionment and 
separatist ideologies. The economic and political marginalization of Uyghurs 
bolstered the idea of an Eastern Turkistan. 
The discovery of large reserves of oil and natural gas added environmental conflict 
to the long list of disputes between the Uyghurs and the Chinese government. Mining 
and export of Xinjiang’s oil and gas to outside the province, and resulting habitat loss, 
fueled the resentment in Uyghurs that their natural resources are exploited at their 
expense (Bovingdon 2004d: 47). The conflict originated over the Uyghur people’s 
desire for political and religious independence from the Han Chinese. With this desire 
for independence, came the struggle for natural resources and local economic 
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sustainability. The exploitation of local oil reserves exacerbated ethnic differences 
and helped fuel the conflict.  As the construction of the oil pipeline between 
Kazakhstan and Western China started in early 2005, the separatist groups 
strengthened their own campaign, sometimes resorting to violence (Dreyer 2005: 74). 
The government, in the meantime, tightened the grip on the disgruntled ethnic group. 
Specifically the September 11 attacks gave the justification to the Chinese 
government to apply more pressure on the separatist groups and frame the ethnic 
conflict as just one more front on the global war on terror (Chung 2002).  
 
Transnational Advocacy Networks of Uyghurs  
 
Uyghurs have been seeking international allies to help with their case for decades. 
Soon after independence Uyghurs established formal political organizations in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Until 1970s, Uyghur refugee and migrant communities 
sustained the East Turkistan ideal in the diaspora and supported the movement in 
Xinjiang through underground publications and other media. Yet, the limited resource 
available in exile blocked the activists’ capacity to raise international awareness about 
their cause. Moreover, they did not have enough access to and support from other 
governments to apply pressure on the CCP (Petersen 2006: 65). 
By 1980s and 1990s, Uyghur independence activism took on a more transnational 
advocacy character. With the advent of global communication technologies, Uyghur 
activist groups began to coalesce more efficiently across geographies and began to 
promote their plea to the international community (Gladney 2004a). In 1990s, Uyghur 
nationalist groups started to establish international organizations in Turkey, Germany, 
Australia and the United States (Petersen 2006: 65). In 2004, the East Turkistan 
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National Congress and the World Uyghur Youth Congress, two of the largest 
international diaspora organizations, merged and created un umbrella organization to 
unite all Uyghur nationalist groups: the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). The WUC 
lobbies international organizations and governments “to promote the right of the 
Uyghur people to use peaceful, nonviolent, and democratic means to determine the 
political future of East Turkistan”.127 Transnational activists appealed to multiple 
international agencies and foreign governments. For instance, The U.S. based East 
Turkistan National Freedom Center met with President Clinton on June 4, 1999 to 
press for fuller support for the Uyghur cause (Bovingdon 2002). Rabiye Kadeer, the 
leader of the Uyghur international human rights and democracy movement and the 
chairperson of the World Uyghur Congress, met with President George Bush in 2007, 
testified before the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights in 2009 
and 2011. Representatives from the World Uyghur Congress have testified before the 
UN Forum on Minority Issues in 2010.128  Numerous Uyghur support organizations 
based in the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, UK, Russia, Canada and Turkey 
pressure their governments to take action on the issue (Gladney 2004c: 239).  
The Uyghur movement is not a unified one. There are secular fractions among the 
movement as well as religious ones. Similarly, there are fractions that promote 
separatism and fractions that support coexistence granted China softens its treatment 
of minorities. The issue itself is as complex and multifaceted as the actors that 
                                                
127 World Uyghur Congress mission statement. http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?cat=148. Accessed 
May 25, 2011.   
128 World Uyghur Congress, “Conference on Kashgar City Closes with Pledge for Urgency Resolution: 
MEPs Promise to Place Kashgar Firmly on the European Parliament’s Agenda” 




populate the movement. Uyghurs’ grievances cannot be reduced to religious 
persecution only. The East Turkistan conflict is “a complex mix of history, ethnicity, 
and religion, fueled by poverty, unemployment, social disparities, and political 
grievances” (Davis 2008: 2). Therefore, the fractions among the movement have 
different concerns and priorities. As a result, the movement “segments the 
international market directing their appeals to potential supporters whose identity and 
goals approximate their own” (Bob 2005: 30) and each group frames their grievances 
according to their particular interests. The secular groups among the movement take 
their pleas to the UN and frame their cause as one of human rights and minority 
survival. The religious groups, on the other hand, are not as well received by Western 
audiences due to the conflicted views on political Islam (Vergani and Zuev 2011: 
228). Therefore, religious fractions among Uyghur activists find more support among 
transnational Muslim organizations. UNIW is an ideal platform for the religious 
groups in the East Turkistan movement for two reasons. First, the size of the 
organizations allows the Uyghur groups to address a substantial number of Muslim 
organizations around the world at once. Second reason is related to the assumed 
lineage between Uyghur and Turkish people. In addition to the ethnic ties, there is a 
large Uyghur exile population and many solidarity organizations in Turkey. The 
significant influence of Turkish organizations within the coalition’s membership and 
executive board makes it easier for the Uyghur groups to attract UNIW’s attention to 






Framing the Message to fit UNIW 
 
The diverse cultural and political composition of UNIW makes it difficult for 
members to decide on a shared position, much less to devise common action plans, on 
each of the many crises in the Muslim World. Yet the East Turkistan conflict is one 
of the uncontested issues along with Chechnya, Indonesian Aceh, Palestine and 
Kashmir. These conflicts perfectly match UNIW’s interest in mobilizing global 
Islamic solidarity in defense of oppressed Muslim populations. Since UNIW’s key 
consideration is persecution towards Muslims, local movements frame their message 
to match UNIW’s interests.  
While the Uyghur-China controversy is larger than religious concerns, Uyghur 
groups that appeal to UNIW skillfully frame their message around religious 
persecution and Islamophobia. The complex nature of the conflict is simplified to one 
of an isolated Muslim community against the intransigent Goliath which aims to 
destroy the community’s culture and religion, to attack prized institutions like the 
Muslim family, women and the mosque. In this discursive frame, the ever-
authoritative Communist state employs the discourse of Islamic terrorism to increase 
its coercion on the forsaken Muslim minority. The way an Uyghur spokesperson 
frames their predicament in a UNIW council meeting hits all the marks of UNIW’s 
sensitivities: 
 
Uyghur Muslims have been struggling against cultural assimilation, genocide, 
second-class treatment, applications of abortion by force, and persecution policies 
by Chinese authorities. I will list four – five serious problems here. First one is the 
assimilation of Muslim identity and cultural values. Chinese government started 
to transfer Uyghur Muslim girls from the age of 15-20 to inner China; 5000-6000 
km away from their homeland. They are forced to work in factories, hotels, bars, 
and nightclubs. According to the Chinese official records, more than 1 million 
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girls are transferred to inland China. This is very serious. Second, is forced 
abortions as a policy of family planning in the region. Two children are allowed 
to Uyghur Muslims but it’s not true. Because the Chinese government has a 
system to control it. Abortions are implemented at the sixth and seventh months 
of pregnancy. Mothers die as well because of late abortions. Third one is Chinese 
settlement. East Turkistan has a population of 35 million and Chinese are more 
than 60% population not in East Turkistan. You cannot find Uyghurs in inner 
cities. There are 15 more settlements in the region. Fourth is the religious bans 
against rights to prayer. Mosques are closed to youth under 18 and women. So a 
Muslim cannot go to a mosque from one town to the other. Religious teachings 
are banned. Even I cannot teach my son at home. It is also a big problem. And 
last, Chinese authority started systematic attack on Uyghur Muslims since 9/11. 
They have been arresting innocent people and now this campaign has become a 
killing campaign. They claim that all Uyghur Muslims are terrorists and that they 
have links to Al-Qaida to hide their inhuman, cruel treatment of the local 
population. Chinese authority has begun to use the anti-terror war. So, East 
Turkistan people are trying to reach the international community. But in fact, they 
are cut off from the world. We are facing too many problems in reaching the 
Muslim World, we ask for help and cooperation. I strongly recommend the Union 
to keep the issue on the agenda to help us.129 
 
This rhetoric does not fall on deaf ears. The UNIW body works most efficiently on 
raising awareness about the conditions of Muslim populations around the world, 
monitoring crisis regions in the Islamic world and activating its members to 
contribute to the solutions.130  UNIW and the influential Turkish members in its 
executive board work efficiently to raise awareness about the issue, particularly on 
account of the ethnic ties between Uyghur Turks and Turkey. The Uyghur refugees in 
Turkey also impel UNIW to publicize the East Turkistan cause internationally. UNIW 
and its members organize protests, international conferences, support East Turkistan 
                                                
129 East Turkistan spokesperson, UNIW 9th Council Meeting, Malaysia, May 2010.  
130 Reactions from the participants confirmed that UNIW leaders’ frequent remarks about the lack of 
intercommunication and awareness among its constituents were not unfounded. The president of the 
Algerian delegation’s comments at a visit to UNIW’s headquarters testifies to the ‘dispersion of the 
Umma’: “Believe me. We are not really aware of what is happening in East Turkistan and to our 
Muslim brothers there. It is so, because we do not have sufficient and reliable information about the 
situation in this occupied Muslim territory. With such symposiums, the awareness level increases 
among the people who have capability to change this unacceptable brutal situation. I will take this as 
my topic in Friday lecture at the mosque Insha’Allah [God willing]”. Ahmad Ibrahimi, President of Al 
Quds Association, UNIW headquarters, Istanbul, March 23, 2010.  
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solidarity organizations and pressure governments to take action. Necmi Sadikoglu, 
the UNIW Secretary General, mentions the conditions of the Uyghur population in 
his every opening speech and press release. In his address to the Pakistani National 
Assembly in February 2011, Sadikoglu called the Pakistani public to pay more 
attention to the conditions of Uyghur refugees in Pakistan and to the minority 
population in China.131  The issue is also brought up in every topical conference 
UNIW organizes. Bulent Yildirim, IHH’s director, raised the subject of Uyghur girls 
at the Fourth International Orphan Meeting held in October 2009: 
 
There are 143 million orphans in the world. 60 million of them go to bed hungry. 
2.5 million children are kidnapped and sold every year and most of them are girls. 
Do you ever ask where the hundred thousand girls kidnapped from East Turkistan 
are?132 
 
In the Second International Youth Gathering organized by UNIW’s Culture and 
Education Commission in August 2009, two students from East Turkistan gave 
briefings about the conflict, called attention to the media’s lack of interest on the 
issue, and asked the international group of university students to “ share this news 
with public and spread the word”.133 
In addition to interjecting the East Turkistan conflict to the agenda of each specific 
conference and meeting, UNIW held a high profile symposium to raise political 
awareness on the issue. In March 2010, UNIW co-organized an East Turkistan 
Symposium in Istanbul and put the situation of Uighur population in China under the 
spotlight. Bringing together the international chapters of East Turkistan Solidarity 
Associations, researchers, academics, representatives of asylum seekers in Turkey, as 
                                                
131Necmi Sadikoglu, February 2011, Address to the Pakistani National Assembly  
132 Bulent Yildirim, IHH Director, fourth International Orphan Meeting, October 17 2009  
133 UNIW, the Second International Youth Gathering, Istanbul, August 2009. 
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well as political figures, the symposium drew attention to the humanitarian crises and 
human rights violations in the region. The participants highlighted restrictions on 
religion, prayer, Uighur language; restrictions on freedom of expression, information 
and communication; violations against women; and forced labor and migration. The 
final declaration made statements about the lack of attention from the international 
community to the situation in East Turkistan and made suggestions for action134. In 
the intergovernmental sphere, UNIW delegation and the NGO leaders accused UN 
Security Council of being hesitant to display the required sensitivity over the issue 
due to China’s veto power and invited UN’s General Assembly to take a position in 
favor of the people of East Turkistan.135  On a country level, some of the suggestions 
for Islamic countries included reconsidering economic and political relations with 
China in favor of East Turkistan; and opening consulates, offices of humanitarian 
organizations and faculties of Islamic universities in East Turkistan. The delegates 
agreed to run effective lobbying activities through communication devices and 
propaganda channels to disseminate information; to publish and translate books in the 
East Turkistan; to prepare exhibitions and short movies to depict the humanitarian 
situation in the region in order to guide popular opinion.  
 
                                                
134 Free East Turkistan Symposium, Final Report, March 2010. 
135 Uyghur activists’ disappointment about the international community is not reserved to the UN and 
the Western governments they have appealed to in the past. They are equally disappointed about the 
neglect of other large international Muslim organizations. In the words of Ahmet Emin Dag of IHH 
Humanitarian Relief Foundation: “At this point, if the Islamic world moves as a bloc, as the European 
Union did in joint declarations published in the past, then it is possible to demand an end to human 
rights violations in East Turkistan and to ensure that the people here are given the right to determine 
their own fate. However, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which should be one of the most 
important platforms in this regard, has not made any significant moves to give support in this matter. 
None of the organizations that have been established by East Turkistan are members or counselors to 
any platforms of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The first move could be to receive these 
groups onto Islamic platforms”. Ahmet Emin Dag, East Turkistan Symposium, March 2010, Istanbul. 
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8.5 Conclusion  
 
Why are previously informal religious groups adopting formal NGO formats and 
the language of civil society, and form transnational coalitions and alliances, such as 
UNIW? In this chapter, I sought to answer this question by analyzing the instrumental 
advantages of this transformation. I argued that UNIW presents institutional 
opportunity structures to small and isolated NGOs at a transnational level. NGOs that 
have limited funds, staff, resources and organizational power enter into partnership 
with UNIW to increase their organizational capital. They gain access to resources, 
organizational expertise, information and skills by interacting and collaborating with 
the larger, more established organizations within UNIW. Moreover, local political 
groups that do not have access to the political system in their own countries turn to 
transnational allies, such as UNIW, in order to increase the visibility and legitimacy 
of their causes, to gain legitimacy as political entrepreneurs as opposed to 
‘insurgents’, and possibly mobilize the transnational allies to pressure their national 
governments.  
As the specific case study in this chapter demonstrate, UNIW’s East Turkistan 
NGOs face difficulties in accessing state channels in China on the one hand and in 
finding allies in the liberal transnational non-state politics environment due to their 
Islamic character on the other. As a result, they seek alliances with transnational 
actors that have Islamic identities. UNIW, as a Muslim transnational NGO coalition, 
is the ideal platform for East Turkistan NGOs to voice their grievances and to receive 
ideological and material assistance. UNIW facilitates East Turkistan NGOs’ struggle 
by increasing Uyghur Muslims’ public visibility in international settings and by 
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extending collective support to the cause. However, getting UNIW’s backing requires 
tactical framing on Eastern Turkistan NGOs’ part. In order to maintain UNIW’s 
support, East Turkistan NGOs frame their grievances in ways that match UNIW’s 
ideational and organizational interests. Although Uyghur Muslims’ issues with the 
Chinese state are more multifaceted than just religious concerns, UNIW’s East 
Turkistan NGOs frame their grievances as religious persecution, Islamophobia, and 
restrictions on religious expression.  
The findings of this chapter, specifically the case study, points to a shortcoming in 
the constructivist literature’s assumptions about the preeminence of ideational 
concerns in transnational non-state actor politics. Constructivist scholarship has been 
prolific in the analyses of transnational non-state actors, such as transnational 
advocacy networks, international NGOs, and transnational NGO coalitions. The 
majority of these analyses put an overwhelming emphasis on the role of ideational 
factors in the formation and sustenance of transnational non-state actors. 
Constructivism presumes a rigid separation between value-based and interest-based 
concerns and therefore argues that these emerging non-state actors are motivated by 
norms as opposed to nation-states that are motivated by interests. However, as this 
case shows, interest-based concerns are as vital as norm-based ones for the 
continuation and performance of transnational non-state actors. While UNIW is a 
religious solidarity network that is directly guided by normative goals, it would be a 
misstep to overlook the instrumental dimensions of its intra-organizational 
dimensions. Therefore, I argue that a more prescient approach requires as much 






9.1 Overview of Findings 
 
Over the last two decades, faith-based civic action has gone through a significant 
transformation. Previously informal Islamist communities have been reestablishing 
themselves as formal NGOs at unprecedented rates and forming transnational 
networks and coalitions. Their overarching goals remain unchanged in this 
transformation; these faith-based organizations and coalitions aim to ‘help Islam’s 
revival, well-being, and future’ by consolidating religious solidarity among Muslim 
populations. However, they pursue this religious solidarity goal in the organizational 
and discursive framework of liberal civil society models. This trend is contradictory 
to the assumptions and arguments of the existing transnational civil society literature. 
An overwhelming majority of the transnational non-state politics literature in 
constructivist and sociological institutionalist perspectives conceptualize transnational 
non-state action in secular and liberal terms. In this dissertation, I problematize this 
conflict and ask: Why are the previously informal Islamist networks adopting the 
discourse of civil society, transforming into formal NGOs, and establishing 
transnational coalitions? 
I take one of the largest Muslim NGO coalitions – the Union of the NGOs of the 
Islamic World (UNIW) - as the case study. UNIW is a transnational NGO coalition 
that aims to consolidate faith-based Muslim NGOs to speak in one voice as a global 
actor. With its 193 member NGOs from 46 countries, UNIW serves as an umbrella 
organization. It facilitates communication, interaction, and information flow among 
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its members; monitors crisis regions in Muslim-majority countries; publicizes the 
grievances of Muslim minorities around the world; and coordinates its members to 
find collective solutions to the Muslim World’s issues.  
The empirical analysis of the study demonstrate that UNIW frames its 
transnational religious solidarity project as a transnational civil society initiative 
because the discursive, geopolitical and institutional opportunity structures of the 
civil society framework provide the coalition and its members additional channels of 
power. Both UNIW and its member NGOs find opportunities to increase their social 
and organizational capital; they engage in mutually beneficial relationships with 
states and governments; and claim legitimacy as serious political actors. 
Although both UNIW and its member NGOs frequently emphasize their civil 
society character, it cannot be argued that religion has a trivial role in their 
organization, cooperation, and ideological position. All members of UNIW are faith-
based organizations that base their identities and missions from Islamic religion and 
tradition.  These organizations are founded by Muslims, their mission statements 
explicitly identify Islamic doctrine or tradition as the ideological framework, and 
majority of their projects are rooted in Islamic theology. Moreover, Muslim faith-
based NGOs run these projects exclusively in areas that have a strong Islamic 
presence. UNIW itself explicitly states that it strives to ensure global religious unity. 
In that, neither UNIW nor its member NGOs is different than former religious 
solidarity initiatives in terms of their ideational motivations. However, they are 
strikingly different than their predecessors as they strongly emphasize their self-
claimed civil society character. Member organizations argue that they are civil society 
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organizations rather than religious grassroots movements. UNIW ‘s leaders insist that 
the coalition is ‘the first global Islamic civil society coalition’ rather than a global 
religious solidarity network. Therefore, although religion and global religious 
solidarity constitute the ideational framework of UNIW and its member 
organizations, it is not the organizing principle. I argue that the adoption of civil 
society framework is a strategic choice as the opportunity structures of civil society 
are more profitable than those of religion. I flesh out this argument by using the 
analytical tools of the social movement theory. By adopting Adamson’s (2005) three 
type matrices of systemic-level opportunity structures, I analyze the case in terms of 
discursive, geopolitical, and institutional opportunity structures. 
The discursive opportunity structures of civil society allow UNIW to claim 
legitimacy as a political actor in the current ideological configuration of world 
politics. As the sociological institutionalist and constructivist literatures suggest, the 
sprawling world culture imposes a set of isomorphic norms, structures and models of 
global organizing that shape state and actor interests. In the sphere of politics, this 
ideological configuration considers civil society as the most legitimate form of 
collective action.  In the prevailing political culture, civil society is celebrated by 
states, intergovernmental organizations, international media, as well as the non-state 
actors themselves. UNIW’s leaders and member NGOs, as political entrepreneurs 
who are embedded in this particular political culture, perceive civil society as the 
most favorable discursive opportunity structure available in transnational politics. 
They present their mission and ideology within the discursive frames of civil society, 
which resonate with those of well-received non-state actors in transnational politics.  
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In return, they attain legitimacy as serious political actors; draw credibility to their 
message; and increase the visibility of their grievances and claims in the international 
public.  
Credibility and legitimacy gained through civil society identity and discourse 
allow UNIW to access further channels of power. One of the most significant 
outcomes of this is gaining access to states and government agencies. As described in 
detail above, UNIW is not the first attempt by faith-based groups to from 
transnational alliances and establish global religious solidarity. However, the majority 
of such networks, coalitions and alliances have remained isolated, short-lived and 
issue based. Moreover, very few of them have attained UNIW’s geographical reach in 
terms of sheer membership size. I argue in this dissertation that one of the key 
explanatory factors of UNIW’s distinctness is its symbiotic relationship with the 
Turkish government. Turkey’s pro-Islamic AKP government aims to transform from 
a peripheral actor in regional and world political to a central one. Since 2002, the 
government has pursued a particular foreign policy strategy that is labeled neo-
Ottomanism. This ambitious strategic depth vision diverges from Turkey’s previous 
foreign policy strategies as it prioritizes building stronger relationships with the 
Middle East, Africa and the broader Muslim geography. AKP government’s foreign 
policy directors maintain that Turkey should claim a leadership role in the Islamic 
World by cultivating alliances in its immediate geopolitical neighborhood, by taking 
on a mediator role in regional conflicts, and by strengthening political and economic 
relationships with its interconnected regions. This strategy is also different than 
Turkey’s previous foreign policy approaches because it prioritizes the use of soft 
 219 
power alongside geopolitical power. According to the policy’s architects, Turkey 
should reestablish social and cultural ties in the region and with other Muslim-
majority countries across the world. In that respect, they hold civil society 
organizations in high regard. Civil society organizations in their perspective are 
unique soft power instruments. Therefore, the government extends material and 
logistical support to UNIW, endorses the coalition in international platforms, and in 
some cases entrusts UNIW’s Turkish member NGOs with covert political missions. 
The interests of UNIW and the Turkish government coincide not only in material 
ways but also in ideological ones.  UNIW’s primary purpose is to consolidate Muslim 
populations and salvage the Umma from its dispersed and disintegrated state. 
Therefore, Turkish government’s attempt at leadership in the Muslim world dovetails 
with UNIW’s ideational concerns. In that sense, UNIW utilizes the geopolitical 
opportunity structures created by the Turkish government’s particular material 
interest and form a mutually beneficial relationship with it.  
Formal civil society identity is not only meaningful to UNIW as a coalition, but 
also to its member NGOs from across the world. For UNIW’s members, the 
instrumental benefits of adopting formal NGO identities and structures are manifold. 
Particularly small NGOs that have limited funds, personnel, and resources benefit 
from entering into partnership with UNIW. Resource poor NGOs increase their 
organizational power by gaining access to funds, expertise and organizational skills 
by collaborating with the more established members of the UNIW.  Additionally, they 
gain international visibility, legitimacy, and leverage in the eyes of their own 
governments and communities. In some cases, they mobilize UNIW’s collective 
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power to pressure their national governments. Yet, these institutional opportunity 
structures come with strings. It is difficult for small and isolated local groups to put 
their causes in the international agenda. In the competitive world of transnational 
politics, some movements garner more attention than others. In the post-9/11 world of 
transnational politics, Islamist movements find it particularly challenging to receive 
support for their causes and form transnational alliances. Therefore, they often turn to 
Islamic coalitions for support. However, as any other transnational collective 
network, UNIW has limited attention and resources to extend equal support to every 
local cause. Therefore, in order to gain UNIW’s backing, local NGOs shape their 
message to match the coalition’s ideological position. They frame their grievances 
and goals in ways that resonate with UNIW’s sensitivities and mission. They present 
their concerns in terms of religious persecution, Islamophobia, discrimination, and 
restrictions of religious expression.  
In sum, in this dissertation I search the reasons why previously informal religious 
groups are increasingly adopting formal NGO structures, the language of civil 
society, and establishing transnational coalitions and alliances. I answer this question 
by analyzing the discursive, geopolitical, and institutional opportunity structures that 
are made available by the prevalent civil society framework in transnational politics. I 
argue that the civil society identity and discourse provide these groups additional 
channels of power by increasing their social and organizational capital, by opening 
inroads to cooperative relationships with states and governments, and by allowing 




9.2 Theoretical Contributions and Implications of the Study 
 
The empirical findings of this dissertation have theoretical implications about the 
study of transnational non-state politics. Both the sociological institutionalist and the 
constructivist scholarships approach transnational non-state politics in the ideational 
versus instrumental contraposition. Sociological institutionalists and constructivists 
challenge the previous state-centric approaches by bringing in the notions of world-
cultural conceptions, global scripts, norms and values. They forcefully argue that 
actors in transnational politics are not solely motivated by their pursuit of interests. 
These perspectives particularly conceptualize transnational non-state actors, such as 
transnational advocacy networks, NGO coalitions, international NGOs, as groups that 
are motivated by principled beliefs, ideational concerns and values as opposed to 
instrumentalist and interest-based ones. In this dissertation, I do not argue for return 
to the pure interest-based approaches. Instead, I employ an analytical perspective that 
moves beyond the ideational/materialist divide, and examine how the ideational 
motivations of principled non-state actors regularly intersect with instrumental 
concerns. 
The intersection of interests and ideas is nowhere as evident as it is in transnational 
non-state actors’ relationship with states. Majority of constructivist scholarship in this 
area has focused disproportionately on the power of principled non-state actors over 
states and international institutions. Numerous empirical research studies emphasized 
the ways in which transnational non-state actors generate international norms, shape 
the policies of international institutions, and pressure states to change their policies 
and practices. I argue in this dissertation that states and transnational non-state actors 
 222 
have a complex and interdependent relationship than a zero-sum one. States’ 
geopolitical, material and security interests enable or constrain the actions of norm-
motivated transnational non-state actors. In other cases where states’ material 
interests and non-state actors’ normative interests coincide, they work in tandem. The 
sphere of transnational politics is populated by a multiplicity of actors that have 
varying norms, values, interests and priorities. Thus, a well-rounded analysis on these 
actors’ ties requires a perspective that takes interdependencies into account. 
Another theoretical consideration of this study is paying equal attention to the 
workings of power within transnational non-state actors. International NGOs, 
transnational advocacy networks and NGO coalitions are norm-motivated actors by 
definition. However shared norms and ideas are not sufficient to sustain their long-
term effectiveness. There are undeniable instrumental elements at work. Individual 
political entrepreneurs within these organizations and networks are shareholders as 
much as stakeholders. Individual groups’ commitment to membership networks and 
coalitions depend on the network’s ability to provide sufficient benefits to outweigh 
membership costs. In other words, interest-based intra-organizational dynamics are as 
important as the shared normative motivations. Therefore, I argue, constructivist 
scholarship’s emphasis on the value-based motivations should be balanced by 
focusing also on the interest-based concerns within organizations.  
A third contribution of this project is drawing attention to the non-secular 
transnational non-state actors that promote conservative norms. Constructivist 
literature have ben prolific in examining secular networks that are motivated by 
liberal norms. In contrast, it has not taken conservative networks, particularly those 
 223 
that embrace political Islamist perspectives, into account. At the root of this oversight 
is the assumption that liberal and Islamist frameworks are competing claims in 
transnational politics. Similarly, Islam and civil society are considered incompatible. 
Since civil society is conceptualized as a formation whose prerequisites are derived 
from Western political and historical conditions, non-Western formations of civil 
society, specifically those in the Muslim world, are overlooked, if not denied. 
However, as the specific case of this project illustrates, Islamist movements have 
been increasingly adopting the discursive frames and organizational structures of the 
liberal civil society frameworks while retaining their conservative norms and 
objectives. In fact, they have been negotiating across the conservative/liberal divide 
and making instrumental use of the liberal civil society discourse’s ideational tools 
towards their conservative goals.  
 
9.3 Emerging Questions for Further Research 
 
There have emerged a few theoretical and empirical areas of further consideration 
throughout the project. The first one is about the politics of humanitarianism. As 
discussed above, civil society and Islam are seen as contradictory frameworks. 
Despite the prevalence of de Tocquevillian interpretations, civil society is still seen as 
an essentially reactionary political actor. It is considered an autonomous and resistant 
sphere of action that restrains state power and facilitates transition to democracy. 
Islam, on the other hand, is conceptualized as a totalistic ideology that does not allow 
dissidence and autonomous associations. Authoritative regimes that do not allow 
reactionary politics in many Muslim-majority countries are offered as evidence to this 
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argument. Accordingly, civic initiatives that work in service provision are dismissed 
for being non-reactionary, and thus non-political.  
This assumption prompts a critical question: Is service work non-political? 
Correspondingly, is overt politics the only way we can define civil society? I argued 
in this dissertation that humanitarian action and service provision could be directly 
political. As a large body of work in humanitarianism studies suggest, humanitarian 
action has always been a form of politics for which the pretense of being impartial 
and therefore non-political was essential. In the social aid/charity system, the very 
decision about which population to help, with what kind of projects, funded by 
whom, involve ideological reasoning and political strategy for all civil society 
organizations. In a large number of Muslim-majority countries, humanitarian action 
and service work are intertwined with politics. The Mavi Marmara case in this 
dissertation is but one illustration of the ways in which service work and politics 
intersect. Further research is needed to understand the ways in which seemingly non-
political service-work function as political agency, particularly in the Muslim World.  
Another implication emerges from UNIW leaders’ disinterest in engaging in the 
compatibility debate. As political actors who are embedded in the prevalent culture of 
world politics, they are aware of the cachet of civil society. Therefore, they do not 
question whether their collective efforts fit the scholarly literature’s definitions of 
civil society. Civil society has become such a ubiquitous concept in world politics 
that every actor employs it in ways that fit their particular interest. In that sense, has 
civil society become a norm in the constructivist sense? If all actors unquestioningly 
adopt the civil society discourse and identity, can we consider civil society a world-
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cultural principle that has diffused and evolved into a global structure that shapes 
state and actor interests despite local conditions and task demands?  
The very malleability of the concept poses another question: If civil society has 
become a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of civic action, has the concept 
lost its analytical value? Should we abandon the concept altogether? Several scholars 
(Hardt 1995; Kumar 1993; Tester 1992) have indeed argued that the civil society 
concept should be discarded as it has become too amorphous to be useful. The 
empirical outcomes of this study indicate otherwise.  Civil society discourse and 
identity are in fact very useful for groups that face difficulties in finding political 
allies and claiming legitimacy for their causes in transnational politics. While the 
concept is beneficial in actual politics, its analytical value as a theoretical tool calls 




























Complete List of UNIW’s Member NGOs by Country of Origin 
 
  Name Country 
1 Humanitarian Assistance Society (HAS) Afghanistan 
2 The Muslim forum of Albania Albania 
3 Ardhmeria - Future Culture Association Albania 
4 ALSAR - Alternative of Future Foundation Albania 
5 Irshad and Islah Society Algeria 
6 Eurasian International Development Association Azerbaijan 
7 Al Eslah Society Bahrain 
8 The Islamic Association Bahrain 
9 Yardımeli Assocation Bangladesh 
10 Saudi Universities Alumni Association Bangladesh Bangladesh 
11 Social Agency for Welfare and Advancement in Bangladesh Bangladesh 
12 Bangladesh Ideal Teachers forum Bangladesh 
13 Bondhan Welfare Society (BWS) Bangladesh 
14 Islamic Council Feni Bangladesh 
15 Association of Muslim Welfare Agencies in Bangladesh (AMWAB) Bangladesh 
16 Bosniak Radio-Television International  
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
17 Nahla Centre for Education and Research 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
18 Islamic Relief Britain 
19 Al Muntada al Islami Trust Britain 
20 Soulaitine Association for Charitable Activities Burkina Faso 
21 Islamic Solidarity and Brotherhood Union Burkina Faso 
22 Cambodian Muslim Intellectual Alliance  (CMIA) Cambodia 
23 Dynamic Islamic Youth Association Cameron 
24 ICNA Relief  Canada 
25 Struggle Against Poverty and Development Association  (ADLM) Chad 
26 Arab Research Center Egypt 
27 Al-Awn Development and Relief Association Ethiopia 
28 European Muslim Union (EMU) Germany 
29 Wefa - International Humanitarian Relief Organization Germany 
30 Vereniging Islam Dialoog Educatie Emantipatie Holland 
31 Indonesian Humanitarian Commite Indonesia 
32 Lemboga Amil Zakat Infaq & Sadaqah Indonesia 
33 Indonesia Muslim Students Association -HMI Indonesia 
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34 Call and Reform Society Iran 
35 Association of Victims of American Occupation Prisons Iraq 
36 Iraqi Students and Youth Union Iraq 
37 Institute of Iraqi Scholars and Academician Iraq 
38 Islamic Kurdish League Iraq 
39 Qabes Strategic Studies Research Center Iraq 
40 The Angels of Rahman Association Iraq 
41 The Grand Council for Imams Ivory Coast 
42 Darul Arkam Foundation Kazakhstan 
43 Spike of Kindness Kosovo 
44 Association for Culture, Education and Learning Kosovo 
45 International Islamic Comittee for Human Rights Kuwait 
46 National Union of Kuwait Students (NUKS) Kuwait 
47 International Islamic Charitable Organization (IICO) Kuwait 
48 Awareness and Consolation Association Lebanon 
49 Tekaful for Child Welfare Lebanon 
50 Humanitarian Relief for Development Society (HRDS) Lebanon 
51 The Welfare Association for Palestinian&Lebanese Families Lebanon 
52 Al Amal for Development Social Care Association Lebanon 
53 Social Association Lebanon 
54 Israa Association for Social Development – IASD Lebanon 
55 Thabit Organization for the Right of Return Lebanon 
56 Human Charity For Relief And Development Lebanon 
57 Islamic Development and Solidarity Society Lebanon 
58 Cultural Humanitarian Organization Marhamat (CHOM) Macedonia 
59 Vizioni M Educational and Cultural Association Macedonia 
60 Ensar Cultural Humanitarian Organization Macedonia 
61 Global Peace Mission (GPM) Malaysia 
62 Takmir Education Foundation Malaysia 
63 National Union of Malaysian Muslim Students Malaysia 
64 Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia  Malaysia 
65 Society for The Enlightenment of The Ummah Malaysia Malaysia 
66 Future Global Network Foundation Malaysia 
67 The Community Development Foundation Malaysia 
68 Maldivian United Youth Association Maldives 
69 Mongolia Islamic Union Mongolia 
70 Center for Cross Cultural Understanding (Horizonti) Montenegro 
71 Ong Alkhayr for Development In Mauritania Mauritania 
72 Mehdi Ben Aboud Research, Development and Information Foundation Morocco 
73 Tawheed and Islah Movement Morocco 
74 Al Bisma Social Activities Organization Morocco 
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75 Relief and Humanitarian Society Morocco 
76 The Union of Hope for Moroccan Children Morocco 
77 Al Zahra for Woman Forum Morocco 
78 Islamic Culture Association Morocco 
79 Student Revival Association Morocco 
80 Al Hidn National Association Morocco 
81 Islamic Education Teachers Association Morocco 
82 Woman Awareness and Revival Association Morocco 
83 Shafsawin Islamic Dawah Organization Morocco 
84 Al Barra Social, Cultural, Development and Environment Association Morocco 
85 Wiam Arts and Sports Association Morocco 
86 Moroccan Scouts Association Morocco 
87 Khubaib Foundation Pakistan 
88 Help In Need Pakistan 
89 Khidmat Foundation  Pakistan 
90 Activists of Patients' Rights Association Palestine 
91 Al-Isra Relief and Development Fund Palestine 
92 The Islamic Society - Jabalia Palestine 
93 Center for Information and Guidance 
Republic of 
Seychelles 
94 Solidarnost Charity Fund  Russia 
95 World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) Saudi Arabia 
96 International Islamic Relief Organization (IIROSA) Saudi Arabia 
97 Humanitarian Organization For the Development of Social Welfare Senegal 
98 Dituria Cultural and Humanitarian Association Serbia 
99 International Islamic Youth League Sierra Leone 
100 Zamzam Foundation Somalia 
101 Maiin Foundation Somalia 
102 Care for Aid and Development Somalia 
103 Harqan Society for Education and Development  Somalia 
104 Muslim Judicial Council South Africa 
105 All Ceylon Young Men’s Muslim Association Conference Sri Lanka 
106 Serendib Foundation for Relief and Development Sri Lanka 
107 Association of Muslim Youth of Sailan Sri Lanka 
108 Invitation Islami Organization Sudan 
109 Maarij Foundation for Peace and Development Sudan 
110 Islamic Relief Agency (ISRA) Sudan 
111 Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies Sudan 
112 Arab Organization for Freedoms and Good Governance Switzerland 
113 Lawyers Union Syria 
114 Palestinian Solidarity Foundation Syria 
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115 The Foundation of Volunteer Organizations of Turkey Turkey 
116 Akabe Culture and Education Foundation Turkey 
117 Anatolian Lions Businessmen Association Turkey 
118 Anatolia Tawhid Foundation Turkey 
119 Research and Culture Foundation  Turkey 
120 Besiktas Reconstruction Adornment  and Solidarity Foundation Turkey 
121 The Union (Birlik) Foundation Turkey 
122 Diwan Research and Education Association Turkey 
123 Ansar Foundation Turkey 
124 Young Businessmen Foundation  Turkey 
125 Youth Marriage and Mahir Foundation Turkey 
126 Khayrat Foundation Turkey 
127 Hilaliye Education Foundation Turkey 
128 Lawyers Association Turkey 
129 Ikhlas Foundation Turkey 
130 Science and Felicity Foundation Turkey 
131 Science Spread Society Turkey 
132 Science Spread Foundation Turkey 
133 The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief Turkey 
134 Human Education, Culture and Solidarity Foundation Turkey 
135 The Foundation for Research in Islamic Sciences Turkey 
136 Business World Foundation Turkey 
137 Kardelen Education Culture and Environment Association Turkey 
138 Inter Cultural Research and Friend Foundation Turkey 
139 Ahmad Hulusi Effendi Culture, Education and Health Foundation Turkey 
140 Independent Businessmen's Association  Turkey 
141 Ottoman Researches Foundation Turkey 
142 Raif Cilasun Education and Culture Foundation Turkey 
143 Raihan Education Foundation Turkey 
144 Ribat Education Foundation Turkey 
145 Safa Education and Solidarity Foundation Turkey 
146 Health Employees Foundation Turkey 
147 The International Council of Awqaf and Non-Governmental Organizations Turkey 
148 Ankara Education and Culture Foundation Turkey 
149 Turkey Imam and Preacher School Foundation Turkey 
150 Avcılar Science,Culture and Service Foundation Turkey 
151 Entrepreneurial Businessmen and Business Ethic Association Turkey 
152 Elmaskalem Education and Culture Association Turkey 
153 Erdem Education Ethics and Solidarity Association Turkey 
154 Smiling Children and Youth Association Turkey 
155 Social Researches and Intercultural Solidarity Association  Turkey 
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156 Bogazici University Reunion Association Turkey 
157 Pusula Education and Research Association Turkey 
158 Doctors Union Foundation Turkey 
159 Ahiskalilar Foundation Turkey 
160 World Turkomen Education Foundation Turkey 
161 Bayrampasa Yesil Mosque Serving To Science Foundation Turkey 
162 Justice Defenders Association  Turkey 
163 Ihsan Education, Culture and Solidarity Foundation Turkey 
164 Gunisigi Education and Solidarity Association Turkey 
165 Veysel Karani Hirka-I Sherif Mosque Serving Foundation Turkey 
166 Food Safety Movement Turkey 
167 Reading Habit Education Culture and Solidarity Association Turkey 
168 Istanbul Dentists Friendship and Solidarity Association Turkey 
169 Umutlar Sonmesin Social Health Association of Cultural Solidarity Turkey 
170 Serving to Humanity Foundation Turkey 
171 Woman Sanitarians Solidarity Association Turkey 
172 World Ahlul Bayt Foundation Turkey 
173 Life Health and Social Services Foundation Turkey 
174 Palestinian Solidarity Association Turkey 
175 Caucasia Foundation Turkey 
176 Architects and Engineers Group  Turkey 
177 Association of Volunteer Educators in Turkey Turkey 
178 Human and Civilization Movement Association Turkey 
179 Solidarity Foundation Turkey 
180 The Eastern Turkistan Education and Solidarity Association Turkey 
181 Consumers Union Turkey 
182 The Food Auditing and Certification Research Association Turkey 
183 
Association for Protecting and Maintaining Ottoman Heritage in 
Adjacency of Quds Turkey 
184 Hikmah Education,Culture and Solidarity Foundation Turkey 
185 International Volunteers Society Turkey 
186 Continuing Education and Solidarity Foundation Turkey 
187 Helping Hand Association Turkey 
188 Darussalam Foundation Turkey 
189 
Trade Union of Municipality and Special Provincial 
Administration Employees Solidarity Turkey 
190 Khoja Ahmad Yasawi Science and Wisdom Foundation Turkey 
191 Gul Foundation Turkey 
192 Darul Hikmah Association for Science, Research and Culture  Turkey 
193 Bab-ı Alem International Student Association Turkey 
194 Deniz Feneri Association Turkey 
195 Din-Bir Sen Turkey 
 231 
196 Kashmiri American Council USA 
197 National Org for Defending Rights and Freedoms (HOOD) Yemen 








Meeting Location Date 
 
1st Council Meeting Istanbul/Turkey March 2006 
2nd Council Meeting Jakarta/Indonesia July 2006 
3rd Council Meeting Khartoum/Sudan December 2006 
4th Council Meeting Rotterdam/Netherlands June 2007 
5th Council Meeting Kuwait April 2008 
6th Council Meeting Casablanca/Morocco February 2009 
7th Council Meeting Istanbul/Turkey June 2009 
8th Council Meeting Pristina/Kosovo November 2009 
9th Council Meeting Kuala Lumpur/Malaysia May 2010 
10th Council Meeting Istanbul/Turkey October 2010 
11th Council Meeting Islamabad/Pakistan February 2011 
12th Council Meeting Bandung/Indonesia May 2011 
13th Council Meeting Istanbul/Turkey November 2011 
 
                                                




ISLAMIC RELIEF ORPHAN WELFARE PROJECTS137 
 
COUNTRY PROJECT TITLE YEARS ACTIVE 
 
Afghanistan Kabul Integrated Family Development Centre 2007 
Albania Orphans Sponsorship, Orphans Activities, Orphans Educational Programme, Orphans One to One Sponsorship,  1992-2007 
Azerbaijan Orphans Programme 1993 
Bangladesh 
Orphans Sponsorship, Integrated Orphans and Welfare and 
Livelihoods Programme, Community Based Orphans 
Development, Bangladesh One to One Sponsorship, Child 






Orphans Sponsorship, Summer School, Psychosocial Trauma 
Therapy for Orphans, One to One Sponsorship, Orphan 
families’ Shelter Program, Orphans Housing Loans 
1993 - 
2007 
Ethiopia Orphans Sponsorship, One to One Sponsorship 2005 - 2007 
India Orphans Sponsorship, One to One Sponsorship 2000 - 2007 
Indonesia Orphan Sponsorship, One to One Sponsorship, Construction of a residential centre 
2007 - 
2008 
Iraq Orphans One to One Sponsorship Programme. Orphans & Widow Livelihood Project 
2004 - 
2007 
Jordan One to One Sponsorship, Orphans Welfare programme 1997 - 2007 
Kenya One to One Sponsorship, Orphan Eidul Fitr Clothes distribution 2007 
Kosova 
Orphans Sponsorship, Orphans Housing Loans, Clothes 
Distribution, Eid Gifts, Food Packets for Orphans, Health care 
& Educational for Orphans families, Orphans School 
Stationary, Summer school, Vocational Training for Kosova 
Orphans, Widows Orphans Welfare WOW-Program    
2001 - 
2007 
Mali Orphans Sponsorship, Centre of hope, One to One Sponsorship 1997 - 2007 
Niger Child Welfare Programme, Orphans 1-2-1 2006 - 2007 




                                                
137 The list is built on the information from Islamic Relief Worldwide’s Orphans and Child Welfare 




Orphans Welfare Programme, Al-Basma Summer Camps, Eid 
Gift Project, Health Check up, School bags uniforms, Toys and 






One to One Sponsorship, Winterization Project 2005 - 2007 
Somalia One to One Sponsorship 2007 
South 
Africa Orphans Sponsorship and Welfare Programme, HIV/AIDS 
2004 - 
2006 
Sri Lanka Orphan Sponsorship 2006 
Sudan Mother and Child Health (MCH) 1994 








A. Overview Information 
1. NGO’s history 
2. NGO’s purpose of foundation 
3. NGO’s projects and activities  
4. NGO’s process of UNIW membership  
B. NGO’s UNIW membership 
1. What are the main issues that the NGO address? 
2. What is the organizational structure of the NGO? 
3. How does the NGO mobilize the required resources? 
4. What are the major problems that the NGO faces? 
5. How effective does the interviewee think the NGO is in executing its projects? 
6. Does the NGO contact with other organizations (inside or outside the country) 
for collaborative projects? 
7. If not, what should be done to improve such communication and cooperation? 
8. How long has the NGO been a member of the UNIW? Describe the 
membership process. 
9. Has the NGO been involved in any collective projects with other members of 
the UNIW? 
10. Does the NGO’s membership provide any advantages in terms of project 
execution or political advocacy? 
11. Has the NGO’s membership been useful in communication and collaborating 
with other NGOs (inside or outside the country)? 
12. Does the Muslim world need UNIW?  
13. Why should Muslim organizations and populations join forces? 
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